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Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, 
and Improper Inferences: A New Law on 
Sexual Offenses by Intimates 
by 
MICHELLE J. ANDERSON* 
Introduction 
At least since the seventeenth century, rape law has included a 
formal marital rape exemption.1  This exemption meant that men 
could not be charged with raping their wives and, if they were, 
marriage provided them with a complete defense.2  Beginning in the 
1970s, feminist reformers set their sights on this antiquated rape 
doctrine (as well as others that were similarly unfair to women) and 
worked to eliminate it from the law.  As a result, the marital rape 
exemption has been subjected to about three decades of scholarly 
criticism.3  Legal academics argued that the marital rape exemption 
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 1. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (Robert H. 
Small ed., 1st Am. ed. 1847) (1736). 
 2. Id.  See also Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (1857) (“[I]t would 
always be competent . . . to show, in defence of a charge of rape alleged to be actually 
committed by himself, that the woman on whom it was charged to have been committed 
was his wife.”). 
 3. See Rene Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. FAM. L. 559, 585 
(1990–91) (“State legislatures need to abolish the exemption altogether, without simply 
narrowing the definition of marriage while retaining immunity for rape within marriage, 
without treating marital rape as a lesser offense, and without imposing extraneous 
requirements for the prosecution of cases involving marital rape.”); Thomas R. Bearrows, 
Transition: Abolishing the Marital Exemption for Rape: A Statutory Proposal, 1983 U. ILL. 
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L. REV. 201 (“Despite lengthy debate and severe criticism, the [marital exemption for 
rape] persists today as an anachronistic reminder of society’s traditional view of women 
and marriage generally.”); Anne L. Buckborough, Family Law: Recent Developments in 
the Law of Marital I, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 345 (1990) (“According to the theory 
of implied consent, marital rape is impossible because all sexual contact within a 
continuing relationship is presumed to be consensual.  Thus, under statutes grounded in 
the theory of implied consent, nonconsensual sexual intercourse is not a crime in the 
context of an ongoing sexual relationship.”); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A 
Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1504 (2000) (“The modern 
defenders of the marital rape exemption . . . submerge and deny the harm that the rule 
causes women.”); The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 306, 313 (1977) 
(“Reasons for maintaining the husband’s immunity [from marital rape convictions are not] 
sufficient to justify the deprivation which the exemption imposes on wives.”); Charlotte L. 
Mitra, “. . . For She Has No Right or Power to Refuse Her Consent,” 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 
558 (“By thus exempting the husband from prosecution for rape on his wife, the law has 
granted him an immunity which is based solely on status.”); Comment, Rape and Battery 
Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719, 720 (1954) [hereinafter Comment, Rape 
and Battery] (“Clearly the criminal law gives protection to a spouse against the grossest 
forms of invasion of bodily integrity.”); Rebecca M. Ryan, The Sex Right: A Legal History 
of the Marital Rape Exemption, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, 941, 992 (1995) (“While certain 
states repealed the exemption entirely, other states merely compromised between old and 
new orthodoxies.”); Katherine M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses 
To and Rationales for Spousal Battering, Marital Rape & Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 
96 (1994) (“The contemporary treatment of marital rape and domestic 
violence . . . demonstrates an underlying commitment to female subordination and female 
difference.”); Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 69 (1990) (“The irrationality of marital rape 
exemptions is not their fundamental flaw. . . .  The evil is that they legalize, and hence 
legitimate, a form of violence that does inestimable damage to all women, not only to 
those who are raped.”); Emily R. Brown, Note, Changing the Marital Rape Exemption: I 
Am Chattel(?!); Hear Me Roar, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 657, 657 (1995) (“While 
legislatures and courts have been busy creating laws to handle [domestic violence, incest 
and child abuse], they have been slow in protecting women from perhaps the most 
damaging form of domestic violence: spousal rape.”) (footnotes omitted); Cassandra M. 
DeLaMothe, Note, Liberta Revisited: A Call to Repeal the Marital Exemption for all Sex 
Offenses in New York’s Penal Law, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857, 858 (1996) (“This Note 
argues that to fully protect victims of spousal sexual assault, the New York Legislature 
should codify the Liberta decision and repeal the marital exemption for all sex offenses.”); 
Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and 
Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 683  (1996) (“[N]ot all recent 
legislative reform aims to revoke the marital exemption’s ‘raping license.’  Several states 
have actually extended their exemptions to include non-married, cohabiting couples.”); 
Linda Jackson, Note, Marital Rape: A Higher Standard Is in Order, 1 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 183, 185 (1994) (concluding that “marital exemptions, unable to survive the 
necessary standards of strict scrutiny, are unconstitutional”); Judith A. Lincoln, Note, 
Abolishing the Marital Rape Exemption: The First Step in Protecting Married Women from 
Spousal Rape, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1219, 1224 (1989) (“Other marital rapes occur during a 
battering episode.  The husband engages in some nonconsensual sexual act as part of the 
abusive process.  While the husband can be prosecuted under wife battering statutes, he 
has also committed the crime of rape and should be prosecuted for that as well.”) 
(footnotes omitted); Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1986) [hereinafter To Have and To 
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was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.4  They called for the elimination of marital 
immunity, either by deleting provisions in sexual offense statutes that 
referred to the marital status of the parties5 or by inserting new 
provisions in those statutes that authorized the prosecution of spouses 
for rape.6 
 
Hold] (“[T]he marital rape exemption serves as both a manifestation of and a vehicle for 
the continued subordination of women in society.”); Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, Note, The 
Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 353 (1995) 
[hereinafter Siegel, Note] (“[T]rue equality between women and men can never exist until 
every state has completely abolished the marital rape exemption.”); Jaye Sitton, 
Comment, Old Wine in New Bottles: The “Marital” Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. REV. 261, 
264 (1993) (“[T]he Comment argues that complete abolition of all laws distinguishing 
among rape and sexual assault victims based on their relationship to their assailant is 
required in order for women to achieve equal protection under the law.”); Abigail 
Andrews Tierney, Comment, Spousal Sexual Assault: Pennsylvania’s Place on the Sliding 
Scale of Protection from Marital Rape, 90 DICK. L. REV. 777, 778 (1986) (“[T]his comment 
suggests complete abolition of spousal immunity and equal application of the rape and 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse laws of Pennsylvania to all persons, regardless of 
their marital statute, as a viable solution to cure the inadequacies of the current spousal 
sexual assault law.”) (footnotes omitted); Sallie Fry Waterman, Comment, For Better or 
Worse: Marital Rape, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 611, 611 (1988) (arguing that marital rape “needs 
to be confronted and given political priority until every state is willing to recognize marital 
rape as a criminal act”). 
 4. See, e.g., West, supra note 3, at 48 (“While virtually every progressive 
commentator, judge, or legislator . . . who seriously has considered the issue readily has 
concluded that [marital rape exemptions] violate equal protection, . . . no major upheaval 
of the law reflects or foreshadows such progressive unanimity.”) (footnotes omitted).  In 
1990, Professor Robin West proposed that Congress enact a Married Women’s Privacy 
Act to guarantee protection to every woman against violent sexual assaults.  Id. at 76.  The 
federal law would “prohibit irrational discrimination against married women in the 
making and enforcement of rape laws,” guarantee that “states would not perpetuate or 
insulate the sexualized social, private, or intimate subordination of women by men,” and 
guarantee that “no state would deny to women protection of the state against private 
criminality.”  Id.  West viewed Congress, rather than the judiciary, as the proper branch to 
declare marital rape exemptions unconstitutional.  Id. at 77.  “Unlike the Court, Congress 
does not recoil inevitably at the prospect of undertaking significant reconstructions of 
social life.  Indeed, this duty is clearly its business.”  Id.  See also Jackson, supra note 3, at 
207, 216 (arguing that, if strict scrutiny “is applied correctly and consistently, all marital 
rape exemptions necessarily would be found unconstitutional”). 
 5. See, e.g., Bearrows, supra note 3, at 222–26 (proposing rape statute that would be 
silent on relationship between perpetrator and victim and would grade offenses based on 
amount of violence used); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference 
Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1800 
(1992) (proposing that legislatures replace marital and other rape statutes with graded 
offenses based on the amount of force used); Sitton, supra note 3, at 264 (“[C]omplete 
abolition of all laws distinguishing among rape and sexual assault victims based on their 
relationship to their assailant is required in order for women to achieve equal protection 
under the law.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Eskow, supra note 3, at 705 (rape statute should first “set[] forth a 
definition of rape that neither affirmatively includes nor excludes spouses as potential 
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Many people believe that reformers won the battle against the 
marital rape exemption.7  This belief is, unfortunately, incorrect.  The 
good news is that twenty-four states and the District of Columbia 
have abolished marital immunity for sexual offenses.8  The bad news 
 
victims, while the second paragraph [would] clarif[y] that marriage is no defense to rape”).  
Although I prefer non-gender neutral terms because rape within marriage is 
overwhelmingly a crime that men commit on women, I use the term spouse because the 
statutes are gender neutral.  See DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 9 (exp. and 
rev. ed. 1990) (“The term ‘wife rape’ is preferred over ‘marital rape’ or ‘spousal rape’ 
because it is not gender neutral.  The term ‘spousal rape’ in particular seems to convey the 
notion that rape is something that wives do to husbands, if not as readily as husbands do it 
to wives, at least sufficiently often that a gender neutral term should be used.”). 
 7. A number of scholars have even declared victory over the marital rape immunity.  
One scholar entitled her piece, “The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction,” 
and another entitled her article, “Accomplishing the Impossible: An Advocate’s Notes 
From the Successful Campaign to Make Marital and Date Rape a Crime in All 50 U.S. 
States and Other Countries.”  Siegel, Note, supra note 3, at 351; Laura X, Accomplishing 
the Impossible: An Advocate’s Notes from the Successful Campaign to Make Marital and 
Date Rape a Crime in All 50 U.S. States and Other Countries, in 5 VIOL. AG. WOMEN 1064 
(1999). 
 8. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (Michie 1987–2001) (silent on rape, Class Y felony); 
§ 5-14-124 (silent on sexual assault in first degree, Class A felony); § 5-14-125 (silent on 
sexual assault in second degree, Class B felony); § 5-14-126 (silent on sexual assault in 
third degree, Class C felony); § 5-14-127 (silent on sexual assault in fourth degree, Class A 
misdemeanor); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-409 (West 2002) (“Any marital 
relationship, whether established statutorily, putatively, or by common law, between an 
actor and a victim shall not be a defense to any offense under this part 4 unless such 
defense is specifically set forth in the applicable statutory section by having the elements 
of the offense specifically exclude a spouse;” spouses exempt only from statutory rape); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (1975–2001) (silent on sexual harassment, unclassified 
misdemeanor); § 767 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in third degree, Class A 
misdemeanor); § 768 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in second degree, Class G felony); 
§ 769 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in first degree; Class F felony); § 770 (silent on 
rape in fourth degree; Class C felony); § 771 (silent on rape in third degree, Class B 
felony); § 772 (silent on rape in second degree, Class B felony); § 773 (silent on rape in 
first degree, Class A felony); § 776 (silent on sexual extortion, Class E felony); D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 22-3019 (2002) (“No actor is immune from prosecution under any section of this 
subchapter because of marriage or cohabitation with the victim; provided, however, that 
marriage of the parties may be asserted as an affirmative defense in a prosecution under 
this subchapter where it is expressly so provided.”); § 22-3024 (“Laws attaching a privilege 
against disclosure of communications between a husband and wife are inapplicable in 
prosecutions under subchapter II of this chapter where the defendant is or was married to 
the victim or where the victim is a child.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2002) 
amended by 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2002-211 (H.B. 1399) (West) (silent on sexual 
battery); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(2) (Harrison 1982–2001) (“The fact that the person 
allegedly raped is the wife of the defendant shall not be a defense to a charge of rape.”); 
§ 16-6-2 (“The fact that the person allegedly sodomized is the spouse of a defendant shall 
not be a defense to a charge of aggravated sodomy.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (West 
2002) (silent on rape, Class A or B felony); § 35-42-4-2 (silent on criminal deviate conduct, 
Class A or B felony); § 35-42-4-8 (silent on sexual battery, Class C or D felony); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (West 2002) updated 2002 Kentucky Laws Ch. 259 (S.B. 25) (silent 
on rape in first degree); § 510.040 (silent on rape in second degree); § 510.060 (silent on 
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rape in third degree); § 510.070 (silent on sodomy in first degree); § 510.080 (silent on 
sodomy in second degree); § 510.090 (silent on sodomy in third degree); § 510.100 (silent 
on sodomy in fourth degree); § 510.110 (silent on sexual abuse in first degree); § 510.120 
(silent on sexual abuse in second degree); § 510.130 (silent on sexual abuse in third 
degree); § 510.140 (silent on sexual misconduct); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253 
(West 2002) (silent on gross sexual assault, Class A, B or C crime); § 255 (silent on 
unlawful sexual contact); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 265, § 22 (West 2002) (silent on rape); 
§ 34 (silent on crime against nature); § 35 (silent on unnatural and lascivious acts); § 3 
(silent on drugging persons for sexual intercourse); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.030 (2002) 
(silent on rape); § 566.040 (silent on sexual assault); § 566.060 (silent on forcible sodomy); 
§ 566.070 (silent on deviate sexual assault); § 566.090 (silent on sexual misconduct in first 
degree); § 566.100 (silent on sexual abuse); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (2001) (silent 
on sexual assault); § 45-5-503 (silent on sexual intercourse without consent); § 45-5-505 
(silent on deviate sexual conduct); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (2001) (silent on sexual 
assault in first degree, Class II felony); § 28-320 (silent on sexual assault in second or third 
degree, Class III felony and Class I misdemeanor); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 
(2002) (“An actor commits a crime under this chapter [sexual offenses] even though the 
victim is the actor’s legal spouse.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 2002) (“No actor 
shall be presumed to be incapable of committing a crime under this chapter because of age 
or impotency or marriage to the victim.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Michie 1978–2001) 
(silent on criminal sexual penetration); § 30-9-12 (silent on criminal sexual contact); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (2002) (“A person may be prosecuted under this Article whether or 
not the victim is the person’s legal spouse at the time of the commission of the alleged 
rape or sexual offense.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (1999–2001) (silent on gross 
sexual imposition, Class A or B felony); § 12.1-20-04 (silent on sexual imposition, Class B 
felony); § 12.1-20-07 (silent on sexual assault, Class C felony or Class A misdemeanor); 
§ 12.1-20-12 (silent on deviate sexual act, Class A misdemeanor); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 163.355 (2001) (silent on rape in the third degree, Class C felony); § 163.365 (2001) 
(silent on rape in second degree, Class B felony); § 163.375 (silent on rape in first degree, 
Class A felony); § 163.385 (silent on sodomy in third degree, Class C felony); § 163.395 
(silent on sodomy in second degree, Class B felony); § 163.405 (silent on sodomy in first 
degree, Class A felony); § 163.408 (silent on unlawful sexual penetration in second degree, 
Class B felony); § 163.411 (silent on unlawful sexual penetration in first degree, Class A 
felony); § 163.415 (silent on sexual abuse in third degree, Class A misdemeanor); § 163.425 
(silent on sexual abuse in second degree, Class C felony); § 163.427 (silent on sexual abuse 
in first degree, Class B felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (West 2002) (silent on 
rape); § 3123 (silent on involuntary deviate sexual intercourse); § 3124.1 (silent on sexual 
assault); § 3125 (silent on aggravated indecent assault); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§§ 22.011, 22.021 (Vernon 2002) (silent on sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(2) (1953–2001) (“This section [rape] applies whether or not 
the actor is married to the victim.”), § 76-5-405 (aggravated sexual assault; includes 
definition of rape in statute which applies “whether or not the actor is married to the 
victim”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2001) (silent on sexual assault), § 3253 (silent on 
aggravated sexual assault); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-3 (1966–2002) (silent on sexual assault 
in first degree, felony); § 61-8B-4 (silent on sexual assault in second degree, felony); § 61-
8B-5 (silent on sexual assault in third degree, felony); § 61-8B-7 (silent on sexual abuse in 
first degree, felony); § 61-8B-8 (silent on sexual abuse in second degree, misdemeanor); 
§ 61-8B-9 (silent on sexual abuse in third degree, misdemeanor); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 940.225(6) (West 2002) (“A defendant shall not be presumed to be incapable of violating 
this section because of marriage to the complainant.”). 
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is that twenty-six states retain marital immunity in one form or 
another.9  Although in some of these twenty-six states marital 
 
 9. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.425 (Michie 2001) (marriage is a defense to sexual assault 
in third degree, Class C felony); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D) (West 2002) (it is a 
defense to sexual abuse that person was spouse of other person at time of commission of 
act; sexual abuse is Class 5 felony); CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(b) (West 2002) (rape of 
spouse must be reported within one year after date of violation; reporting requirement 
shall not apply if victim’s allegation of offense is corroborated by independent evidence); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70a (West 2002) (marital immunity for aggravated sexual 
assault in the first degree, Class B felony); § 53a-71 (marital immunity for sexual assault in 
second degree); § 53a-72a (marital immunity for sexual assault in third degree); § 53a-72b 
(marital immunity for sexual assault in third degree with firearm); § 53a-73a (marital 
immunity for sexual assault in fourth degree); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-732 (2001) note in 
2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (spouses and cohabitants are exempt 
from sexual assault in third degree, Class C felony, if actor submits other person to sexual 
contact through strong compulsion or other person is mentally defective); § 707-733 (2001) 
note in H.B. 2560 (spouses and cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault in fourth 
degree, a misdemeanor, if actor submits other person to sexual contact by compulsion); 
IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (“No person shall be convicted of rape for 
any act or acts with that person’s spouse, except under the circumstances cited in 
paragraphs 3 [force] and 4 [threats of harm or use of intoxicating substance] of section 18-
6101.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-18(c) (West 2002) (prosecution of a spouse is 
barred for criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-13), aggravated criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-
14), criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-15), and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-17), if 
not reported to law enforcement within 30 days after offense was committed); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 709.4 West 2002 (marital immunity for mentally incapacitated and 
physically helpless sexual assault); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2517 (2001) (marriage is defense 
to sexual battery, Class A person misdemeanor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West 2002) 
(marital immunity for  simple rape); § 43.1 (spouses exempt from sexual battery); MD. 
CRIM. LAW § 3-316 (West 2002) (spouses can only be prosecuted for rape in first degree, 
rape in second degree, or sexual offense in third degree if force is used or couple is living 
separately); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be 
prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in first through fourth degrees based solely on his 
or her spouse being under age 16, mentally incapable or mentally incapacitated); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 
2433) (West) (spouse does not commit criminal sexual conduct in third or fourth degree if 
actor knows or has reason to know that complainant is mentally impaired, mentally 
incapacitated, or physically helpless); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2002) (legal spouse of 
alleged victim may be found guilty of sexual battery if legal spouse engaged in forcible 
sexual penetration without consent of alleged victim); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002) 
(marriage is no defense to charge of sexual assault if assault was committed by force or by 
threat of force); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.0 (West 2002) (spouses exempt from 
sexual battery, third degree felony); § 2907.05 (spouses exempt from gross sexual 
imposition, third or fourth degree felony); § 2907.06 (spouses exempt from sexual 
imposition, first degree misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) 
amended by 2002 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 22 (H.B. 2924) (West) (rape of spouse must be 
accompanied by actual or threatened force or violence, along with apparent power of 
execution against victim or third person); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–2001) 
(spouses exempt from first degree sexual assault if victim is mentally incapacitated, 
mentally disabled, or physically helpless); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 
2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in third degree); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 (Michie 1968–2002) (spouses exempt from sexual contact 
ANDERSON13 8/25/2003  3:07 PM 
July 2003] A NEW LAW ON SEXUAL OFFENSES BY INTIMATES 1469 
immunity for the specific crime of forcible rape is dead, immunity for 
other sexual offenses thrives.10  For example, twenty states grant 
marital immunity for sex with a wife who is incapacitated or 
unconscious and cannot consent.11  Fifteen states grant marital 
 
without consent with person who is capable of consenting, Class 1 misdemeanor); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (West 2002) (spousal sexual battery requires defendant to be 
armed with weapon, inflict serious bodily injury, or parties must be living separately and 
filed for divorce); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B), § 18.2-67.1(B), § 18.2-67.2(B) (West 
2002) (no person shall be found guilty of rape, forcible sodomy, or object sexual 
penetration unless, at time of alleged offense, spouses were living separate or defendant 
caused bodily injury to spouse by use of force or violence); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.44.060 (West 2002) (spouses exempt from rape in third degree, Class C felony); 
§ 9A.44.100(1)(c) (West 2002) (marital immunity for indecent liberties, Class A or B 
felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-304 (Michie 1977–2001) (marriage is defense to third 
degree sexual assault if no injury has occurred); § 6-2-313 (marriage is defense to sexual 
battery). 
Additionally, the statutes of New York and Alabama still contain provisions allowing 
for marital immunity from most sexual offenses with the exception of rape.  The New 
York Court of Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court have arguably abolished the 
marital immunities in these codes, yet the statutes have remained static for almost twenty 
years.  See People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984) (abolishing marital immunity in 
New York) and Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1986) (abolishing marital immunity 
in Alabama). 
 10. See infra notes 68, 75 and accompanying text. 
 11. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.420(a)(3) (Michie 2001) (marriage is defense to second 
degree sexual assault if the victim is incapacitated or unaware the sexual act is being 
committed); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407 (West 2002) (implied marital immunity 
when victim is mentally incapacitated because statute requires force for spousal conviction 
of sexual assault); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67(a)(3) (West 2002) (spouses or 
cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault in fourth degree, which occurs when person 
intentionally subjects another to sexual contact who is mentally defective, mentally 
incapacitated or physically helpless); § 53a-71 (spouses and cohabitants are immune from 
sexual assault in the second degree when the victim is physically helpless); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 707-732(d) (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) 
(spouses and cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault in third degree, Class C felony, if 
victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); IDAHO CODE 
§ 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (husband cannot be prosecuted for rape if wife is incapable 
of giving consent or unconscious at time of act); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 2002) 
(marriage is defense to sexual abuse in third degree if victim is suffering from mental 
defect or incapacity which precludes giving consent; Class C felony); LA.REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43 (West 2002) (express exemption from simple rape which includes situation where 
victim is incapable of resisting due to an intoxicating substance); MD. CRIM. LAW. § 3-318 
(West 2002) (express exemption from rape in second degree and sexual offense in third 
degree when victim is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in 
first through fourth degrees based solely on his or her spouse being under age 16, mentally 
incapable or mentally incapacitated); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended 
by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (spouse does not commit 
criminal sexual conduct in third or fourth degree if actor knows or has reason to know that 
complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2002) (implied marital immunity when victim is mentally 
incapacitated or physically helpless, as spouses are immune from prosecution for sexual 
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immunity for sexual offenses unless requirements such as prompt 
complaint, extra force, separation, or divorce are met.12  The law in 
 
battery unless husband uses force); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002) (implied marital 
immunity when victim is mentally or physically incapable as spouses are immune unless 
husband uses force); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2002) amended by 2002 
Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (spousal immunity if victim is mentally 
or physically incapable of consent); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) (marital 
immunity for  rape where the victim is incapable of consent through mental illness, 
unsoundness of mind, intoxicated or unconscious); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–
2001) (spouses exempt from first degree sexual assault if victim is mentally incapacitated, 
mentally disabled, or physically helpless); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (LAW. CO-OP. 
2002) (implied marital immunity when the actor causes the victim to become mentally 
incapacitated or physically helpless by administering a controlled substance); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.2 (Michie 1968–2002) (spouses exempt from sexual contact 
when person is incapable of consenting, Class 4 felony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 
(West 2002) (implied marital immunity when victim is mentally incapacitated or physically 
helpless because spouses are generally exempt from prosecution unless weapon is used or 
there is bodily injury); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(ii) (West 2002) (marital immunity 
when the victim suffers from a mental incapacity or physical helplessness); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9A.44.100(1)(b) (West 2002) (marital immunity for indecent liberties when 
the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally defective, mentally 
incapacitated, or physically helpless, Class A or B felony). 
 12. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (it is defense to sexual assault when 
victim is mentally incapable of consenting that offender is married to person and neither 
party has filed with the court for separation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(A) 
(West 2002) (“A person commits sexual assault of a spouse by intentionally or knowingly 
engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with a spouse without consent of the 
spouse by the immediate or threatened use of force against the spouse or another.”); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 262 (West 2002) (rape of spouse must be reported within one year after 
date of violation; reporting requirement shall not apply if victim’s allegation of offense is 
corroborated by independent evidence); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70b (West 2002) 
(spouses or cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault unless offender uses force or the 
threat of force); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (husband can only be 
prosecuted for rape where wife “resists but her resistance is overcome by force or 
violence” or “[w]here she is prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and great 
bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution; or by any intoxicating, 
narcotic, or anesthetic substance administered by or with the privity of the accused”); 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-18(c) (West 2002) (prosecution of a spouse is barred for 
criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-13), aggravated criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-14), criminal 
sexual abuse (§ 5/12-15), and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-17), if not reported 
to law enforcement within 30 days after offense was committed); MD. CRIM. LAW § 3-316 
(West 2002) (spouse may not be prosecuted under § 3-303 [rape in first degree], § 3-304 
[rape in second degree], § 3-307 [sexual offense in third degree] or § 3-308 [sexual offense 
in fourth degree] unless person committing crime uses force and act is without consent of 
spouse, or couple has lived apart under written separation agreement or for at least three 
months before alleged rape or sexual offense.  A person may be prosecuted under these 
statutes if there was decree of limited divorce at time of offense); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.F. 2433) (West) 
(person does not commit criminal sexual conduct under § 609.342(a) and (b) [criminal 
sexual conduct in first degree], § 609.343(a) and (b) [criminal sexual conduct in second 
degree], § 609.344(a), (b), (d), and (e) [criminal sexual conduct in third degree], and 
§ 609.345(a), (b), (d), (e) [criminal sexual conduct in fourth degree], if actor and 
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more than half the states today makes it harder to convict men of 
sexual offenses committed against their wives.  In so doing, the law in 
these jurisdictions degrades married women and affords men who 
sexually assault their wives an unwarranted status preference.13 
In this Article, I assess the law on marital immunity in state 
sexual offense statutes today and advocate much needed reform.  
Structurally and doctrinally, I make two arguments.  First: It is past 
time for all states to eliminate marital immunity that continues to 
contaminate their sexual offense statutes.14  Because discrimination 
 
complainant were adults cohabiting in ongoing voluntary sexual relationship at time of 
alleged offense, or if complainant is actor’s legal spouse, unless couple is living apart and 
one of them has filed for legal separation or dissolution of marriage); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-3-99 (2002) (person is not guilty of sexual battery if alleged victim is that person’s 
legal souse and at time of alleged offense such person and alleged victim are not separated 
and living apart unless force is used); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002) (marriage is no 
defense to charge of sexual assault if assault was committed by force or by threat of force); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. 
File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (spouse cannot be charged with rape unless couple is living 
separate or force is used); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) amended by 2002 
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 22 (H.B. 2924) (West) (rape of spouse must be accompanied by 
actual or threatened force or violence, along with apparent power of execution against 
victim or third person); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (crime of 
spousal sexual battery must be reported within thirty days, § 16-3-658 (person cannot be 
guilty of criminal sexual conduct in first or second degree if victim is the legal spouse 
unless couple is living apart); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 (West 2002) (spousal rape 
requires the defendant to be armed with a weapon, cause serious bodily injury, or living 
apart and one has filed for separate maintenance or divorce); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
61(B), § 18.2-67.1(B), § 18.2-67.2(B) (West 2002) (no person shall be found guilty of rape, 
forcible sodomy, or object sexual penetration unless, at time of alleged offense, spouses 
were living separate and apart.) 
 13. Cf. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 870 (2001) (“In light of the 
widespread social and legal reluctance to effectively address rape among familiars, the 
marital rape exclusion can be seen as only the most formal expression of a tendency that 
extends across the design and deep into the administration of the law to make closeness a 
proxy for consent.”).  West, supra note 3, at 78 (“The marital exemption, in brief, is simply 
the most brutal of all possible expressions of the social inclination to trivialize women’s 
interest in physical and sexual security.”). 
 14. Contrary to popular belief, wife rape is actually more common than stranger rape.  
See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 64 (“‘[W]e believe that a woman is most likely to be 
physically forced into having sexual intercourse by her husband.’ Hunt was less tentative.  
‘Incredible as it may seem, more women are raped by their husbands each year than by 
strangers, acquaintances or other persons.’”).  Fourteen percent of the married women in 
one study had been raped by their husbands.  RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 57 (“Eighty-seven 
women in our sample of 930 women eighteen years and older were the victims of at least 
one completed or attempted rape by their husbands or ex-husbands.  This constitutes 14 
percent of the 644 women who had ever been married (286 of the 930 women had never 
been married).  This means that approximately one in every seven women who has ever 
been married in our San Francisco sample was willing to disclose an experience of sexual 
assault by their husbands that met our quite conservative definition of rape.”) (emphasis in 
original).  Finkelhor and Yllo found: 
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against married women who are sexually assaulted by their husbands 
is indefensible, state law should provide no favorable treatment to 
men who sexually assault their wives.  Formal neutrality in rape law 
on the marital status of the complainant and the defendant—
affording no preference to married men who rape their wives—is the 
bare minimum a state must have to claim fairness to women. 
Second: Formal neutrality is not enough.  Formal neutrality fails 
to solve a deeper and more intractable problem spawned by the 
marital rape exemption.  The exemption did more than just protect 
men from being prosecuted for raping their wives.  It presaged the 
devastating impact that a prior sexual relationship between a 
defendant and a complainant has on a claim of rape today.15  
Substantial bias against sexually active women who are raped by their 
intimates takes the form of a common but improper inference of 
consent to the sex alleged to have been rape based solely on the 
existence of a prior intimate relationship between the parties.16  The 
improper inference of ongoing consent in sexual relationships is a 
doctrinal problem that affects all intimate rape, regardless of the 
marital status of the parties. 
The Department of Justice estimates that sixty-two percent of 
adult rapes are committed by intimates—spouses, ex-spouses, 
boyfriends, or ex-boyfriends.17  If the criminal law is to redress these 
 
Rape by a stranger is the variety that is most likely to be reported to police, yet 
10 percent of the women in our study had been sexually assaulted by their 
husbands, whereas only 3 percent had been similarly assaulted by a stranger.  In 
addition, rape by a date was reported by 10 percent of the women.  Clearly, 
sexual assaults by intimates, including husbands, are by far the most common 
type of rape.  Thus rape by husbands appears to be one of the forms of sexual 
coercion that a woman is most likely to experience in her lifetime. 
DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 6–7 
(1985) (“Our survey showed disturbingly high rates of sexual assault by husbands.  Ten 
percent of the married or previously married women in our sample said that their husbands 
had ‘used physical force or threat to try to have sex with them.’  We do not know whether 
all these assaults meet the precise legal definition of rape or attempted rape.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
 15. See infra notes 235–51 and accompanying text. 
 16. The bias against rape victims may be called “the culture of acceptance” of date 
rape or “a special permissiveness regarding male sexual aggression against female social 
acquaintances.”  Steven I. Friedland, Date Rape and the Culture of Acceptance, 43 FLA. L. 
REV. 487, 489 (1991).  The stereotypes the culture of acceptance includes are the 
“aggressive male” (one who actively pursues sexual relations) and the “punished” female 
(one who “asks for” sex because of how she is dressed or how she communicates 
nonverbally to males).  Id.  Friedland declared, “an active attempt must be made, at all 
stages of a trial, to neutralize the latent gender-based prejudice caused by the culture of 
acceptance.”  Id. at 491. 
 17. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 
RESEARCH REPORT:  FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:  FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL 
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rapes, then it must attack the notion—handed down through 
generations by the marital rape exemption—that husbands, ex-
husbands, boyfriends, and ex-boyfriends have been granted ongoing 
consent to sexual intercourse simply because of their prior sexual 
relationships with their victims. 
I propose that states adopt a new law on sexual offenses by 
intimates to correct the improper inference of ongoing consent.  This 
new law would cover sexual conduct between the defendant and the 
complainant in marriage, cohabitation, dating, or other 
circumstances.  It would declare that the complainant’s consent on 
the instance in question may not be inferred based solely on her 
consent to the same or different acts with the defendant on other 
occasions. 
Part I of this Article traces the development of the marital rape 
exemption in this country.  It begins with the history of the doctrine 
under English common law, analyzing the three traditional 
justifications for the marital rape exemption.  It argues that the most 
enduring justification has been the notion that the marriage contract 
grants women’s ongoing consent to sexual activity with their 
husbands.  It then describes the immunities based on marital status 
that continue in sexual offense statutes in the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia.  It analyzes the modern justification for these 
current marital immunities, including the position, advanced by the 
Model Penal Code and a number of scholars, that men who have 
sexual relationships with women may presume consent to future 
sexual intercourse with them.  It argues that these modern 
justifications derive from the traditional notion of ongoing consent. 
Part II argues, at a minimum, that the feminist reform agenda 
begun in the 1970s must be completed.  It argues for formal neutrality 
in rape law on the marital status of the parties so that the law 
provides no preferential treatment to men who rape their wives.  It 
refutes the ongoing consent ideology by analyzing the commonly held 
belief that undergirds it: that wife rape is less harmful to victims than 
stranger rape.  After reviewing studies on the matter, it concludes 
that, contrary to popular belief, wife rape tends to be more violent 
and psychologically damaging than stranger rape.  Abolishing the 
status preference that men enjoy when they rape their wives is crucial 
to redressing the harms caused by wife rape. 
Part III turns to the development of the broader law on sexual 
offenses by intimates in this country.  It begins by revisiting the 
history of the marital rape exemption.  The marital rape exemption 
 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 44 (2000).  An additional 28% of rapes are 
committed by acquaintances and relatives who have not been previously intimate with 
their victims.  Id. 
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began at a time when licit sex was confined to marriage and extra-
marital sex was proscribed by laws against fornication and adultery.  
As society de-criminalized non-marital sexual relations in the late 
twentieth century, statutory marital immunities began to include 
cohabitants and voluntary social companions within their purview.  
Around the same time, legislatures began to implement rape shield 
laws.  Despite their general prohibition on the admission of evidence 
of a complainant’s prior sexual history, these laws universally 
admitted evidence of her prior sexual history with the defendant, 
regardless of the marital status of the parties.  This Part argues that 
these two legal changes—the inclusion of cohabitants and voluntary 
social companions within the purview of marital immunities and the 
admission of evidence of the sexual history between the complainant 
and the defendant—were both modern manifestations of the ongoing 
consent ideology. 
In light of the development of the law on sexual offenses by 
intimates, Part IV revisits the issue of formal neutrality on marital 
status in sexual offense statutes.  It analyzes reform proposals that 
states simply abolish marital immunity in their sexual offense statutes 
or that states add specific provisions indicating that men may be 
prosecuted for raping their wives.  After reviewing cases from 
jurisdictions in which the statutes are either silent or contain specific 
provisions indicating that men may be prosecuted for raping their 
wives, it argues that both proposals are inadequate because they fail 
to address the ongoing consent ideology based on intimate 
relationships that remains embedded in rape law.  Thus, not only is 
the feminist reform agenda for formal neutrality begun in the 1970s 
unfinished, it is also inadequate. 
Part V proposes a new law on sexual offenses by married and 
unmarried intimates that addresses the improper inference of ongoing 
consent based on intimate relationships.  After reviewing and 
rejecting alternative proposals, it argues that states should abandon 
statutory provisions that deal exclusively with marital status.  Instead, 
they should adopt a provision declaring that a prior sexual 
relationship between the parties, whether in marriage, cohabitation, 
dating, or another context, does not provide the defendant with a 
defense to the charged sexual offense.  This new provision would also 
declare that consent may not be inferred when based solely on the 
complainant’s prior consent to the same or another sexual act with 
the defendant.  In contrast to the ongoing consent ideology, this Part 
offers a normative vision of consent that is temporally constrained 
and act-specific.  It is this more egalitarian normative vision of 
consent that underlies the new law on sexual offenses by intimates.  
Finally, Part V applies this new law to the cases previously discussed 
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and concludes that such an application would effect a just 
improvement over the status quo. 
The Appendix of State Sexual Offense Statutes with Marital 
Immunity details the current statutes in the 26 states that contain 
some form of marital immunity. 
I.  Development of the Marital Rape Exemption 
This Part discusses the legal development of the marital rape 
exemption.  It begins by analyzing the history of the marital rape 
exemption under English common law, arguing that the most 
enduring traditional justification for the doctrine has been the 
ongoing consent ideology advanced by Sir Matthew Hale in the 
seventeenth century.  It then turns to the current marital immunities 
that continue to exist in state statutes, despite the efforts at feminist 
reform begun in the 1970s.  These current immunities fall into three 
categories: exemptions for certain sexual offenses, separate spousal 
sexual offense statutes, and extra requirements for spousal sexual 
offenses.  As a final measure of analysis, this Part turns to the modern 
justifications that the drafters of the Model Penal Code and others 
have advanced for both the ancient and modern versions of marital 
immunity for sexual offenses.  It argues that these modern 
justifications ultimately depend upon Hale’s ongoing consent 
ideology. 
A. History of the Marital Rape Exemption 
The traditional definition of rape under English common law was 
unlawful sexual intercourse with a female without her consent.18  In 
his leading treatise on criminal law, Rollin Perkins explained that the 
marital rape exemption was built into the definition of the crime 
through the word unlawful.19  Any sexual intercourse, even forced, 
between a husband and his wife was lawful, and thus excluded under 
the definition of rape.20  Perkins wrote, “the true reason why the 
husband, who has sexual intercourse with his wife against her will, is 
not guilty of rape is that such intercourse is not unlawful. . . .  Sexual 
intercourse between husband and wife is sanctioned by law; all other 
sexual intercourse is unlawful.”21  Three major justifications existed 
for the designation of all sexual intercourse between husband and 
 
 18. ROLLIN PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 110 (1982). 
 19. Id. at 115. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  I will return to Perkins’ designation of “all other sexual intercourse” as 
“unlawful.”  See infra Part III.A. 
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wife as lawful under English common law: the property theory, the 
unity theory, and the ongoing consent theory.22 
Under the property theory, women were considered to be the 
property of men.  Rape was a transgression against the man who 
owned the woman as his property, not against the woman herself.23  
The rape of an unmarried woman transgressed against her father and 
the rape of a married woman transgressed against her husband.24  The 
rape of a married woman by her husband himself was not a 
transgression at all because a man was allowed to treat his chattel as 
he deemed appropriate.25  Because the rape of a married woman was 
a violation of her husband’s property, “prosecuting a husband for 
raping his wife made no more sense than indicting him for stealing his 
own property.”26 
The second justification in English common law for the marital 
rape exemption was the unity theory, a derivative of the feudal 
doctrine of coverture, in which a woman’s independent legal identity 
was abolished at marriage, becoming subsumed within her husband’s 
identity.27  Sir William Blackstone explained the unity theory in his 
treatise on English common law: “By marriage, the husband and wife 
are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the 
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated 
 
 22. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 43–44 (N.J. 1981). 
 23. Schelong, supra note 3, at 87.  See also RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 3 (“The idea that 
females are the property of males is the key to understanding the history of extramarital 
rape and the laws pertaining to it.”); Michael Freeman, But If You Can’t Rape Your Wife 
Who[m] Can You Rape?: The Marital Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAM. L. Q. 1, 8 
(1981).  This idea of women as property existed in Biblical and Roman law.  In Biblical 
law, rape was a crime committed against a husband’s or a father’s property interest, not 
against the woman.  Schelong, supra note 3, at 85.  See also Deuteronomy 22:28–29 (King 
James) (“‘If a man finds a damsel that is a virgin, which is not betrothed, and lay hold on 
her and lie with her,’ he had to marry her ‘because he hath humbled her,’ and he had to 
pay her father fifty shekels of silver, which was the bride price.  The bride price 
compensated the father for the loss of his daughter’s virginity.”).  See Michelle J. 
Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New 
Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2002).  The first law of marriage from 
Romulus of Rome in Eighth Century B.C. stated that “obliged married women” had “no 
other refuge [but] to conform themselves entirely to the temper of their husbands and the 
husbands to rule their wives as necessary and inseparable possessions.”  RAQUEL 
KENNEDY BERGEN, WIFE RAPE: UNDERSTANDING THE RESPONSE OF SURVIVORS AND 
SERVICE PROVIDERS 8 (1996) [hereinafter BERGEN, WIFE RAPE]. 
 24. Schelong, supra note 3, at 87.  See also BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 3 
(“Rape laws were originally enacted as property laws, to protect a man’s property (a 
daughter or a wife) from other men, not as laws to protect women or their rights to control 
their bodies.”). 
 25. Sitton, supra note 3, at 265. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Schelong, supra note 3, at 86. 
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and consolidated” into her husband’s legal existence.28  Under the 
unity theory, a husband was legally responsible for his wife’s conduct 
and was able to physically punish her if she resisted his authority.29  
Blackstone explained that a man could: 
give his wife moderate correction, for, as he is to answer for her 
misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this 
power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same 
moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or 
children.30 
Once man and woman had been unified by marriage, a wife 
could not “enter into a contract, sue or be sued, own personal 
property, make a will, or deny her husband’s sexual advances.”31  
Since the husband and wife were considered one legal being, “a man 
could no more be charged with raping his wife than be charged with 
raping himself.”32 
Although powerful in their day, the justifications for the marital 
rape exemption provided by the property and unity theories did not 
ultimately have the legal staying power that the ongoing consent 
theory garnered.  In the late 1600s, the Chief Justice in England, Lord 
Matthew Hale, articulated what would become the most popular 
justification in modern jurisprudence for the marital rape 
exemption.33  Hale understood marriage as granting a wife’s ongoing 
consent to sexual intercourse.34  He wrote, “the husband cannot be 
guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by 
 
 28. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.  See also Reva B. Siegel, “The 
Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2122 (1996). 
 29. Siegel, supra note 23, at 2123.  See also Schelong, supra note 3, at 86.  In essence, 
the right of chastisement allowed a husband to beat his wife. 
 30. BLACKSTONE, supra 28 note at *444.  See also Siegel, supra note 28, at 2123.  
Blackstone’s analysis “served as a guide . . . to the legal implications of marriage” in 
American courts.  Linda Kerber, From the Declaration of Independence to the Declaration 
of Sentiments: The Legal Status of Women in the Early Republic, 1776–1848, in 10 WOMEN, 
THE LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 397, 400 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987).  The first 
American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries was published as early as 1771.  Id. at 400 
n.7.  In fact, laws limiting a married woman’s legal position in colonial America closely 
followed English common law and the concepts of coverture and the unity theory.  At 
marriage, a woman’s legal existence disappeared.  She could not own property, make 
contracts or sue on her own behalf.  Linda Grant DePauw, Women and the Law: The 
Colonial Period, in 10 WOMEN, THE LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 259, 260 (Kermit L. 
Hall, ed. 1987).  “Indeed, she could not even commit a crime; the law assumed that 
whatever she did was under compulsion from her husband.”  Id. 
 31. Schelong, supra note 3, at 86.  See also Siegel, supra note 28, at 2122. 
 32. Augustine, supra note 3, at 561. 
 33. HALE, supra note 1, at 629. 
 34. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 90 (“Under the ideology of obligation, 
husband and wife are melded together in a unitary bond.  Sex is part of the sacred glue of 
this union.  An implicit bargain exists by which wives make themselves sexually available 
to husbands in return for being supported.”). 
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their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up 
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”35  A 
man could not, however, force his wife to have sex with a third party: 
“for tho she hath given her body to her husband, she is not to be 
prostituted by him to another.”36  By giving “her body” sexually to her 
husband, a woman thereby gave her ongoing contractual consent to 
conjugal relations with him in the future.37  This ongoing consent 
ideology permeates rape law even today. 
Scholars have noted that Hale’s assertions on marital rape were 
accepted without question as law in English courts and later in 
American courts, despite the fact that Hale cited no legal authority 
for his position.  After reviewing this history, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, for example, concluded that “the marital rape 
exemption rule expressly adopted by many of our sister states has its 
source in a bare, extra-judicial declaration made some 300 years 
ago.”38  Despite the bareness of his declaration, Hale has been the 
most commonly cited source for marital immunity in sexual offense 
statutes in both England and the United States.39  For example, Rollin 
Perkins cited Hale as his source for the marital rape exemption in his 
criminal law treatise.40 
From the seventeenth century throughout the nineteenth 
century, the marital rape exemption was not questioned.  Hale’s 
ongoing consent theory of marital sexual relations remained the 
judicially recognized foundation for the doctrine throughout this 
 
 35. Id.  See also Schelong, supra note 3, at 87–88.  One scholar, in analyzing why Hale’s 
statement was so readily accepted into seventeenth century law, reasoned that Hale “may 
simply have been enunciating the overall reality of seventeenth century English law for 
married women.”  Augustine, supra note 3, at 561.  Augustine was referring to the theory 
that women were the property of their husbands. 
 36. HALE, supra note 1, at 628. 
 37. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (N.J. 1981).  John Stuart Mill, in the 1860s, argued 
that a female slave being raped by her master was considered outrageous by society yet it 
was still perceived that a wife had a duty “never to reject her husband’s sexual demands.”  
MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE, & THE LAW IN VICTORIAN 
ENGLAND, 1850–1895, 157 (1989).  Mill said, “‘[H]owever brutal a tyrant [a wife] may 
unfortunately be chained to—though she may know that he hates her, though it may be his 
daily pleasure to torment her, and though she may feel it impossible not to loathe him—he 
can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation of a human being, that of being 
made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her inclinations.’”  Id. 
 38. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (N.J. 1981). 
 39. Augustine, supra note 3, at 560–61.  See also Hasday, supra note 3, at 1396–98; 
FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 163–67.  One reason for this broad acceptance, 
suggested by Professor Jill Elaine Hasday of the University of Chicago, is that Hale’s 
position was “grounded in principles of marital status law and common law coverture.”  
Hasday, supra note 3, at 1397. 
 40. PERKINS, supra note 18, at 115. 
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time.41  Appellate cases that mentioned the doctrine did so in passing, 
usually in dictum while resolving other issues.42  In 1857, for example, 
a Massachusetts court held that, although it was not necessary for a 
complainant to allege that she was not the wife of the defendant in 
order to lodge a valid complaint of rape,43 “it would always be 
competent for a party indicted to show, in defence of a charge of rape 
alleged to be actually committed by himself, that the woman on 
whom it was charged to have been committed was his wife.”44 
Around the same time, women did begin to allege that rape by 
their husbands constituted cruelty that should give them cause for 
divorce.45  Based on the ongoing consent ideology, however, courts 
rejected this argument.  In an 1845 case, Shaw v. Shaw,46 for example, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors refused to find that a man 
who forced his wife to have sexual intercourse against her will had 
engaged in intolerable cruelty.  The court decided, “even occasional 
sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount 
to legal cruelty. . . .  Here the act in it self [sic] was a lawful act 
[between husband and wife]—in ordinary circumstances, not injurious 
nor dangerous.”47  The Shaw case reveals one way that the ongoing 
 
 41. People v. DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 510 (1983) (recognizing Hale’s enunciation 
of spousal exemption from rape as source for exemption in United States).  This 
recognition existed despite the fact that the statement “should not have been considered a 
binding and definitive statement of the common law.”  Id.  The court noted that Hale’s 
statement was made “without citation,” implying that it was not supported by law and 
therefore never should have been adopted.  Id.  The reality of the widely accepted marital 
rape immunity was that “women subject to forced sex in marriage did not have the option 
of seeking criminal prosecution.”  Hasday, supra note 3, at 1406. 
 42. Hasday, supra note 3, at 1393.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 
Gray) 489 (1857).  The issue in that case was not whether a man could commit rape on his 
own wife; instead, the defense used Hale’s statement to show what was accepted law and 
to show what the complainant must allege, i.e., that she was not the wife of the defendant.  
Hasday was unable to locate any nineteenth-century prosecutions of a husband raping his 
wife.  Hasday, supra note 3, at 1406. 
 43. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) at 489.  But see People v. Fathers, 153 N.E. 704 (Ill. 
1926) (“In an indictment for the crime of rape without force, an allegation that the 
prosecutrix was not the wife of the accused person is essential. The omission of that 
allegation in such an indictment is fatal. . . .”). 
 44. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) at 489.  The Fogerty case was the first United States 
case to judicially recognize Hale’s “implied consent” theory.  See DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 
at 510.  Some rape convictions were reversed because the complainant failed to show that 
she was not the wife of the defendant.  Hasday, supra note 3, at 1393–94. 
 45. Hasday, supra note 3, at 1394.  At this point, some states allowed battered wives to 
obtain a divorce on cruelty grounds, but the wives had to prove “extreme” and “repeated 
cruelty” in order to succeed.  See Siegel, supra note 28, at 2132. 
 46. Shaw v. Shaw, 17 Conn. 189 (1845).  Mrs. Shaw was petitioning for divorce on the 
grounds that her husband  forced her to have intercourse with him, endangering her health 
in the process. 
 47. Id.  Despite the fact that courts rejected the argument in the mid-nineteenth 
century, by the late nineteenth century most courts granted divorce petitions for cruelty 
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based on a husband subjecting his wife to sexual demands when those demands threatened 
her health.  Hasday, supra note 3, at 1467.  Professor Hasday observed, “The legal 
possibility of exit may have given some wives more leverage in negotiating the terms of 
marital intercourse; yet it did not do more than that to protect wives from their husbands’ 
sexual demands while the marriage lasted. . . .  Until divorce, Hale’s theory of irretractible 
consent remained in place.”  Id. at 1468.  Making divorce somewhat more available on 
these grounds did not dispel the reality that divorce was not an appealing or easily 
attainable solution for most women.  Id.  Success in a divorce petition required wives to 
demonstrate both “that their husband’s unwanted demands were unusual, either 
quantitatively excessive or particularly brutal; . . . and that these demands had jeopardized 
their health.”  Id. at 1469.  Marital rape, as an act by itself, did not qualify as cause.  For a 
discussion on cases that represented the limits on divorce for sexual cruelty, see id. at 
1471–74.  Obtaining a divorce for sexual cruelty reasons was often highly embarrassing 
and even if a woman was successful in doing so, she “lacked real socioeconomic 
alternatives to marriage.”  Id. at 1468.  One development in the late nineteenth century, 
made in divorce petition cases pursued by the husband, proved to be a victory for married 
women, albeit a narrow one.  In these cases, the wife continued to “perform domestic and 
childcare services” but refused to engage in sexual intercourse with her husband.  Id.  
“These wives refused to submit to marital intercourse because they did not want to have 
any more children or because they no longer loved their husbands.”  Id. at 1476 (footnotes 
omitted).  Husbands’ petitions to divorce their wives for desertion or cruelty on the 
grounds that they refused all marital intercourse were denied by the majority of the courts.  
Id. at 1475.  Judgments for the wives were crucial in these cases because alimony and 
dower were not available to wives who were held responsible for the divorce.  Id.  More 
importantly, these decisions demonstrated some acceptance by the courts of a woman’s 
refusal to engage in marital intercourse, even if it was just to show that it was not a valid 
reason for divorce.  Id.  Courts found that other aspects of wifely obligations were more 
essential, denial of which were stronger reasons for divorce than refusing marital 
intercourse.  One obligation a woman had was to live in the same household as the 
husband and to provide domestic services to the husband and children.  Id. at 1477–78. 
Women’s formal marital status in the United States under the unity theory began to 
change with the implementation of Married Women’s Property Acts, which gave women 
the right to own property, sue and be sued, and work outside the home without their 
husband’s permission.  Schelong, supra note 3, at 91; see also Siegel, supra note 28, at 2128.  
Women’s rights advocates of this era, of course, condemned husbands’ rights to chastise 
their wives.  Schelong, supra note 3, at 91.  By the 1870s, a man’s right to physically 
chastise his wife was no longer accepted in U.S. law.  Siegel, supra note 28, at 2129.  “Thus, 
when a wife beater was charged with assault and battery, judges refused to entertain his 
claim that a husband had a legal right to strike his wife; instead they denounced the 
prerogative, and allowed the criminal prosecution to proceed.”  Id. at 2129–30.  A 
woman’s right to have control over marital intercourse was one of the major reforms that 
feminists in the mid-1800s rallied for.  In fact, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a prominent 
feminist of this time, perceived this right to be the most important achievement for which 
women should fight.  Hasday, supra note 3, at 1419.  Stanton was “convinced that a wife’s 
right to refuse her husband’s sexual demands was the bedrock foundation needed to 
support equality.”  Id. at 1422.  Feminists were concerned with the reasons why married 
women submitted to unwanted sex with their husbands, whether it was by force or a lack 
of a plausible alternative.  See id. at 1416.  The phrase “legalized prostitution” was used to 
represent married women who consented to sex because of their economic and social 
dependence on their husbands.  Id.  “[T]he wife who was structurally compelled to have 
sex when she did not desire the act or its reproductive consequences was different only in 
name from the woman without any available option but to sell her body to strange men on 
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consent theory derived in criminal rape law made an incursion into 
the civil sphere of divorce law. 
In an 1890 case, a man forced a third party to rape his wife 
“under menace of death to both parties in case of refusal, and 
supporting his threat by a loaded gun held over the parties.”48  The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina stated, “It is true that [a husband] 
may enforce sexual connection [on his wife]; and, in the exercise of 
this marital right, it is held that he cannot be guilty of the offense of 
rape.  But it is too plain for argument that this privilege is a personal 
one, only.”49  Citing Hale’s analysis of accomplice rape, the North 
Carolina court decided, “If . . . the husband aids and abets another to 
ravish his wife, he may be convicted as if he were a stranger.”50 
It was not until early in the twentieth century that a man was first 
prosecuted for attempting to rape his wife.51  These early prosecutions 
were unsuccessful.  For example, in 1905, the Court of Criminal 
 
the street.”  Id. at 1416–17.  See also id. at 1427–33 (discussing idea of marriage as legalized 
prostitution).  Wives “acquiesced to marital intercourse because they had no practical 
alternative, nowhere else to go and no other means of negotiating their marital 
relationship.”  Id. at 1428.  A woman’s right to her own body and the woman’s 
reproductive role in the family were inseparable.  Because women naturally carried the 
reproductive responsibilities, “[g]iving women the right ‘to decide when she shall become 
a mother, how often [and] under what circumstances’ was only just[.]”  Id. at 1426.  At that 
time, a woman’s primary responsibility was raising her children; feminists believed that 
women should be entitled to control how much of their time they spent doing so.  See id. 
Nevertheless, even when courts renounced the chastisement doctrine, they often 
refused to enforce charges of assault against husbands, relying on the trope of marital 
privacy.  Id. at 2154.  See State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868) (holding that the 
defendant was not guilty for whipping his wife “because the evil of publicity would be 
greater than the evil involved in the trifles complained of; and because they ought to be 
left to family government”).  See also State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. (Busb.) 123 (1852) (a slap 
on the cheek qualifies as assault and battery in law but “cannot apply to persons in the 
marriage state, [for] it would break down the great principle of mutual confidence and 
dependence; throw open the bedroom to the gaze of the public; and spread discord and 
misery, contention and strife, where peace and concord ought to reign.”).  When faced 
with such a case, for example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1868 decided that it 
would “not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic 
privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence.”  Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 
(“[W]hen trifles are taken hold of by the public, and the parties are exposed and 
disgraced, . . . that which ought to be forgotten in a day, will be remembered for life.”). 
 48. State v. Dowell, 11 S.E. 525 (N.C. 1890).  Because the facts are so violent, the most 
we can infer from this case is that, at least for the most violent accomplice rapes, men 
could be liable for raping their wives. 
 49. Id.  See also People v. Chapman, 28 N.W. 896 (Mich. 1886) (holding that a husband 
who arranged for another man to seduce his wife could be convicted of rape when the 
seducement resulted in rape). 
 50. See Dowell, 11 S.E. at 525.  A man could be convicted of assault with intent to 
commit the rape of his wife by forcing another man, at gunpoint, to attempt sexual 
intercourse with his wife.  Id. 
 51. See Hasday, supra note 3, at 1393–94. 
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Appeals of Texas heard the appeal of Frazier v. State.52  Before 
Frazier attempted to rape his wife Emma, she tried to divorce him, 
but the court refused her request.53  Emma remained in the house but 
slept in a separate room.54  She accused Frazier of entering her room 
and assaulting her with the intent to rape.55  Frazier was convicted at 
trial, but the appellate court reversed, because the two parties were 
married, Frazier could not be found guilty of the crime.56  The court 
focused on the fact that Emma “performed the ordinary duties 
devolving upon the wife in regard to household matters, doing the 
cooking and such kindred things, and they all ate at the same table.”57  
Emma’s desire for a divorce made no difference; Frazier still had the 
right to force her to have sexual intercourse.58 
Claims regarding marital rape also continued to be unsuccessful 
in the civil divorce context.  In 1921, for example, the Supreme Court 
of Alabama resolved a case in which the wife had withdrawn from 
sexual relations with her husband in order to stop having children.59  
The husband proceeded to force her to engage in sexual intercourse 
against her will.60  The wife then left the home “to avoid further 
instances of that character.”61  The Alabama court held that a wife 
who left her husband under these circumstances had abandoned the 
marriage without cause; therefore, she could not collect alimony or 
obtain custody of her child.62  The wife’s denial of sex could not “be 
excused, much less justified, and she was by her own admission guilty 
of a grave breach of marital duty.”63  The breach of marital duty was 
 
 52. 86 S.W. 754 (Tex. 1905). 
 53. Id. at 754. 
 54. Id. at 755. 
 55. Id.  She fought him off so he could not complete this attempt.  Id. 
 56. Id.  (“[A]ll the authorities hold that a man cannot himself be guilty of actual rape 
upon his wife; one of the main reasons being the matrimonial consent which she gives 
when she assumes the marriage relation, and which the law will not permit her to retract in 
order to charge her husband with the offense of rape.”). 
 57. Id.  The court also noted that Mr. Frazier “supported the family, provided for their 
wants, [and] attended to the business about the place and farm.”  Id. 
 58. Id. (“[W]herever the question has been adjudicated . . . the husband himself cannot 
be himself guilty of actual rape upon his wife.”). 
 59. Anonymous, 89 So. 462 (Ala. 1921). 
 60. Id. at 463. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  In the beginning of the twentieth century, domestic relations courts were 
established to handle domestic violence disputes.  Instead of seeking to punish the 
assaulter, however, these courts “urged couples to reconcile, providing informal or formal 
counseling designed to preserve the relationship whenever possible.”  Id. at 464.  The 
court conceded that the marital right of a husband to have sexual relations with his wife 
was “not absolute, but is qualified by considerations of health and decency.”  Id. 
 63. Id.  See also Siegel, supra note 28, at 2170 (“Battered wives were discouraged from 
filing criminal charges against their husbands, urged to accept responsibility for their role 
in provoking the violence, and encouraged to remain in the relationship and rebuild it 
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the wife’s refusal to abide by her ongoing consent to sexual 
intercourse, not the man’s rape. 
Until the mid-1970s in this country, there were no serious legal 
challenges to the marital rape exemption, and Hale’s ongoing consent 
theory continued to justify the doctrine. 64 
B. Current Marital Immunity for Sexual Offenses 
In the mid-1970s, feminist reformers began to challenge the 
marital rape exemption in courts and in state legislatures.  Over the 
next three decades, they were successful in twenty-four states and the 
District of Columbia, in which marital immunity was abolished for 
sexual offenses.65  In the remaining twenty-six states, marital 
immunity remains in one form or another.66 
Many legal scholars who have researched and commented upon 
the marital immunity have focused on state provisions regarding 
forcible rape.67  They have ignored or given short shrift to provisions 
on sexual assault, criminal sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse, 
and other sexual offenses.68  To understand fully the way that marital 
 
rather than attempt to separate or divorce.”)  As recently as the mid-1970s, police officers 
were trained to handle “family disturbances” as “personal matters requiring no direct 
police action.”  Id. at 2171.  The Oakland Police Department’s 1975 Training Bulletin 
stated, “[n]ormally, officers should adhere to the policy that arrests shall be avoided. . .but 
[when] one of the parties demands arrest, you should attempt to explain the ramifications 
of such action . . . and encourage the parties to reason with each other.”  Id. 
 64. People v. DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 511 (N.Y. 1983). 
 65. See statutes listed supra note 8. 
 66. See statutes listed supra note 9. 
 67. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 3, at 1496; RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 376. 
 68. For example, some scholars divided states into two categories: those with a partial 
marital rape exemption and those with no marital rape exemption, an approach that 
tended to ignore marital immunities for sexual crimes other than rape.  See, e.g., RUSSELL, 
supra note 6, at 376; Laura X, supra note 7, at 1064.  Diana Russell, for example, listed 
those states that allowed a spouse to be prosecuted for rape but did not examine the 
sexual offense statutes other than rape.  In Alaska, Russell notes, “Husbands can be 
charged for rape of wife.”  RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 376.  This statement is somewhat 
misleading because Alaska provides marital immunity for sexual penetration or sexual 
contact when the victim is mentally incapacitated and cannot consent.  See ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.41.425 (Michie 2001) (marriage is defense to sexual assault in third degree; sexual 
assault in the third degree is when an offender “engages in sexual contact with a person 
who the offender knows is mentally incapable; incapacitated; or unaware that a sexual act 
is being committed,” a Class C felony); § 11.41.420 (3) (marriage is a defense to sexual 
assault in the second degree if the offender “engages in sexual penetration with a person 
who the offender knows is mentally incapable; incapacitated; or unaware that  sexual act is 
being committed.”). 
Sitton, supra note 3, at 262.  A few authors have examined the marital rape immunity 
as it pertains to sexual crimes other than rape.  Lisa Eskow, for example, discussed those 
states that limited the prosecution of marital sexual offenses, but she did not examine the 
specific statutes of each state.  Eskow, supra note 3, at 682.  Other scholars have attempted 
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immunity works in a state, however, it is necessary to examine all of 
the states’ sexual offense provisions.  For example, the Model Penal 
Code includes six separate marital immunities for sexual offenses: for 
forcible rape, gross sexual imposition, forcible deviate sexual 
intercourse, corruption of minors, sexual assault, and indecent 
exposure.69 
Legal scholars have not systematically critiqued the twenty-six 
state statutes that currently provide some form of marital immunity 
for nonconsensual sexual offenses.  The states that retain marital 
immunity fall into three, non-mutually exclusive categories: those that 
exempt spouses from sexual offenses other than forcible rape, those 
that maintain separate spousal sexual offense statutes, and those that 
impose extra requirements for the prosecution of marital rape.  The 
following sections will address each in turn. 
(1) Marital Immunity for Certain Sexual Offenses 
Twenty states exempt men from sexual offense charges when 
their wives are mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.70  
 
to examine the marital rape immunity throughout criminal sexual conduct statutes, but 
their research offered only a selected example of states and the conduct they prohibited, 
rather than comprehensive analysis.  See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 3, at 1496; Sitton, supra 
note 3, at 277–81; Siegel, Note, supra note 3, at 364–69; West, supra note 3, at 46–48. 
Richard Posner examined the presence of marital immunity in the sexual offense 
statutes of the fifty states.  RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE 
TO AMERICA’S SEX LAWS 35–43 (1996).  However, his chronicle may not accurately 
reflect the true existence or absence of marital immunity in state statutory law.  E.g., for 
Minnesota, Posner declared “No Exemptions.”  A closer reading, however, reveals that 
marital exemptions exist for certain sexual offenses if the victim is incapable of consenting.  
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 
(S.B. 2433) (West) (spouse does not commit criminal sexual conduct in third or fourth 
degree if actor knows or has reason to know that complainant is mentally impaired, 
mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless). 
 69. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.0(3); 213.1(1); 213.2(1); 213.3(1); 213.4; 213.5 (2001). 
 70. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.420(a)(3) (Michie 2001) (marriage is defense to second 
degree sexual assault if the victim is incapacitated or unaware the sexual act is being 
committed); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407 (West 2002) (implied marital immunity 
when victim is mentally incapacitated because statute requires force for spousal conviction 
of sexual assault); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002) (spouses or cohabitants 
are exempt from sexual assault in fourth degree, which occurs when person intentionally 
subjects another to sexual contact who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or 
physically helpless); § 53a-71 (spouses and cohabitants are immune from sexual assault in 
the second degree when the victim is physically helpless); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-732(d) 
(2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (spouses and cohabitants 
are exempt from sexual assault in third degree, Class C felony, if victim is mentally 
defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 
1948–2002) (husband cannot be prosecuted for rape if wife is incapable of giving consent 
or unconscious at time of act); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 2002) (marriage is defense 
to sexual abuse in third degree if victim is suffering from mental defect or incapacity which 
precludes giving consent; Class C felony); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West 2002) (express 
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“Mentally incapacitated” is usually defined as so drugged or 
intoxicated that one cannot give valid consent.71  “Physically helpless” 
is usually defined as unconscious, which includes unconsciousness due 
to drugging or a coma, for example.72  In these twenty states, 
penetrating a woman who cannot consent because she is drugged or 
unconscious is a crime if the man is not married to the victim.  
However, it is not a crime if the man is married to the victim. 
In three of these states—Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina—
men are even immune from charges when they themselves administer 
the drugs, intoxicants, or controlled substances to render their wives 
 
exemption from simple rape which includes situation where victim is incapable of resisting 
due to an intoxicating substance); MD. CRIM. LAW. § 3-318 (West 2002) (express 
exemption from rape in second degree and sexual offense in third degree when victim is 
mentally incapacitated or physically helpless); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West 
2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in first through fourth 
degrees based solely on his or her spouse being under age 16, mentally incapable or 
mentally incapacitated); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. 
Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (spouse does not commit criminal sexual 
conduct in third or fourth degree if actor knows or has reason to know that complainant is 
mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
3-99 (2002) (implied marital immunity when victim is mentally incapacitated or physically 
helpless, as spouses are immune from prosecution for sexual battery unless husband uses 
force); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002) (implied marital immunity when victim is 
mentally or physically incapable as spouses are immune unless husband uses force); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File 156 
(H.B. 485) (West) (spousal immunity if victim is mentally or physically incapable of 
consent); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) (marital immunity for rape where 
the victim is incapable of consent through mental illness, unsoundness of mind, intoxicated 
or unconscious); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–2001) (spouses exempt from first 
degree sexual assault if victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically 
helpless); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (implied marital immunity 
when the actor causes the victim to become mentally incapacitated or physically helpless 
by administering a controlled substance); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.2 (Michie 1968–
2002) (spouses exempt from sexual contact when person is incapable of consenting, Class 4 
felony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 (West 2002) (implied marital immunity when 
victim is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless because spouses are general exempt 
from prosecution unless weapon is used or there is bodily injury); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
61(A)(ii) (West 2002) (marital immunity when the victim suffers from a mental incapacity 
or physical helplessness); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.100(1)(b) (West 2002) 
(marital immunity for indecent liberties when the victim is incapable of consent by reason 
of being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, Class A or B 
felony). 
 71. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(h) (definition of mentally 
incapacitated is when victim “is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or 
controlling his or her conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other 
substance administered to that person without his or her consent”). 
 72. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (physically helpless 
is defined as unconscious, asleep, or “for any other reason physically unable to 
communicate unwillingness to an act”). 
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mentally incapacitated.73  In eight other states, men are immune from 
charges when their wives are rendered incapable of consenting due to 
drugs or intoxicants administered without consent, which may include 
when a husband administers intoxicants without his wife’s consent.74 
 
 73. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(a) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. 
Law. Serv. File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (rape includes when “for the purpose of preventing 
resistance, the offender substantially impairs the other person’s judgment or control by 
administering any drug, intoxicant, or controlled substance to the other person 
surreptitiously or by force, threat of force, or deception”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 
§ 1111 (West 2002) (“Rape is an act of sexual intercourse involving vaginal or anal 
penetration accomplished with a male or female who is not the spouse of the perpetrator” 
where the victim is “incapable through mental illness or any other unsoundness of 
mind; . . . [w]here the victim is intoxicated by a narcotic or anesthetic agent, administered 
by or with the privity of the accused as a means of forcing the victim to submit; . . . [or] 
[w]here the victim is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act.”); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (criminal sexual conduct in first degree includes when “the 
actor causes the victim, without the victim’s consent, to become mentally incapacitated or 
physically helpless by administering, distributing, dispensing, delivering . . . a controlled 
substance.”). 
Likewise, in South Carolina, a man is explicitly immune from charges even when he 
caused his wife to be unconscious.  S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002) 
(sexual conduct in first degree includes when actor causes victim to become physically 
helpless, defined as unconscious, asleep or “for any other reason physically unable to 
communicate unwillingness to an act”). 
 74. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted 
for criminal sexual conduct in first through fourth degrees based solely on his spouse being 
mentally incapacitated); § 750.520a(h) (definition of mentally incapacitated is when 
“person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her conduct 
due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance administered to that 
person without his or her consent”) (emphasis added); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-65 (5) 
(West 2002) (definition of mentally incapacitated is when “person is rendered temporarily 
incapable of appraising or controlling such person’s conduct owing to the influence of a 
drug or intoxicating substance administered without such person’s consent”) (emphasis 
added); MD. CRIM. LAW § 3-301(C) (West 2002) (mentally incapacitated defined has “an 
individual who, because of the influence of a drug, narcotic, or intoxicating substance, or 
because of an act committed on the individual without the individual’s consent . . . is 
rendered substantially incapable of . . . [a]ppraising the nature of the individual’s 
conduct”) (emphasis added); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609-341, (West 2002), amended by  
2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (mentally incapacitated defined as 
“person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance, 
administered to that person without the person’s agreement”) (emphasis added); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS 1956 § 11-37-1(5) (1953–2001) (mentally incapacitated defined as a “person who is 
rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her conduct due to the 
influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance administered to that person without 
his or her consent”) (emphasis added); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(C) (2002) (mentally 
incapacitated defined as “one rendered incapable of knowing or controlling his or her 
conduct, or incapable of resisting due to the influence of any drug, narcotic, anesthetic, or 
other substance administered to that person without his or her consent”); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 707-700 (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (mentally 
incapacitated defined as person who is “rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or 
controlling the person’s conduct owing to the influence of a substance administered to the 
person without the person’s consent”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(4) (West 2002) 
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Additionally, twelve states grant men immunity when they 
commit various nonconsensual sexual offenses against their wives, 
including gross sexual imposition, sexual abuse, sexual assault, sexual 
battery, sexual contact, and sexual misconduct.75 
(2) Separate Statutes for Marital Sexual Offenses 
Six states have statutes that separate rape or sexual assault by 
spouses from rape or sexual assault committed by others.76  Arizona, 
 
(mentally incapacitated defined as “person [who is] rendered temporarily incapable of 
appraising or controlling the person’s conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic 
or other substance administered to that person without the person’s consent”). 
Louisiana’s rape statute does not include marital immunity “when the victim is 
incapable of resisting or of understanding the nature of the act by reason of stupor or 
abnormal condition of the mind produced by a narcotic or anesthetic agent or other 
controlled dangerous substance administered by the offender and without the knowledge 
of the victim.”  However, there is marital immunity when someone other than the offender 
administers the substance.  LA. R.S. 14:43 (A)(1)-(2). 
Likewise, one Mississippi court has held that when a husband deliberately causes his 
wife’s unconsciousness by administering drugs, he is not immune to prosecution, as 
drugging the victim consists of the use of force.  See Trigg v. State, 759 So. 2d 448 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2000). 
 75. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.425 (Michie 2001) (marriage is defense to sexual assault in 
third degree, Class C felony); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D) (West 2002) (it is 
defense to sexual abuse that person was spouse of other person at time of commission of 
act; sexual abuse is Class 5 felony); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70a (West 2002) 
(marital immunity for aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, Class B felony); § 53a-
71 (marital immunity for sexual assault in second degree); § 53a-72a (marital immunity for 
sexual assault in third degree); § 53a-72b (marital immunity for sexual assault in third 
degree with firearm); § 53a-73a (marital immunity for sexual assault in fourth degree); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-732 (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 
2002) (spouses and cohabitants are immune from sexual assault in third degree, Class C 
felony, if actor submits other person to sexual contact through strong compulsion or other 
person is mentally defective); § 707-733 (2001) note in H.B. 2560 (spouses are exempt from 
sexual assault in fourth degree, a misdemeanor, if actor submits other person to sexual 
contact by compulsion); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3517 (2001) (marriage is defense to sexual 
battery, Class A person misdemeanor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West 2002) (spouses 
exempt from simple rape); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) (spouses exempt 
from criminal sexual conduct in third and fourth degree); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2907.03 (West 2002) (spouses exempt from sexual battery, third degree felony); 
§ 2907.05 (spouses exempt from gross sexual imposition, third or fourth degree felony); 
§ 2907.06 (spouses exempt from sexual imposition, first degree misdemeanor); S.C. CODE 
ANN. 1976 § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal 
sexual conduct in third degree); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 (Michie 1968–2002) 
(spouses exempt from sexual contact without consent with person who is capable of 
consenting, Class 1 misdemeanor); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 2002) 
(spouses exempt from rape in third degree, Class C felony); § 9A.44.100(1)(c) (West 2002) 
(marital immunity for  indecent liberties, Class A or B felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-
304 (Michie 1977–2001) (spouses are exempt from sexual assault in third degree, 
punishable by not more than 15 years); § 6-2-313 (marriage is defense to sexual battery). 
 76. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(A) (West 2002) (“A person commits sexual 
assault of a spouse by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral 
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South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia mandate lesser penalties for 
spousal rape than for other rapes regardless of the force used or 
injury caused.77  These states downgrade the severity of the crime by 
statute.  In Arizona, sexual assault is a Class 2 felony, receiving from 
5.25 to 14 years, while spousal sexual assault is a Class 6 felony, which 
judges have the discretion to treat as a misdemeanor for punishment 
purposes.78  In Arizona and Virginia, lessened penalties for spousal 
sexual offenses can be diminished further at the discretion of the 
judge, who can mandate counseling instead of jail time.79  In 
 
sexual contact with a spouse without consent of the spouse by the immediate or 
threatened use of force against the spouse or another.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 
2002) (rape of spouse occurs when perpetrator accomplishes sexual intercourse against the 
person’s will by force or violence, or when the person is prevented from resisting by any 
intoxicating or controlled substance, or when the person is unconscious at the time of the 
act); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70b(b) (West 2002) (“No spouse or cohabitor shall 
compel the other spouse or cohabitor to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force 
against such other spouse or cohabitor, or by the threat of the use of force against such 
other spouse or cohabitor which reasonably causes such other spouse or cohabitor to fear 
physical injury.”); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (“Sexual battery, 
when accomplished through the use of aggravated force by one spouse against the other 
spouse if they are living together constitutes the felony of spousal sexual battery.”); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (West 2002) (spousal sexual battery occurs when one spouse 
subjects the other to unlawful sexual penetration where the defendant is armed with a 
weapon or causes seriously bodily injury to the victim); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B), 
§ 18.2-67.1(B), § 18.2-67.2:1 (West 2002) (marital sexual assault occurs when the 
perpetrator engages in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anallingus or anal 
intercourse with his or her spouse against the spouse’s will by force or a present threat of 
force). 
 77. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(B) (West 2002) (first offense 
sexual assault of spouse is Class 6 felony) with § 13-1406(B) (sexual assault is Class 2 
felony); compare S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (spousal sexual 
battery mandates sentence of not more than ten years) with § 16-3-652 (criminal sexual 
conduct in first degree mandates sentence of not more than thirty years) and § 16-3-654 
(criminal sexual conduct in third degree is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
ten years); compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(c)(1)(C)(2) (West 2002) (aggravated 
spousal rape is Class B felony) and § 39-13-507(b)(2)(A) (spousal rape is Class C felony) 
with § 39-13-502(b) (aggravated rape is Class A felony) and § 39-13-503(b) (rape is Class B 
felony); compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.2:1 (West 2002) (marital sexual assault, 
punishable by confinement in state correctional facility for term of not less than one year 
nor more than twenty years) with § 18.2-61 (rape, punishable by confinement in state 
correctional facility for life or for any term not less than five years). 
 78. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (West 2002) (sexual assault is a class 2 
felony) with § 13-1406.01 (sexual assault of a spouse is a class 6 felony). 
 79. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(B) (West 2002) (sexual assault of spouse is 
Class 6 felony; the judge has discretion to enter judgment for conviction of Class 1 
misdemeanor with mandatory counseling); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(C) (West 2002) 
(“[A]ll or part of any sentence imposed for a violation of subsection B [spousal rape] may 
be suspended upon the defendant’s completion of counseling or therapy . . . [i]f the court 
finds such action will promote maintenance of the family unit and will be in the best 
interest of the complaining witness.”); § 18.2-61(D), § 18.2-67.1(D), 18.2-67.2(C) (“Upon a 
finding of guilt under subsection B [spousal rape, forcible sodomy, object sexual 
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Tennessee, sexual offenses of every type are downgraded for spouses.  
Aggravated rape is a Class A felony, but aggravated spousal rape is a 
Class B felony; rape is a Class B felony, but spousal rape is a Class C 
felony.  Aggravated sexual battery is a Class B felony, while spousal 
sexual battery with the same aggravated circumstances is only a Class 
D felony.80  In South Carolina, criminal sexual conduct in the first 
degree is punishable by not more than thirty years of imprisonment, 
while spousal sexual battery, the same crime by a spouse, is punished 
by not more than ten years.81 
(3) Extra Requirements for Marital Sexual Offenses 
A number of states require the victim and the prosecutor to 
satisfy additional criteria in order to pursue instances of marital 
sexual assault.  While these states allow for the prosecution of spousal 
sexual assault, statutes make the prosecutions more difficult to 
pursue.  There are three types of non-mutually exclusive criteria that 
states have imposed: reporting requirements,82 the separation or 
 
penetration] . . . the court, without entering a judgment of guilt, upon motion of the 
defendant and with the consent of the complaining witness and the attorney for the 
Commonwealth, may defer further proceedings and place the defendant on probation 
pending completion of counseling or therapy. . . .  If the defendant fails to so complete 
such counseling or therapy, the court may make final disposition of the case and proceed 
as otherwise provided.  If such counseling is completed . . . , the court may discharge the 
defendant and dismiss the proceedings against him if, after consideration of the views of 
the complaining witness and such other evidence as may be relevant, the court finds such 
action will promote maintenance of the family unit and be in the best interest of the 
complaining witness.”). 
 80. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-502 AGGRAVATED RAPE (West 2002) with 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 SPOUSAL EXCLUSION (West 2002); compare TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 39-13-503 RAPE (West 2002) with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 SPOUSAL 
EXCLUSION (West 2002); compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-504 AGGRAVATED 
SEXUAL BATTERY (West 2002) with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 SPOUSAL 
EXCLUSION (West 2002). 
 81. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (criminal sexual 
conduct in first degree punishable by imprisonment for not more than thirty years) with 
S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (spousal sexual battery punishable 
by imprisonment of not more than ten years). 
 82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 2002) (rape of spouse must be reported within one 
year after date of violation; reporting requirement shall not apply if victim’s allegation of 
offense is corroborated by independent evidence); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 725 § 5/12-
18(c) (West 2002) (prosecution of a spouse is barred for criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-13), 
aggravated criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-14), criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-15), and 
aggravated criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-17), if not reported to law enforcement within 30 
days after offense was committed); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) 
(crime of spousal sexual battery must be reported within thirty days). 
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divorce of the couple at the time of the assault,83 and additional 
requirements of force or violence.84 
 
 83. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (it is defense to sexual assault when 
victim is mentally incapable of consenting that offender is married to person and neither 
party has filed with the court for separation); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (2001) note in 
2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (married does not include spouses living 
apart); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501 (2001) (person is not considered spouse if couple if 
living apart or either spouse has filed for separation or divorce or for relief under 
protection from abuse act); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West 2002) (person not 
considered spouse if judgment of separation exists or if parties are living apart and 
offender knows that temporary restraining order has been issued); MD. CRIM. LAW § 3-
316 (West 2002) (spouse may not be prosecuted under § 3-303 [rape in first degree], § 3-
304 [rape in second degree], § 3-307 [sexual offense in third degree] or § 3-308 [sexual 
offense in fourth degree] unless person committing crime uses force and act is without 
consent of spouse, or couple has lived apart under written separation agreement or for at 
least three months before alleged rape or sexual offense.  A person may be prosecuted 
under these statutes if there was decree of limited divorce at time of offense); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.F. 
2433) (West) (person does not commit criminal sexual conduct under § 609.342(a) and (b) 
[criminal sexual conduct in first degree], § 609.343(a) and (b) [criminal sexual conduct in 
second degree], § 609.344(a), (b), (d), and (e) [criminal sexual conduct in third degree], 
and § 609.345(a), (b), (d), (e) [criminal sexual conduct in fourth degree], if actor and 
complainant were adults cohabiting in ongoing voluntary sexual relationship at time of 
alleged offense, or if complainant is actor’s legal spouse, unless couple is living apart and 
one of them has filed for legal separation or dissolution of marriage); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-3-99 (2002) (person is not guilty of sexual battery if alleged victim is that person’s 
legal spouse and at time of alleged offense such person and alleged victim are not 
separated and living apart unless force is used); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) 
(West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (spouse 
cannot be charged with rape unless couple is living separate or force is used); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS 1956 § 11-37-1 (1953–2001) (married does not include spouses who are living apart 
and decision for divorce has been granted); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 
2002) (person cannot be guilty of criminal sexual conduct in first or second degree if victim 
is the legal spouse unless couple is living apart); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 (West 
2002) (spousal rape requires the defendant to be armed with a weapon, cause serious 
bodily injury, or living apart and one has filed for separate maintenance or divorce); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B), § 18.2-67.1(B), § 18.2-67.2(B) (West 2002) (no person shall be 
found guilty of rape, forcible sodomy, or object sexual penetration unless, at time of 
alleged offense, spouses were living separate and apart); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.44.010 (West 2002) (married does not include a person who is living separate from 
spouse and who has filed for legal separation or dissolution of marriage). 
 84. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(A) (West 2002) (“A person commits sexual 
assault of a spouse by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral 
sexual contact with a spouse without consent of the spouse by the immediate or 
threatened use of force against the spouse or another.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
70b (West 2002) (spouses or cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault unless offender 
uses force or the threat of force); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (husband 
can only be prosecuted for rape where wife “resists but her resistance is overcome by force 
or violence” or “[w]here she is prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and 
great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution; or by any intoxicating, 
narcotic, or anesthetic substance administered by or with the privity of the accused”); MD. 
CRIM. LAW § 3-316 (West 2002) (spouses can only be prosecuted for rape in first degree, 
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The first criterion is a stringent reporting requirement.85  In 
California, wife rape must be reported within one year of the date of 
the incident, unless the wife’s allegation is corroborated by 
independent, admissible evidence.86  Other rape victims in California 
have no similar reporting requirement.87  Illinois bars the prosecution 
of a spouse for criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual 
assault, criminal sexual abuse, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse if 
the incident is not reported to law enforcement officials within 30 
days.88  Other rape victims in Illinois face no similar reporting 
 
rape in second degree, or sexual offense in third degree if force is used or couple is living 
separately); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2002) (legal spouse of alleged victim may be 
found guilty of sexual battery if legal spouse engaged in forcible sexual penetration 
without consent of alleged victim); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002) (marriage is no 
defense to charge of sexual assault if assault was committed by force or by threat of force); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. 
File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (marriage or cohabitation is no defense to rape if offender uses 
force or threat of force); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) amended by (2002 
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 22 (H.B. 2924) (West) (rape of spouse must be accompanied by 
actual or threatened force or violence, along with apparent power of execution against 
victim or third person); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (spousal 
sexual battery requires aggravated force, defined as “use or the threat of use of a weapon 
or the use or threat of use of physical force or physical violence of a high and aggravated 
nature); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (West 2002) (spousal sexual battery requires 
defendant to be armed with weapon, inflict serious bodily injury, or parties must be living 
separately and filed for divorce); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B), § 18.2-67.1(B), § 18.2-
67.2(B) (West 2002) (no person shall be found guilty of rape, forcible sodomy, or object 
sexual penetration unless, at time of alleged offense, the parties were living separately or 
defendant caused bodily injury to spouse by use of force or violence). 
 85. Reporting requirements are not statutes of limitations.  Reporting requirements 
indicate the time within which a complainant must inform the authorities of an offense.  If 
a complainant fails to report the offense within that time, the offense is not legally 
cognizable.  The statute of limitations is the time within which a prosecutor must charge an 
offender.  If the prosecutor fails to charge an offender within that prescribed amount of 
time, the claim is presumed to be stale and so should no longer be pursued legally.  See 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 800 (providing statute of limitations is six years after date of the 
commission of offense for offenses punishable by imprisonment for eight years).  Section 
800 applies to spousal rape.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(b).  “However, no prosecution shall 
be commenced under [section 262 rape of a spouse] unless the violation was reported to 
medical personnel, a member of the clergy, an attorney, a shelter representative, a 
counselor, a judicial officer, a rape crisis agency, a prosecuting agency, a law enforcement 
officer, or a firefighter within one year after the date of the violation.”  Id. 
 86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 2002) (rape of spouse must be reported within one 
year after date of violation; reporting requirement shall not apply if victim’s allegation of 
offense is corroborated by independent evidence). 
 87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2002). 
 88. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 720 § 5/12-18(c) (West 2002) (prosecution of a spouse is 
barred for criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-13), aggravated criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-
14), criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-15), and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-17), if 
not reported to law enforcement within 30 days after offense was committed). 
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requirement.89  Similarly, in South Carolina, the crime of spousal 
sexual battery must be reported to officials within 30 days in order to 
be prosecuted.90  Other criminal sexual conduct victims in South 
Carolina, by contrast, face no such reporting requirement.91 
The second criterion is the requirement of separation or divorce.  
Thirteen states—Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Rhode 
Island, Washington, and Virginia—require that a couple be separated 
or divorced at the time of the assault before certain sexual offense 
prosecutions may proceed.92  In Minnesota, Tennessee, Washington, 
and Rhode Island, the parties must be living apart and have filed for 
legal divorce or separation.93  In Maryland, there must be a limited 
divorce decree between the parties to avoid marital immunity.94  In 
Alaska and Kansas, one party must have filed for legal separation, 
divorce, or dissolution of the marriage to avoid marital immunity.95  In 
Hawaii, Mississippi, Ohio, Virginia, Kansas, and South Carolina, 
marital immunity does not apply to spouses who are living apart.96  In 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (crime of spousal sexual 
battery must be reported within thirty days). 
 91. S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 §§ 16-3-652, 16-3-653, 16-3-654 (Law. Co-op. 2002). 
 92. See supra note 83.  This requirement is not imposed, however, if the spouse uses 
force to accomplish the act. 
 93. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. 
Ch. 381 (S.F. 2433) (West) (term legal spouse does not include when couple is living apart 
and one has filed for legal separation or dissolution of marriage); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 
§ 11-37-1 (1953–2001) (married does not include spouses who are living apart and decision 
for divorce has been granted); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (West 2002) (spousal 
sexual battery requires defendant to be armed with weapon, inflict serious bodily injury, 
or parties must be living separately and filed for divorce); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9a.44.010  (West 2002) (married does not include a person who is living separate from 
spouse and who has filed for legal separation or dissolution of marriage). 
 94. MD. CRIM. LAW § 3-318 (West 2002) (spouses are exempt from prosecution unless 
at time of crime spouses have lived apart under decree of limited divorce). 
 95. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432(a) (Michie 2001) (person not considered married if 
either party has filed for separation or divorce); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501(3) (2001) 
(person is not considered spouse if couple is living apart or either spouse has filed for 
separation or divorce or for relief under protection from abuse act). 
 96. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) 
(West 2002) (married does not include spouses living apart); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501 
(2001) (person is not considered spouse if couple is living apart or either spouse has filed 
for separation or divorce or for relief under protection from abuse act); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-3-99 (2002) (person is not guilty of sexual battery if alleged victim is that person’s 
legal spouse and at time of alleged offense such person and alleged victim are not 
separated and living apart unless force is used); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 
2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (spouse cannot 
be charged with rape unless parties are living separate and apart); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 
§ 16-3-658  (Law. Co-op. 2002) (person cannot be guilty of criminal sexual conduct if 
victim is spouse unless they are living apart); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.1, § 18.2-67.2 
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Kansas, filing for relief under a protection from abuse order will 
avoid marital immunity.97  In Louisiana, a legal judgment of 
separation or separation plus a restraining order must have already 
been rendered to avoid marital immunity.98 
The third criterion is an extra requirement of force.  Eleven 
states—Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia—do not 
recognize spousal rape or spousal sexual assault unless the offender 
uses force, violence, duress, or threats of great bodily harm.99  
Additionally, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Rhode Island have an 
implied requirement of force because these states exempt spouses 
from every non-forcible sexual crime.100  These states require physical 
 
(West 2002) (exemption from forcible sodomy and object penetration if spouses are living 
apart). 
 97. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501 (2001) (person is not considered spouse if couple is 
living apart or either spouse has filed for separation or divorce or for relief under 
protection from abuse act). 
 98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West 2002) (person not considered spouse if judgment 
of separation exists or if parties are living apart and offender knows that temporary 
restraining order has been issued). 
 99. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(A) (West 2002) (“A person commits sexual 
assault of a spouse by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral 
sexual contact with a spouse without consent of the spouse by the immediate or 
threatened use of force against the spouse or another.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
70b (West 2002) (spouses or cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault unless offender 
uses force or the threat of force); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (husband 
can only be prosecuted for rape where wife “resists but her resistance is overcome by force 
or violence” or “[w]here she is prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and 
great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution; or by any intoxicating, 
narcotic, or anesthetic substance administered by or with the privity of the accused”); MD. 
CRIM. LAW § 3-316 (West 2002) (spouses can only be prosecuted for rape in first degree, 
rape in second degree, or sexual offense in third degree if force is used or couple is living 
separately); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2002) (legal spouse of alleged victim may be 
found guilty of sexual battery if legal spouse engaged in forcible sexual penetration 
without consent of alleged victim); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002) (marriage is no 
defense to charge of sexual assault if assault was committed by force or by threat of force); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. 
File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (marriage or cohabitation is no defense to rape if offender uses 
force or threat of force); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) amended by (2002 
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 22 (H.B. 2924) (West) (rape of spouse must be accompanied by 
actual or threatened force or violence, along with apparent power of execution against 
victim or third person); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (spousal 
sexual battery requires aggravated force, defined as “use or the threat of use of a weapon 
or the use or threat of use of physical force or physical violence of a high and aggravated 
nature); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (West 2002) (spousal sexual battery requires 
defendant to be armed with weapon, inflict serious bodily injury, or parties must be living 
separately and filed for divorce); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (West 2002) (rape), § 18.2-
67.1 (forcible sodomy), § 18.2-67.2 (object sexual penetration). 
 100. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 2002) (sexual abuse in third degree only offense 
with marital immunity for non-force part of provision); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West 
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force rather than other forms of coercion that would suffice for the 
rape of a stranger.  For example, in Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, and Virginia, the use or threatened use of force is 
required, whereas nonconsent or inability to consent would suffice if 
the parties were not married.101 
In some states, this force requirement is not satisfied by the kind 
of coercion that would suffice if the parties were strangers.  It is only 
satisfied by serious physical force resulting in substantial injuries.102  In 
South Carolina, for example, spousal sexual battery requires 
aggravated force, defined as the use or threatened use of a weapon or 
the use of or threatened use of physical force or physical violence of a 
high and aggravated nature, yet criminal sexual conduct for non-
spouses includes coercion without these aggravating circumstances.103  
Moreover, the punishment for spousal sexual battery (not more than 
ten years), which requires aggravated violence, is identical to criminal 
sexual conduct for non-spouses in the third degree (not more than ten 
years), which requires no aggravated violence.104 
In Tennessee, a man cannot be prosecuted for sexual battery 
against his wife unless he is armed with a weapon or inflicted serious 
bodily injury on her.105  Even with the requirement of a weapon or 
bodily injury, Tennessee still prosecutes spousal sexual battery only as 
a Class D felony,106 while aggravated sexual battery, with the same 
aggravating circumstances, is a Class B felony.107 
C. Modern Justifications 
Although the marital rape exemption has been subjected to 
widespread academic criticism in the past three decades, a number of 
contemporary legal scholars continue to defend the doctrine.  The 
 
2002) (simple rape has marital immunity and does not include force); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) 
(exempts spouses from prosecution for offenses other than forcible offenses); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–2001) (implied requirement of force because spousal immunity 
from rest of sexual assault provision). 
 101. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 53a-70b (West 2002); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 200.373 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Okla. 
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 22 (H.B. 2924) (West); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.2:1 (West 2002). 
 102. “Indications exist that marital rapes often must be substantially more physically 
assaultive than comparable acts by strangers in order to produce prosecution or 
conviction.”  MACKINNON, supra note 13, at 863. 
 103. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) with S.C. CODE 
ANN. 1976 § 16-3-654 (Law. Co-op. 2002). 
 104. Id. 
 105. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d)(1)(A) & (B) (West 2002). 
 106. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d)(2)(A) (West 2002). 
 107. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-504(b) (West 2002). 
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three categories in which marital immunity persists—marital 
immunity for certain sexual offenses, separate marital sexual offense 
statutes, and extra requirements for marital sexual offenses—rest on 
three controversial assumptions about why marital sexual offenses 
should be treated differently.  First and foremost, the requirement of 
separation or divorce in thirteen states before certain sexual offenses 
are legally cognizable rests on the classic assumption of ongoing 
consent in a marriage.  Without separation or divorce, there is no 
nonconsent associated with the sexual interaction and, hence, no 
crime.  Second, the marital exemption for mentally incapacitated 
rape, unconscious rape, and sexual offenses without extra force in 
more than twenty states rests on the assumption that, because of the 
“implied authorization” granted by marriage, spousal sexual offenses 
that do not involve serious physical force are not important enough or 
harmful enough for the justice system to criminalize.108  Third, the 
downgrading of spousal offenses across the board in seven states, the 
application of lesser penalties to spousal sexual offenses, and the 
refusal to prosecute spousal sexual offenses without prompt 
complaint rests on the assumption that spousal sexual offenses in 
general are not important enough or harmful enough for the justice 
system to criminalize.  This justification, too, stems from the ongoing 
consent ideology.  I will address each of these notions in turn. 
First, the requirement of separation or divorce before certain 
sexual offenses are legally cognizable in thirteen states flows directly 
from Hale’s theory of ongoing consent.  A number of scholars have 
argued that a woman who has previously consented to sexual 
intercourse with a man should be assumed to have given her ongoing 
consent to future sexual acts.  The 1962 Commentary to the Model 
Penal Code’s comprehensive marital rape exemption, for example, 
mirrors Hale’s analysis on ongoing consent: 
[M]arriage . . . while not amounting to a legal waiver of the 
woman’s right to say “no,” does imply a kind of generalized consent 
that distinguishes some versions of the crime of rape from parallel 
behavior by a husband.  The relationship itself creates a 
presumption of consent, valid until revoked.109 
More than three decades later, some scholars continue to 
advance a similar argument.  For example, when advancing a position 
to increase convictions of acquaintance rapists, John Ingram argues 
that a man who has a sexual relationship with a woman may presume 
that he has consent to future sex with her: 
Parents habitually kiss their young children at bedtime; business 
friends shake hands when they see each other; relatives exchange 
 
 108. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 109. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, Comment (ALI 1985) (emphasis added). 
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hugs at holiday time.  The parties involved in such conduct assume 
it will continue.  It would be cumbersome and ludicrous to 
reestablish consent to such physical contact on each occasion.  If 
there has been consent in the past, and no present words or actions 
indicate a change in attitude, it is reasonable to presume that 
consent continues.  I believe the same should be true in sexual 
relationships. 110 
Ingram, therefore, advocates that the law harbor a “rebuttable 
presumption” of consent to whatever prior sexual intimacies the 
parties had previously engaged in.111  Although this “rebuttable 
presumption” may be overcome without dissolution of the 
marriage,112 it continues to assume that consent may be ongoing, 
extending through time unless there are changed circumstances. 
Second, marital exemptions for mentally incapacitated rape and 
unconscious rape in twenty states derive from a belief that non-
forcible spousal sexual offenses are not harmful enough for the justice 
system to criminalize because of ongoing consent.  Some scholars 
have argued that the previously discussed presumption of ongoing 
consent should extend to circumstances in which a woman cannot 
consent to sexual acts because she is incapacitated or unconscious.  
For example, the Commentary to the marital immunity provision in 
the Model Penal Code explains: 
At a minimum . . . husbands must be exempt from those categories 
of liability based not on force or coercion but on a presumed 
 
 110. John Dwight Ingram, Date Rape: It’s Time for “No” to Really Mean “No,” 21 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 3, 26 (1993).  Ingram argued that the solution to increasing convictions of 
nonviolent nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a voluntary social companion was to 
label it “sexual assault” instead of “rape.”  Id. at 26.  “Studies show that when such sexual 
conduct is labeled ‘sexual assault’ or some similar term, usually punishable less severely 
than rape, there is a much greater likelihood of conviction, especially in a jury trial.”  Id. 
(footnotes omitted).  In turn, Ingram speculated that an increase in convictions for 
nonstranger assaults might encourage victims to report their attacks, and ultimately result 
in less frequent assaults.  Id.  Ingram even found merit to a proposal that a woman, after 
being sexually assaulted, should pursue an indecent exposure charge instead of a rape 
count.  Id. at 27.  Doing so, he argued, would eliminate many problems that women face 
when accusing someone of rape.  “Among the advantages of this approach are: (1) police 
do not have any respect for men who expose themselves to women, and will not show any 
boys-will-be-boys deference for the accused; (2) the police will not treat the victim as a 
whore; (3) the woman will not be embarrassed and mistrusted by police, prosecutors, 
friends, and relatives; (4) the assaulter will be humiliated and treated as a “weirdo” by his 
friends and relatives and (hopefully) his fellow inmates; and (5) it is very unlikely that a 
consent defense will succeed.”  Id.  Ingram recognized that the penalty for an indecent 
exposure conviction would be less than for a rape charge, but he insisted that it will 
“arguably” lead to “increased prosecution and conviction of sexual assaulters, which may 
help in eventually reducing the number of sexual assaults.”  Id. 
 111. Id. at 30. 
 112. Id. at 31 (“even when a presumption can be said to exist, sexual partners should 
require very little to rebut or negate it”). 
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incapacity of the woman to consent.  For example, a man who has 
intercourse with his unconscious wife should scarcely be 
condemned to felony liability on the ground that the woman in such 
circumstances is incapable of consenting to sex with her own 
husband, at least unless there are aggravating circumstances.  The 
same holds true for intercourse with a wife who for some reason 
other than unconsciousness is not aware that a sexual act is 
committed upon her.113 
Michael Hilf argues that this kind of marital immunity is justified 
by the lesser expectation of personal autonomy that women have 
when they enter marriage: 
While an act of non-consensual intercourse is an interference with 
personal autonomy, a married person’s general expectation of 
autonomy is less than a single person’s. . . .  It is obvious that some 
personal autonomy is sacrificed when one enters into a marital 
relation in order to allow for some degree of marital autonomy.  A 
married person has, to some extent, a lesser expectation of personal 
autonomy; therefore, the affront to one’s autonomy is less in the 
case of spousal rape than in the case of ordinary rape. . . .  While a 
married person’s interest in bodily integrity is not inconsiderable, a 
balance must be struck between the individual’s interest in private 
autonomy and the public policy favoring spousal immunity.114 
Hilf suggests the circumstances in which “the public policy 
favoring spousal immunity” outweighed the wife’s “interest in private 
autonomy.”115  He asks, “Do we quite seriously want to subject to 
criminal liability a husband who begins to engage in sexual contact 
with his sleeping or intoxicated wife?  To ask the question is to 
answer it.”116 
In an influential article in the Columbia Law Review, Donald 
Dripps crystallizes a theory about sexual intercourse under these 
circumstances with his notion of “implied authorization” for sex.117  
 
 113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, Comment (ALI 1985). 
 114. Michael Gary Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 31, 41 
(1980). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 43. 
 117. Dripps, supra note 5, at 1800.  Dripps uses the term “sexual expropriation” to 
describe nonconsensual, nonviolent sex.  He claims that expropriation should be criminal, 
but to a lesser degree than forced sex involving violence.  Id. at 1799–1800.  Dripps also 
argued that legislatures should replace rape statutes with graded statutory offenses based 
on the amount of force used, punishing acts of violence more harshly than “nonviolent 
pressures.”  Id. at 1800.  Dripps argued, “[p]hysical violence in general does far more harm 
to the victim’s welfare than an unwanted sex act.”  Id.  He continued, “[p]eople 
generally . . . would rather be subjected to unwanted sex than be shot, slashed or beaten 
with a tire iron.”  Panel Discussion: Donald Dripps, Linda Fairstein, Robin West, 
Panelists, Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM. L. REV. 125, 141 (1994) (hereinafter 
Panel Discussion).  In comparing a serial stranger rape, where violence was threatened 
during the crime, to a college acquaintance rape, Dripps believed that although the 
acquaintance rape victim suffered, she suffered less than the victim of the stranger rape.  
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He poses a hypothetical set of facts: A married couple returns home 
from a party very drunk.  After his wife passes out “unconscious on 
the bed,” the man “engages in coitus with her.”118  Dripps argues that, 
although the wife never consented to the sexual act, he enjoyed 
“implied authorization” to penetrate her without her consent.119  
According to Dripps, the man’s “implied authorization” to have sex 
derives from the fact that the woman has, “while sober and over a 
long course of dealing, approved of a complex relationship in which 
sex plays a prominent role.”120  Dripps’s argument for “implied 
authorization” for unconscious, nonconsensual sexual relations is one 
modern manifestation of the ongoing consent ideology. 
Third, the wholesale downgrading of spousal offenses, the 
application of lesser penalties to these offenses, and the refusal to 
prosecute them without a prompt complaint in seven states suggest 
that some scholars and legislators believe that spousal sexual offenses 
in general are not important enough or harmful enough for the justice 
system to criminalize.  Many people believe that there is no harm in 
sexual intercourse without consent when a man has been previously 
intimate with a woman.  Media images tend to depict wife rape as a 
“petty conflict” or “trivial event” stirred by an excess of male sexual 
passion and resulting in little authentic suffering for women.121  
Consequently, people tend to believe that wife rape is a less 
 
Id.  Robin West responded that Dripps trivializes the effects of unwanted sex on a victim: 
“From the victim’s perspective, unwanted sexual penetration involves unwanted force, and 
unwanted force is violent. . . .  Dripps omits this central feature of the experience.”  Robin 
L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
1442, 1448 (1993).  For his part, Dripps referred to West’s argument as an “insistence on 
equating ardor with violence,” one that gives “an inadequate account of the evil of sexual 
assault.”  Donald A. Dripps, More on Distinguishing Sex, Sexual Expropriation, and 
Sexual Assault: A Reply to Professor West, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1460, 1461 (1993). 
 118. Dripps, supra note 5, at 1801. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 14–15.  See also HELEN BENEDICT, 
VIRGIN OR VAMP: HOW THE PRESS COVERS SEX CRIMES 25–87 (1992) (discussing one of 
first marital rape trials in country, Rideout trial).  In covering a trial involving accusations 
of rape by Greta Rideout against her husband, John, reporters gave significant attention 
to the defense attorney’s allegations and arguments.  Id. at 57 (noting “the slant against 
Greta in the printed stories . . . was so unmistakable”).  The reporters were caught up in 
the sensationalism and national intrigue surrounding the trial.  Id. at 52.  The interest was 
generated merely by the fact that a wife accused her husband of rape, and had little to do 
with the suffering and trauma that results from marital rape.  Id.  When the couple 
reconciled after John’s acquittal for rape, Greta was portrayed as a wife “crying rape for 
revenge and attention,” and was no longer seen “as a victim.”  Id. at 69.  Media coverage 
failed to acknowledge that “rape by an intimate is often more traumatic for the victim 
than by a stranger.”  Id. at 71.  Rather than recognizing Greta as a battered wife who was 
financially dependent on her husband, the media trivialized her allegations of rape as 
“incited by feminists” in order to “cry rape for revenge.”  Id. at 60. 
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traumatizing experience to victims than is stranger rape.122  For 
example, in a 1981 statement in front of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Alabama Senator Jeremiah Denton evaluated “whether 
the anguish caused by intercourse forced by a husband is equivalent 
to that inflicted by intercourse forced by someone else” and 
concluded that the “character of the voluntary association of a 
husband and wife . . . could be thought to mitigate the nature of the 
harm resulting from the unwanted intercourse.”123  Hilf likewise 
argues, “the harm caused by spousal rape would seem to be less 
severe than the harm caused by non-spousal rape.”124 
In short, each of the modern justifications for the current marital 
immunities have at their core the belief that marriage extends to men 
some kind of ongoing consent for sexual acts.  The notion that there 
should be a “rebuttable presumption” of consent to sexual acts, the 
notion of “implied authorization” to mentally incapacitated and 
unconscious sexual acts, and the notion that there is less harm from 
spousal sexual assault because of the “character of the voluntary 
association of a husband and wife,” each derive from Hale’s ongoing 
consent ideology.125 
II.  Formal Neutrality on Marital Status in Sexual Offenses 
The doctrine of ongoing consent underlying both the past and 
current marital immunities in sexual offense statutes contradicts 
circumstances in the real world at an intolerable cost to married 
women.  As a result, states must abolish their current marital 
immunities to achieve formal neutrality on the marital status of the 
parties, affording no status preference to men who sexually abuse 
their wives.  Upon examination, each of the intertwined modern 
justifications for continued marital immunities in sexual offense 
statutes is ultimately unpersuasive.  I will address each in turn. 
 
 122. COLLEEN A. WARD, ATTITUDES TOWARD RAPE: FEMINIST & SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 74 (1995). 
 123. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 137.  In 1985, Lord Justice Mill in England 
concurred: “The rape of a former wife or mistress may have exceptional features which 
make it a less serious offence than otherwise it would be. . . . [I]n some instances the 
violation of the person and defilement that are inevitable features where a stranger rapes a 
woman are not always present to the same degree when the offender and the victim had 
previously had a long-standing sexual relationship.”  R. v. Cox, 7 Crim. App. R. (S.) 422 (6 
Dec. 1985).  See also Comment, Rape and Battery, supra note 3, at 723–24 (“In the 
ordinary marriage relationship the classical form of forcible rape is not probable.  
Presumably the parties have at times been very intimate, and the possibilities of serious 
social, physical, or mental harm from a familiar, if unwanted, conjugal embrace are rather 
small.”). 
 124. Hilf, supra note 114, at 41. 
 125. See FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 137; Dripps, supra note 5, at 1801; 
Ingram, supra note 110, at 30–31. 
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First, a number of scholars have argued that a woman who has 
previously consented to sexual intercourse with a man should be 
presumed to have given her ongoing consent to future sexual acts.  
Because marriage implies a wife’s “generalized consent,” as the 
Model Penal Code terms it, there is a requirement of separation or 
divorce before certain spousal sexual offenses will be considered 
criminal in twelve states.  Without separation or divorce, there is 
consent that prevents those sexual acts from being criminal. 
In the real world, however, many women who experience rape in 
marriage are battered and remain with their abusers for complicated 
reasons other than “generalized consent” to sexual relations in the 
future.126  Battered women are especially vulnerable to wife rape.127  
Studies indicate that between one-third and one-half of battered 
women have been raped one or more times by their batterers.128  A 
woman who is raped by her husband may stay with him because she 
has nowhere to go,129 she may want to provide stability for her young 
children,130 or she may feel love for her husband, despite his sexual 
 
 126. LENORE WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND 
HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 42–45 (1989). 
 127. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 22 (“Battered women are at especially high 
risk of sexual assault.  Studies of battered women regularly show that anywhere from a 
third to a half of them are victims of marital sexual assault.”).  See also Raquel Kennedy 
Bergen, Marital Rape, Violence Against Women Online Resources (1999), at 
http://www.vaw.umn.edu/finaldocuments/Vawnet/mrape.htm [hereinafter Bergen, Marital 
Rape].  Surprisingly, then, there is no section on marital rape in casebook of over 1000 
pages.  CLAIRE DALTON & ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 
(2001). 
 128. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127.  RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 96 (“21 percent of 
the 644 women who had ever married reported being subjected to physical violence by a 
husband at some time in their lives.  This figure may be lower than the true incidence of 
violence in marriage for a number of reasons.  First, it was left to respondents to define 
what they thought constituted physical violence.  They were simply asked the question: 
Was your husband (or ex-husband) ever physically violent with you?  If they said no, there 
was no further probing.”) (emphasis added). 
In one study, 40% of the 1,200 battered women in Denver shelters had been subjected 
to at least one sexual assault by a boyfriend or husband; one-third of those women had 
been sexually assaulted at least once a month.  RUSSELL, supra note 6, at xxi, xxviii .  That 
said, some women have been raped in marriage but not battered.  FINKELHOR & YLLO, 
supra note 14, at 45 (40% of marital rape victims were not routinely beaten by their 
husbands and “these women had not been subjected to the frequent and frightening 
outbursts that the victims of battering had”); Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127 (“Four 
percent of women in [Russell’s] sample who had ever been married had been raped by 
their partners but not battered.  In what Finkelhor and Yllo (1985) have called ‘force-only 
rape,’ husbands use only the amount of force necessary to coerce their wives; battering 
may not be characteristic of these relationships.  Forty percent of Finkelhor and Yllo’s 
sample of women were victims of ‘force-only rape.’”). 
 129. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 222. 
 130. Id. at 220. 
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abuse.131  Many victims of wife rape are financially unable to leave.132  
A number of victims are told by family, friends, religious leaders, or 
health professionals that they should stay.133  Many rapists tell their 
wives that they will murder them if they leave.134  In fact, sexual abuse 
as well as other physical abuse frequently increases when women do 
declare their intention to leave or actually leave their spouses.135 
 
 131. Patricia Mahoney et al., Violence Against Women by Intimate Relationship 
Partners, in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 143, 147 (Claire M. Renzetti 
et al. eds., 2001) (“In particular, a woman’s opportunities to leave an abusive relationship 
can be affected in a variety of ways by sharing her life with her perpetrator.  For example, 
the perpetrator may control all aspects of family finances; this can keep a woman from 
having enough financial resources to leave, but it may also serve to keep her ignorant of 
the skills she would need to support herself on her own.”). 
 132. See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 220 (“For 90 percent of the women who stayed, their 
husbands provided the money they lived on at the time of the survey, as compared with 24 
percent of the wives who were no longer married to the men who raped them.”); see also 
id. (“Most significant of all is that all nineteen of the wives (100 percent) who were the 
sole providers of the household income at the time of the first wife rape were no longer 
married to the men who raped them.  This is powerful evidence that economic resources 
play a key role in why raped wives stay.”) 
 133. State v. Morrison, 426 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1981) (counselors at mental health institution 
told wife rape victim that they could do nothing for her and that she should go home with 
rapist).  See also FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 27 (“One night he knocked her 
out completely with a punch in the mouth.  Another time he threw a knife at her.  That 
same evening, in front of his parents, he threw her to the ground and kicked her in the 
head.  He burned her with a cigarette.  He locked her in their shed for an evening.  His 
mother warned her to leave: ‘He’s gonna kill you.’  Then, when she did so, the mother 
begged her to go back to him, because he was so distraught she thought he would commit 
suicide.”).  See also id. at 32 (obviously violently raped woman asked her doctor what was 
wrong with her husband and he responded, “The only thing wrong with him is that he is a 
sex maniac.  He needs to have his sexual satisfaction”); id. at 127 (marital rape victim 
“stayed with her husband for years on the advice of her fundamentalist pastor”). 
Women also experience doctors who treat the effects of obvious sexual violence but 
do nothing to help.  See FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 32 (“He would put his 
whole hand inside her vagina and try to pull [the vagina] inside out.  Once when he did 
this he began to hurt her so badly that she kicked him away with her feet.  As he pulled 
away, his fist ripped her vagina, and she started to bleed ‘like somebody had turned the 
water on.’  Four blood transfusions later, she recovered, but the doctor told her she had 
been very, very lucky.  Unfortunately, the doctor neither asked about the cause of the 
injury nor reported it to the police.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 74 S.W.3d 663, 667 (Ark. 2002) (victim testified that Jones 
told her “that if I wanted out of the marriage by divorce I wouldn’t get it because the only 
way to get out of our marriage was like our wedding vows is through death and I would 
have to die.”); Hernandez v. State, 804 S.W.2d 168, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (victim did 
not file for divorce because Hernandez “threatened to kill her”); State v. Morrison, 426 
A.2d 47 (N.J. 1981) (estranged husband taped photo of gravesite to victim’s door, 
indicating that their marriage would only end in death). 
 135. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 25 (“A wife’s leaving or threatening to 
leave her marriage frequently provokes a marital rape.  Irene Frieze, in fact, found that 
among the group of battered women she studied, leaving or threatening to leave was the 
factor that was most often associated with a sexual assault.  In our study, over two-thirds 
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Many, perhaps most, women who are raped by their spouses do 
not leave the relationship after the first instance of rape.136  In a 1998 
Pennsylvania case, for example, the victim testified that her husband, 
Richter, had on a previous occasion raped her and then penetrated 
her with a brush dipped in plumber’s glue.137  After being taken to the 
hospital and treated for serious internal injuries, she reported the 
rape to authorities.138  Richter pled guilty to aggravated assault and 
was sentenced to probation and a stay-away order.  Nevertheless, six 
weeks later, Richter moved in with his wife again.139  After some time, 
they divorced.  Three years after the first rape, Richter went to his ex-
wife’s house, beat her in the face, broke her tooth, and then forced 
sex on her.140  She was again hospitalized from his attack.  A few years 
later, Richter again raped her.  The first time Richter sexually 
assaulted his wife was no less a rape simply because the parties were 
still married.  One cannot assume that Richter’s wife gave 
“generalized consent” to sex with him based on their marriage. 
Like Richter’s wife, battered wives who are raped are at the 
greatest risk of sustaining serious injury from their husbands.141  
 
of the women in our sample were raped in the waning days of a relationship, either after 
previous separations or when they were making plans to get out.”).  See also BERGEN, 
WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 21 (“[W]omen are particularly at risk of being raped when 
they are separated or divorced, because despite the dissolution of the marital bond, this 
sense of entitlement and the belief that their (ex) wives are their property live on.”). 
In one case, for example, Blevins violated a protective order and broke into his family 
home, armed with a pistol, woke his wife, and told her he wanted to have sex with her.  
She resisted.  Blevins v. State, 18 S.W.3d 266, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  He then held 
her at gunpoint, threatened to kill her, gagged her, forcibly injected her with a syringe of 
methamphetamine, and then had sex with her.  Id. at 267–68. 
 136. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 34, at 25–26 (“The vast majority of women in 
this sample did not leave the relationship after the first incident but instead tried to 
manage the violence.  After the first incident, all of the women reported feeling a similar 
sense of shock that the assault was happening to them and a general feeling of disbelief 
that someone they loved was responsible for their pain.”).  For example, in a 1994 Virginia 
case, a wife testified that her husband (who was a police officer and a tenth degree black 
belt in karate) had subjected her to eight to twelve instances of sexual violence over the 
course of their marriage.  Morse v. Commonwealth, 440 S.E.2d 145 (Va. Ct. App. 1994). 
 137. Pennsylvania v. Richter, 711 A.2d 464, 466 (Pa. 1998). 
 138. Richter, 711 A.2d at 466. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. “[V]ictims of wife rape are at greater risk of being murdered by their husbands, or 
of murdering them, than battered women who are not also sexually violated.”  RUSSELL, 
supra note 6, at xxviii.  “[B]attered women who were raped by their male partners were 
significantly more likely to have been beaten during pregnancy than those who had not 
been raped.”  Id. at xxix.  See, e.g., State v. Randle, 647 N.W.2d 324 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) 
(Randle kidnapped his estranged wife, grabbed her when she attempted to escape, put her 
in a headlock, punched her several times in the head, choked her, and then forced sex on 
her).  See also Temple v. State, 517 S.E.2d 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (Temple kicked down 
his estranged wife’s door, choked her, slapped her, beat her with gun, held gun to her head 
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Having been raped is associated with “significantly more serious 
physical violence in terms of the severity and frequency of the 
aggression as well as the severity of the resulting injuries.”142  Without 
separation or divorce, battered wives who are raped are harmed 
physically as well as psychologically by sexual assaults.  For these 
reasons, there should be no requirement of separation or divorce 
before a sexual offense in marriage is legally cognizable. 
Second, a number of scholars have argued that the “generalized 
consent” that marriage grants a husband should extend to 
circumstances in which the wife is mentally incapacitated or 
unconscious and cannot consent.  The related notion is that 
incapacitated or unconscious rape by a spouse is not harmful enough 
for the justice system to recognize.  In a number of states, men even 
enjoy immunity when they themselves drug their wives, rendering 
them unable to consent.143 
 
and threatened to kill her, sexually assaulted her with gun, and beat her until she lost 
consciousness). 
 142. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at xxviii.  “They found that battered women who were also 
raped had significantly lower self-esteem than women who had only been battered.  
Campbell also reports that women in her study who were raped and battered by their male 
partners had significantly lower self-esteem than those who had not been raped, ‘even if it 
happened only once or early in the relationship.’”  Id.  See also Lisa A. Goodman et al., 
Violence Against Women: Physical and Mental Health Effects, in APP. & PREVENTIVE 
PSYCH. 79, 84 (1993) (“[B]attered women who are raped by their partners are likely to 
experience more severe nonsexual attacks than other battered women.”).  It is also 
associated with increased anxiety and paranoid ideation as well as damaged body image 
and numerous physical ailments for the victim.  RUSSELL, supra note 6, at xxix. 
 143. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-65 (5) (West 2002) (definition of mentally incapacitated 
is when “person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling such 
person’s conduct owing to the influence of a drug or intoxicating substance 
administered . . . without such person’s consent”) (emphasis added); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 707-700 (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (mentally 
incapacitated defined as person who is “rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or 
controlling the person’s conduct owing to the influence of a substance administered to the 
person without the person’s consent”) (emphasis added); MD. CRIM. LAW § 3-301 (West 
2002) (mentally incapacitated defined as “an individual who, because of the influence of a 
drug, narcotic, or intoxicating substance, or because of an act committed on the individual 
without the individual’s consent . . . is rendered substantially incapable of appraising the 
nature of the individual’s conduct”) (emphasis added); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in first 
through fourth degrees based solely on his or her spouse being under age 16, mentally 
incapable or mentally incapacitated); § 750.520a (definition of mentally incapacitated is 
when “person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her 
conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance administered to 
that person without his or her consent”) (emphasis added); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609-341 
(West 2002), amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) 
(mentally incapacitated defined as “person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, 
anesthetic, or any other substance, administered to that person without the person’s 
agreement”) (emphasis added); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97 (2002) (mentally 
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As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that drugging a 
wife to have sex with her is not an uncommon weapon in a batterer’s 
arsenal.144  In one case, for example, a man laced his wife’s food with 
half a bottle of anti-depressants, rendering her unconscious.145  While 
she was unconscious, he orally and digitally penetrated her as he 
videotaped the episode.146  The use of drugs is analogous to the use of 
physical force to render a woman incapacitated.  Some men beat or 
 
incapacitated defined as “one rendered incapable of knowing or controlling his or her 
conduct, or incapable of resisting due to the influence of any drug, narcotic, anesthetic, or 
other substance administered to that person without his or her consent”); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2907.02(a) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File 156 (H.B. 485) 
(West) (rape includes when “for the purpose of preventing resistance, the offender 
substantially impairs the other person’s judgment or control by administering any drug, 
intoxicant, or controlled substance to the other person surreptitiously or by force, threat of 
force, or deception”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) (“Rape is an act of 
sexual intercourse involving vaginal or anal penetration accomplished with a male or 
female who is not the spouse of the perpetrator” where the victim is “incapable through 
mental illness or any other unsoundness of mind; where the victim is intoxicated by a 
narcotic or anesthetic agent, administered by or with the privity of the accused as a means 
of forcing the victim to submit; or where the victim is at the time unconscious of the nature 
of the act.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-1 (1953–2001) (mentally incapacitated defined 
as a “person who is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her 
conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance administered to 
that person without his or her consent”) (emphasis added); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 
(Law. Co-op. 2002) (criminal sexual conduct in first degree includes when “the actor 
causes the victim, without the victim’s consent, to become mentally incapacitated or 
physically helpless by administering, distributing, dispensing, delivering . . . a controlled 
substance”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501 (West 2002) (mentally incapacitated defined 
as “person [who is] rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling the 
person’s conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic or other substance 
administered to that person without the person’s consent”) (emphasis added). 
Louisiana’s rape statute does not include marital immunity “when the victim is 
incapable of resisting or of understanding the nature of the act by reason of stupor or 
abnormal condition of the mind produced by a narcotic or anesthetic agent or other 
controlled dangerous substance administered by the offender and without the knowledge 
of the victim.”  However, there is marital immunity when someone other than the offender 
administers the substance.  La. R.S. 14:43 (A)(1)–(2). 
 143. S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (sexual conduct in first 
degree includes when actor causes victim to become physically helpless, defined as 
unconscious, asleep or “for any other reason physically unable to communicate 
unwillingness to an act”). 
 144. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127.  See also The Wife Rape Information Page, 
at http://www.wellesley.edu/WCW/mrape.html (last visited June 7, 2003) (discussing how 
sex may be accomplished without woman’s consent if she is under influence of alcohol or 
drugs, is unconscious or asleep, or permanently or temporarily disabled). 
 145. See Trigg v. State, 759 So. 2d 448 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (defendant engaged in 
sexual acts with unconscious wife after drugging her). 
 146. See id. at 450. 
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choke their wives to render them unconscious before raping them.147  
As one victim in a study on wife rape described: 
[My husband] would try to choke me, and then I would pass out.  
Then he would rape me.  He would put me to sleep and then rape 
me.  Sometimes when we were out somewhere, and he didn’t like 
something I did, he would say, “You wanna go to sleep?” and laugh 
like it was real funny.  It was like a punishment.148 
Although most states would recognize the choking here as force 
that makes the sexual offense rape, too many states would not 
recognize drugging a wife for the identical purpose as force that 
makes the sexual offense rape. 
Distinct from the issue of deliberate drugging on the part of the 
husband, in twenty states men enjoy immunity when they simply take 
advantage of their wives’ mental incapacity or unconsciousness to 
have sex with them without their consent.149  Some scholars roundly 
dismiss the potential harm of this kind of invasion.  Dripps argues 
that it should not be criminal for a man to penetrate his wife when she 
is passed out.150  The problems with this position are both principled 
and practical. 
As a matter of principle, the argument in favor of the marital 
exemption for mental incapacitation or unconscious rape ignores or 
greatly undervalues a married woman’s sexual autonomy—her 
freedom to decide whether and when to engage in intercourse.151  A 
woman has the right to reserve her body for her own ends and not to 
be used as an object for someone else’s ends.152  Affording married 
 
 147. See State v. Beliveau, No. 01AP-211, 2001 WL 1286495, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) 
(defendant threw his girlfriend down and raped her while she was unconscious).  Although 
this case involved a man and his girlfriend, the factual situation is relevant to demonstrate 
how a person can rape their partner, whether married or not, after knocking them 
unconscious.  Beyond intimate relationships, there are many cases where acquaintances 
have taken advantage of women and girls who have passed out or become semi-conscious 
due to intoxication or drugs.  See, e.g., State v. Farnum, 554 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 1996) (victim awoke from an unconscious state to find defendant had already 
penetrated her vagina). 
 148. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 19.  See also Charlotte Watts & Cathy 
Zimmerman, Violence Against Women: Global Scope and Magnitude, 359 LANCET 1232 
(2002) (surveying women around globe for instances of intimate partner violence).  The 
authors noted that research carried out in Zimbabwe showed that 26% of married women 
had been subjected to forced sex by their partners, and that of those women, 12% 
reported being forced while they were asleep.  See id. 
 149. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 151. For a general discussion of sexual autonomy in other rape contexts, see STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE 
OF LAW at ix–x (1998). 
 152. Although a woman passed out cold is not dead, she is, perhaps, as close as one 
could get.  Laws that allow men to penetrate women who are unconscious treat women’s 
bodies as lifeless receptacles. 
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women this right is crucial to their dignity and equality under the law.  
It is this right that rape laws should be designed to protect.153 
Hilf argues, however, “A married person has, to some extent, a 
lesser expectation of personal autonomy; therefore, the affront to 
one’s autonomy is less in the case if spousal rape than in the case of 
ordinary rape.”154  While married individuals may have lesser 
expectations of certain kinds of autonomy, it does not follow that in 
the sexual realm, a woman’s autonomy must bow to the demands of 
her husband’s interest in obtaining sex.  A man’s desire for an orgasm 
simply does not outweigh his wife’s interest in avoiding the invasion 
of unwanted intercourse.  A married woman’s expectation of sexual 
autonomy should be no less than a single person’s. 
As a practical matter, the argument that incapacitated and 
unconscious rape are not harmful reveals ignorance about the perils 
of sexual penetration for a woman.  A man who penetrates a woman 
when she is unconscious denies her the power to negotiate the use of 
contraceptives and other protection to prevent pregnancy and 
disease.  In the 1921 Alabama case, for example, when the wife 
withdrew from sexual relations in order to stop having children, her 
husband proceeded to force her to have sex against her will.155  If she 
had been drugged and he had taken advantage of her unconscious 
state and made her pregnant as a result, the primary injury she sought 
to avoid—unwanted pregnancy—would have been the same.  
Unwanted pregnancy and disease are serious injuries for both 
unmarried and married women. 
Even if the man does not make his unconscious wife pregnant 
against her will or give her a sexually transmitted disease, he has 
profoundly degraded her bodily integrity.  Women’s dry orifices are 
not permeable.  To penetrate them takes force that may bruise, tear, 
and otherwise damage tissue.156  Physical and psychological pain will 
likely greet the woman when she regains consciousness.  These 
injuries and this suffering matter.  Sexual injury and suffering are 
what rape laws should be designed to prevent.  Because incapacitated 
and unconscious rape denies sexual autonomy and causes harm, the 
 
 153. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 151, at 99–113. 
 154. See Hilf, supra note 114, at 41. 
 155. Anonymous, 89 So. 462 (Ala. 1921). 
 156. Despite this potential, most victims do not have this kind of corroborating physical 
evidence of rape.  The vast majority of rape victims suffer little or no physical injury in 
addition to the rape itself.  Susan B. Sorenson & Judith M. Siegel, Gender, Ethnicity, and 
Sexual Assault: Findings from a Los Angeles Study, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 93, 97 (1992).  About 
10% of rape victims suffer extrinsic physical injury.  Id.  Only 5% suffer serious, extrinsic 
injury.  See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX 
OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 
12 (1997). 
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twenty states that currently provide immunity for it should abolish 
that immunity. 
Third, a number of scholars have argued that spousal sexual 
offenses in general are not harmful enough for the justice system to 
criminalize.  It is this argument that underlies the general 
downgrading of spousal sexual offenses, subjecting them to lesser 
penalties and requiring prompt complaints in seven states.  
Interestingly, it is the ongoing consent in marriage that supposedly 
makes spousal sexual assaults less harmful.  As previously mentioned, 
Senator Denton argued that the “character of the voluntary 
association of a husband and wife . . . could be thought to mitigate the 
nature of the harm resulting from the unwanted intercourse.”157  The 
implicit position is that stranger sexual offenses are injurious to 
victims, but, because of ongoing consent, spousal sexual offenses are 
not. 
The research, however, indicates that wife rape is as harmful to 
victims as stranger rape.  Marital sexual attacks are more likely than 
stranger sexual attacks to end in completed rapes rather than 
attempted rapes.158  Wife rape victims are more likely than victims of 
acquaintances or strangers to be raped orally and anally.159  Contrary 
 
 157. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 137.  In 1985, Lord Justice Mill in England 
concurred: “The rape of a former wife or mistress may have exceptional features which 
make it a less serious offence than otherwise it would be. . . .  [I]n some instances the 
violation of the person and defilement that are inevitable features where a stranger rapes a 
woman are not always present to the same degree when the offender and the victim had 
previously had a long-standing sexual relationship.”  R. v. Cox, 7 Crim. App. 422 (1985) 
(concurrence).  See also Comment, Rape and Battery, supra note 3, at 724 (“In the 
ordinary marriage relationship the classical form of forcible rape is not probable.  
Presumably the parties have at times been very intimate, and the possibilities of serious 
social, physical or mental harm from a familiar, if unwanted, conjugal embrace are rather 
small.”). 
 158. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 64 (“It is evident that the more intimate the 
relationship, the more likely the attempts at rape will succeed; thus the number of 
attempted rapes for husbands, lovers, and boyfriends are all very low in comparison to the 
number of attempted rapes by non-intimates.”). 
 159. See Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127.  In one study of marital rape victims that 
did not specifically ask about these experiences, one-third of the raped wives mentioned 
having been subjected to forced anal intercourse and a fifth of them mentioned forced oral 
sex.  FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 30 (“Nearly a quarter said they had been 
subjected to sex in the presence of others—usually their children.  These incidents are not 
disagreements over sexual positions; they are sexual humiliations inflicted on women.”).  
In a study of wife rape victims, “40% of the women reported at least one incident of anal 
rape, and 33% had been forced to perform oral sex on their partners.”  BERGEN, WIFE 
RAPE, supra note 23, at 19.  Both oral and anal rape can have serious psychological 
consequences; moreover, anal rape results in serious physical damage to the victim and 
oral rape can threaten to choke and kill her.  See, e.g., FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, 
at 35 (“Clare said that for weeks afterward she had to defecate standing up, and that the 
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to popular opinion, wife rapes tend to be more violent than stranger 
rapes.160  Men have raped their wives with wooden batons, fists, dogs, 
and loaded firearms.161  The physical consequences of wife rape can, 
therefore, be painful and dangerous: 
The physical effects of marital rape may include injuries to the 
vaginal and anal areas, lacerations, soreness, bruising, torn muscles, 
fatigue and vomiting.  Women who have been battered and raped 
by their husbands may suffer other physical consequences including 
broken bones, black eyes, bloody noses, and knife wounds that 
occur during the sexual violence.  [Researchers] report that one 
half of the marital rape survivors in their sample were kicked, hit or 
burned during sex.  Specific gynecological consequences of marital 
rape include vaginal stretching, miscarriages, stillbirths, bladder 
infections, infertility and the potential contraction of sexually 
transmitted diseases, including HIV.162 
Despite the serious physical consequences of wife rape, the 
psychological consequences are usually more devastating.163  Short-
 
injury took five years to heal fully.  Another woman said that repeated anal rapes left her 
rectum torn and bleeding.”). 
 160. Patricia Rozee, Stranger Rape, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION: 
A HANDBOOK 97 (Michele Antoinette Paludi ed., 1999).  For a discussion of the kinds of 
force used in marital rape, see RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 112. 
 161. See, e.g., Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 776 (Wyo. 1987) (defendant battered and 
raped his wife with a wooden baton); Temple v. State, 517 S.E.2d 850, 851 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1999) (Temple kicked down estranged wife’s door, choked her, slapped her, beat her with 
gun, held gun to her head, threatened to kill her, sexually assaulted her with gun, and beat 
her until she lost consciousness); People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) 
(defendant raped victim with his fist repeatedly, ripping her vagina and causing internal 
damage, after which victim suffered from long-term urinary incontinence); State v. 
Dominy, 6 S.W.3d 472, 474 (Tenn. 1999) (Dominy repeatedly raped wife with dog).  For 
other victim’s stories see, e.g., BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 16 (“I was cooking, 
and he came out and started to hassle me, and I burned the eggs and then he started 
beating me because I had burned them.  So he beat me up for a half hour, I guess, and 
then he said, ‘OK, bitch, get back upstairs,’ and I knew he wanted sex just by the way he 
said it.  I said, ‘I can’t do that now because I’m really upset and I can’t make love to 
someone who beat me up’ . . . and he said ‘now,’ and he turned off the stove and ripped off 
my pajamas and started punching me . . . and I got into the corner and was all curled up 
and he picked me up and threw me on the bed and did his thing.  It was disgusting, and 
afterward I got up and threw up.”); id. at 17 (“Sometimes we would go to bed, and he 
would push my legs aside and force sex on me.  Or he would grab my head and force me 
[to give him oral sex]. . . .  Other times he would beat the crap out of me in bed or hold a 
gun to my head to force me.”). 
 162. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127.  See also BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 
23, at 59. 
 163. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 15, at 126 (“The destruction of the ability to trust 
was the most common long-term effect of rape in marriage that our interviewees 
mentioned.  Marital rape constituted for them not only a sexual assault, but a violation of 
trust and intimacy.  The shock experienced by a woman who was sexually brutalized by 
the man she had loved and trusted above all others did not wane quickly.  More than a 
third of our interviewees felt that their ability to trust and develop intimate relationships 
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term psychological effects of wife rape may include “anxiety, shock, 
intense fear, depression, suicidal ideation, and post-traumatic stress 
disorder.”164  Long-term psychological effects may include 
“disordered eating, sleep problems, depression, problems establishing 
trusting relationships, and increased negative feelings about 
themselves” as well as “flash-backs, sexual dysfunction, and 
emotional pain for years after the violence.”165  In one study of raped 
wives, “[m]ore than half of the women mentioned considering or 
attempting suicide at some point.”166 
One reason that wife rapes are so traumatic is that victims are 
less likely to tell family members, rape crisis counselors, or police 
officers about their experiences, and they are less likely to receive 
support when they do.167  In her groundbreaking study on wife rape, 
Diana Russell concluded: 
 
with men had been impaired, the impairment ranging from wanting to withdraw from 
contact with men altogether to feeling great caution in relations with men; from an 
underlying disdain to an outright hatred.”).  See also Mark A. Whatley, For Better or 
Worse: The Case of Marital Rape, 8 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 29, 33 (1993) (“Women who 
are victims of marital rape have a hard time trusting men; an increased phobia of intimacy 
and sex, and a lasting fear of being sexually assaulted again.”). 
 164. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127.  In Diana Russell’s ground breaking study 
of marital rape, 56% of the victims she studied were “extremely upset” by having been 
raped, 21% were “very upset” and 18% were somewhat upset.  RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 
191. 
 165. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127.  See also FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 
14, at 126 (“In addition to the immediate trauma of marital rape, the victims we talked to 
reported serious long-term effects.  Some were still experiencing them five or ten years 
after they had divorced their husbands.  They talked about an inability to trust.  They 
talked about lingering fear and emotional pain.  They talked about terrifying flashbacks 
and nightmares.  They talked about apprehensions about men and sexual dysfunctions—
problems that kept them from having a social life, or that interfered with subsequent 
marriages.”); BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at  60 (“Like other survivors of sexual 
assault, many of the women in this sample commonly experienced flashbacks and ongoing 
nightmares about their assaults.”).  See also Lee Bidwell & Priscilla White, The Family 
Context of Rape, 1 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 277, 283 (1986) (“The depersonalization and 
devaluation that accompany the act of rape must be especially devasting [sic] when the 
rapist is your husband.”). 
Again, contrary to popular opinion, wife rape victims may experience more anger and 
depression than do stranger rape victims.  Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127.  But see 
Rozee, supra note 160, at 107 (“Some studies have found that stranger rape seems to be 
related to greater depression and fear (Ellis, Atkeson, & Calhoun, 1981), while others 
have found no difference in mental health outcomes among date, stranger, and marital 
rape survivors (Resick, 1993).”). 
 166. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 59.  See also Whatley, supra note 163, at 33 
(“[V]ictims of marital rape turn to drugs and alcohol, [and] attempt suicide.”) 
 167. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127.  Stranger rape survivors are more likely 
than acquaintance rape survivors to reach out for social support and are more likely to 
report the attack to authorities.  Rozee, supra note 160, at 97. 
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[W]ife rape can be as terrifying and life threatening to the victim as 
stranger rape.  In addition, it often evokes a powerful sense of 
betrayal, deep disillusionment, and total isolation.  Women often 
receive very poor treatment by friends, relatives, and professional 
services when they are raped by strangers.  This isolation can be 
even more extreme for victims of wife rape.  And just as they are 
more likely to be blamed, they are more likely to blame 
themselves.168 
In addition to feeling betrayed, isolated, and blamed, victims of 
wife rape are also more likely than victims of stranger rape to endure 
multiple offenses from their attackers and to suffer from persistent 
terror.169  In their follow-up study on marital rape, David Finkelhor 
and Kersti Yllo reported that fifty percent of the women in their 
 
 168. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 198; Charlene Muehlenhard & Barry Highby, Coercive 
Sex, in SEXUALITY IN AMERICA: UNDERSTANDING OUR SEXUAL VALUES AND 
BEHAVIOR 172, 178 (Robert Francoeur et al. eds., 1998) (hereinafter SEXUALITY IN 
AMERICA) (“Victims of acquaintance rape are as likely as victims of stranger rape to 
experience depression, anxiety, problems with relationships, problems with sex, and 
thoughts of suicide.  Women who are raped by acquaintances they had trusted may doubt 
their ability to evaluate the character of others and may be reluctant to trust others.  
Women raped by acquaintances are less likely than women raped by strangers to be 
believed and supported by others.”). 
 169. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127 (“Marital rape may be even more traumatic 
than rape by a stranger because a wife lives with her assailant and she may live in constant 
terror of another assault whether she is awake or asleep.”).  See also id. (“Women who are 
raped by their husbands are likely to be raped many times—often 20 times or more before 
they are able to end the violence.”); FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 23 (“For most 
marital-rape victims, rape is a chronic and constant threat, not an isolated problem.  The 
battered women, of course, were the most vulnerable of all to such repeated sexual abuse.  
Twice as many battered women suffered from chronic rapes (twenty times or more) as the 
other raped women.”); Muehlenhard & Highby, supra note 168, at 179 (“Whereas stranger 
rape is typically a one-time occurrence, the rape of wives and other partners is likely to 
occur repeatedly and may last for years.  The more frequently women are raped by their 
husbands or partners, the more likely they are to suffer from grave long-term 
consequences.”); Mahoney et al., supra note 131, at 147 (“When a woman lives with her 
perpetrator, one of the ways her situation is different from the woman attacked by a 
stranger is that she has no safe haven, no place where she can feel safe and secure from 
another attack.  Even women who do not live with their intimate partners may not feel, as 
dates and ex-partners often know how best to break into a woman’s home; they know 
which doors and windows have no locks and when a woman may be most vulnerable.”); 
Kersti Yllo, Wife Rape: A Social Problem for the 21st Century, 5 VIOL. AG. WOMEN 1059, 
1060 (1999) (“When you are raped by a stranger, you live with a frightening memory, but 
when you are raped by your husband, you live with your rapist.”). 
For a victim’s perspective, see BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 43 (“It was 
very clear to me.  He raped me.  He ripped off my pajamas, he beat me up.  I mean, some 
scumbag down the street would do that to me.  So to me it wasn’t any different because I 
was married to him, it was rape—real clear what it was.  It emotionally hurt worse [than 
stranger rape].  I mean you can compartmentalize it as stranger rape—you were at the 
wrong place at the wrong time.  You can manage to get over it differently.  But here 
you’re at home with your husband, and you don’t expect that.  I was under constant terror 
[from then on] even if he didn’t do it.”). 
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study had been sexually assaulted twenty times or more.170  The 
negative physical and mental consequences of such repeated sexual 
attacks include chronic injury and trauma.171  Given the serious 
physical and psychological harm of wife rape, the seven states that 
currently maintain such unfair requirements should not downgrade it, 
subject it to lesser penalties, or refuse to prosecute it without a 
prompt complaint. 
At a bare minimum, twenty-six states must abolish the remaining 
marital immunity for sexual offenses.  They need to treat marital and 
non-marital sexual assault the same and repeal the laws that require 
separation or divorce, extra force, or prompt complaint, as well as the 
provisions that downgrade spousal sexual offenses or exempt 
incapacitated or unconscious rape from legal condemnation. 
Formal neutrality as to the marital status of the parties in sexual 
offense statutes is, at this point, long overdue.  Although legal 
scholars have not until now specifically analyzed and challenged the 
provisions that remain in statutes today, some have argued generally 
for the deletion of marital exemptions172 or for new provisions that 
authorize the prosecution of wife rape.173  By eliminating the 
provisions that evince bias against married women and favoritism 
toward sexually abusive men, these proposals would achieve formal 
 
 170. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 23.  They continued, “And for the majority 
of the women we talked to, rape was a repeated occurrence.  For some, assaults were so 
common they could not remember how often.”  Id.  See also BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra 
note 23, at 19 (reporting that “most women (55%) were raped frequently—more than 20 
times during the course of their relationships”). 
 171. Mahoney et al., supra note 131, at 146.  She continued, “Intimate violence victims 
experience this multiple victimization by the same perpetrator over time, and the 
perpetrator is likely to employ a variety of types of violence.  For example, the person who 
threatens a woman with a knife is the same person who has beaten her in the past.  Each 
violent episode builds on past violent episodes and threats.”  Id. 
 172. See, e.g., Bearrows, supra note 3, at 222–26 (proposing a rape statute that would be 
silent on relationship between perpetrator and victim and would grade offenses based on 
amount of violence used); Dripps, supra note 5, at 1800 (proposing that legislatures 
replace marital and other rape statutes with graded offenses based on the amount of force 
used); Sitton, supra note 3, at 264 (“[C]omplete abolition of all laws distinguishing among 
rape and sexual assault victims based on their relationship to their assailant is required in 
order for women to achieve equal protection under the law.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Eskow, supra note 3, at 705 (rape statute should first “set[] forth a 
definition of rape that neither affirmatively includes nor excludes spouses as potential 
victims, while the second paragraph [would] clarif[y] that marriage is no defense to 
rape.”).  Although I prefer non-gender neutral terms because rape within marriage is 
overwhelmingly a crime that men commit on women, I use the term spouse because the 
statutes are gender neutral.  See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 9 (“The term ‘wife rape’ is 
preferred over ‘marital rape’ or ‘spousal rape’ because it is not gender neutral.  The term 
‘spousal rape’ in particular seems to convey the notion that rape is something that wives 
do to husbands, if not as readily as husbands do it to wives, at least sufficiently often that a 
gender neutral term should be used.”). 
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neutrality on the question of the marital status of the parties in sexual 
offense statutes. 
III.  Development of the Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates 
As much as formal neutrality on marital status in sexual offense 
statutes is needed, it is not enough.  Even the complete abolition of 
marital immunity in some jurisdictions has done little for raped wives 
who face police, prosecutors, judges, and juries who infer that, absent 
extraordinary violence, the wives’ prior consent to sexual intercourse 
implied ongoing consent to the alleged rape.174  It has also done 
nothing for those women raped by former lovers, boyfriends, and 
cohabitants who face the same legal actors who make the same 
improper inference of ongoing consent.  The ongoing consent 
ideology, applicable to all forms of intimate rape, is perhaps the most 
difficult and enduring problem produced by the marital rape 
exemption. 
When analyzing marital rape, few legal scholars have linked 
marital rape to rape by other intimates.175  By focusing on the formal 
contours of marital immunity in forcible rape statutes, most legal 
 
 174. Following the battle against marital immunity for forcible rape, reformers have 
shown little political will to tackle marital immunities for other sexual offenses.  RUSSELL, 
supra note 6, at xxi.  After the marital exemption for rape was defeated, the battle wound 
down, observed Martin Schwartz in 1989.  Id.  “There is only one problem,” he continued, 
“[n]othing has changed” because reformers “have not created the political climate to allow 
the police to arrest and the prosecutors to prosecute.”  Id.  See also id. at xx (“Only three 
cases of wife rape were reported in Colorado one year after rape in marriage had been 
criminalized.  Byrne no doubt knew that most wives are reluctant to report because of the 
humiliating aspects of the trial and the lack of public sympathy for their plight.”).  See also 
Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127 (“There is a large body of research that addresses 
the inadequate response of the police to the problem of wife abuse. . . .  [I]nterviews with 
marital rape survivors reveal that when police officers learn that the assailant is the 
woman’s husband, they may fail to respond to a call from a victim of marital rape, refuse 
to allow a woman to file a complaint, and/or refuse to accompany her to the hospital to 
collect medical evidence.”). 
 175. Robin West stands as one exception.  West, supra note 3, at 78.  In the concluding 
paragraph of her influential article on the constitutionality of the marital rape exemption, 
she stated: 
[T]he foundational and permanent recognition of women’s rights to be free from 
forced marital sex . . . may be a prerequisite to further progress on a range of 
related issues regarding women’s physical and sexual security.  Date rape and 
acquaintance rape, for example, unlike marital rape, clearly are criminal, but 
they may be insulated from legal prosecution and public condemnation in many 
states at least in part because of their shadow resemblance to marital rape. 
Id.  West saw the formal abolition of the marital rape exemption as a possible precondition 
to ameliorating the legal system’s harsh treatment of date rape victims.  Id.  To treat 
marital rape and date rape as two separate battles, however, may have undermined the 
fight against both. 
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scholars failed to notice the larger problem of the ongoing consent 
ideology that the marital rape exemption originally caused. 
Unlike legal scholars, social scientists when analyzing marital 
rape have often included all intimates in their analysis, regardless of 
the legal status those intimates share.176  As Raquel Kennedy Bergen 
explained in her 1996 book, Wife Rape, “I do this to acknowledge that 
one need not be legally married to suffer the trauma and 
consequences of being raped by one’s intimate partner.”177  The harm 
marital rape causes is not unique to the marital relationship.  It arises 
when intimates cohabitate or date, regardless of the legal status they 
share.178  There are many important similarities between rape by 
intimates and marital rape.  In her book Rape in Marriage, Diana 
Russell detailed those similarities in this way: 
First, in both situations there is frequently a lack of recognition by 
both parties that forced intercourse, or intercourse because of 
threat of force or inability to consent, is rape.  Second, the rape 
often occurs more than once; frequently it occurs many times.  
Third, the woman is often unwilling to employ all her resources, 
particularly her capacity to be violent, when trying to fend off the 
rapist.  Fourth, there is often more of a sense of disillusionment and 
betrayal as a consequence of rape by intimates than when a woman 
is raped by an acquaintance or stranger.  Fifth, the police and public 
at large are often even more skeptical, unsympathetic, and 
unhelpful than in cases of rape by non-intimates.  Sixth, as with a 
husband, the woman often has a hard time getting rid of an 
unwanted male lover when she wants to.  The male lover frequently 
seems to feel his masculine role threatened if it is not he who 
decides on any major changes in the relationship, particularly the 
ending of the sexual side of it.  Even when the relationship is over, 
she may have a hard time getting rid of an ex-lover or ex-husband.  
And seventh, the perception of the woman as an unequal partner 
with unequal rights, indeed, as the property of the man, is also 
evident in both types of relationships.179 
 
 176. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 8.  See also Mahoney et al., supra note 131, 
at 143–44 (“Because we are focusing on intimate violence against women, the perpetrators 
of this type of violence can include current and former husbands, current and former 
boyfriends, and current and former girlfriends (i.e., lesbian relationship partners).  It 
includes people who are dating while living apart as well as those who are cohabiting or 
married; people who share children, as well as those who do not; young people dating for 
the first time and older people who are divorced.”). 
 177. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 8.  See also id. (Furthermore. . . ‘a 
marriage license probably does not change the dynamics of sexual abuse within an 
ongoing intimate relationship, except to make it legal in some states.’  Thus, my sample 
includes legally married women, those who have cohabited with their partners for more 
than a year, and those in partnerships who share a child.). 
 178. For example, one study found that cohabitating intimates had twice the level of 
violence of non-cohabiting intimates.  Mahoney et al., supra note 131, at 161. 
 179. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 269. 
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Russell concluded, “another thing that many lover relationships 
have in common with marriage is that once a woman has voluntarily 
consented to intercourse, many men believe she has given up her 
right to refuse them on future occasions.”180  On many levels, then, 
rape by non-spouse intimates is the functional equivalent of spousal 
rape. 
The question remains whether intimate rape is the legal 
equivalent of marital rape and how the ongoing consent ideology 
manifests itself as a result.  Revisiting the legal history of the marital 
rape exemption sheds light on this question. 
The next section details that history and argues that the driving 
force behind the marital rape exemption has been not marital status 
but intimate sexual relations.  Notably, as society began to de-
criminalize sexual relations outside of marriage, the sexual offense 
immunities provided by statute began to include cohabitants and 
voluntary social companions.  Additionally, rape shield laws routinely 
admitted evidence of the prior sexual history between the defendant 
and the complainant.  These legal changes are two modern 
manifestations of the traditional ongoing consent ideology. 
A. History of the Marital Rape Exemption Revisited 
After noting that sexual intercourse between husband and wife is 
always lawful, Rollin Perkins pointed out in his treatise that “all other 
sexual intercourse is unlawful.”181  Perkins’s second point is crucial.  
Under English common law when Hale formulated the marital rape 
exemption, marriage was the only context in which people were 
legally allowed to be sexually active.  For most of the history of 
English common law, legitimate sexual activity was confined to 
marriage.182  Extra-marital sexual acts—whether consensual or 
nonconsensual—were proscribed by laws on adultery and 
fornication.183  It is important to incorporate the criminalization of 
these other sexual acts into the analysis.  As Anne Coughlin recently 
argued, “we cannot understand rape law unless we study the doctrine, 
not in isolation, but in conjunction with the fornication and adultery 
prohibitions with which it formerly resided and, perhaps, continues to 
reside.”184  Coughlin warned: 
 
 180. Id. at 261. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See generally HALE, supra note 1, at 629 (discussing rationale for marital rape 
exemption). 
 183. Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998). 
 184. See id.  Couglin continued, “By unearthing our ancestors’ belief that all nonmarital 
intercourse should be criminalized, we may begin to understand, even as we reject, the 
inclination of courts to approach rape complaints with deep suspicion.”  Id. at 8. 
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If our critique [of modern rape jurisprudence] is inattentive to the 
sexual proscriptions with which rape formerly coexisted, we may 
fail to articulate the precise forms that sexism previously assumed 
and thus be unable to respond directly to the illiberal and/or anti-
feminist ways of thinking about sexuality presumably still indulged 
by those opposed to rape reform.185 
Attention to the proscriptions on fornication and adultery with 
which rape law formerly coexisted clarifies the precise ways that the 
ongoing consent ideology continues today. 
When viewing the marital rape exemption in light of the broader 
proscription against fornication and adultery, the doctrine’s shape 
shifts.  In a jurisdiction in which all non-marital sexual activity was 
illegal, the rape immunity prohibited women from bringing charges 
against the only men with whom they could have been legally sexually 
active.186  The rape immunity, therefore, was not centrally about the 
formal status of marriage between husband and wife per se (except to 
the extent that marriage conferred legal authority for sexual activity).  
It was fundamentally about the sexual activity between the parties 
itself. 
The most famous justification for the marital rape exemption—
Hale’s ongoing consent theory—lends support to this view.  As earlier 
noted, Hale declared, “[t]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape 
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual 
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in 
this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”187  Hale’s 
analysis reveals the centrality of sexual relations to the immunity.  
When Hale said, “the wife hath given herself up in this kind unto her 
husband,” he was referring to giving “her body to her husband,” as he 
stated two sentences later.188  Hale believed that marriage afforded 
men contractual consent to sexual activity with their wives over 
time.189  Once she “gave her body to her husband,” a wife necessarily 
also gave him ongoing consent to sexual intercourse in the future.190 
Coupled with proscriptions against fornication and adultery, the 
marital rape exemption dictated which men could be charged with 
rape.191  Men who had not previously gained legal sexual access to 
women (through marriage, which was the only legal form of sexual 
access at the time) could be charged with raping them.  Men who had 
previously gained legal sexual access to women, by contrast, could not 
 
 185. Id. at 10. 
 186. PERKINS, supra note 18, at 115. 
 187. HALE, supra note 1, at 629. 
 188. Id. at 628. 
 189. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 163–64. 
 190. Id. 
 191. PERKINS, supra note 18, at 115. 
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be charged with raping them.  The law, therefore, protected men from 
being charged with sexually assaulting the only women with whom 
they could be legally sexually active.192  The marital rape immunity 
was a polite trope for the notion that women could not bring sexual 
offense charges against men with whom they were (legally) sexually 
active.  Therefore, when the marital rape exemption developed, there 
were no legal intimate relationships besides those in marriage.  
Marital sexual relations comprised the whole category of legal 
intimate relations. 
The English common law’s prohibition on fornication and 
adultery shaped the developing legal systems in the colonies of the 
New World.  Non-marital sexual intercourse was one of the first 
offenses proscribed by lawmakers in this country.193  In their definitive 
history of sexuality in America, John D’Emilio and Estelle Freedman 
found that colonial statutes outlawed both fornication and adultery, 
“prescribing corporeal or capital punishment, fines, and, in some 
cases, banishment for sexual transgressors.”194  In fact, fornication was 
the most common legal charge against women in New England.195  
D’Emilio and Freedman described its punishment: 
Fornication carried heavy penalties, including fines, whipping, or 
both.  In Maryland, where laws were less likely to be enforced, 
unmarried couples who had sex could receive up to twenty lashes 
and be fined as much as five hundred pounds of tobacco.  In 
Plymouth Colony, civil penalties for fornication included a ten-
pound fine—reduced only to fifty shillings for a betrothed 
couples—several lashes on the back, or both.  Throughout New 
England, a fine of nine lashes awaited both parents of a child born 
too soon after marriage.196 
 
 192. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 193. Coughlin, supra note 182, at 26. 
 194. JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA xvii, 18 (2d ed. 1988).  See also David Weis, Basic Sexological 
Premises, in SEXUALITY IN AMERICA, supra note 168 at 11; Merril D. Smith, Regulating 
Sex and Sexuality in Colonial New England, in SEX AND SEXUALITY IN EARLY AMERICA 
87 (Merril D. Smith ed., 1998) (“Just as sexual activity prior to marriage threatened the 
stability of colonial New England society, so did the absence of marital sexual activity.”).  
Puritans viewed marriage as a spiritual union.  Sex was expected and was a duty to be 
fulfilled.  Weis, supra, at 11. 
 195. Else L. Hambleton, The Regulation of Sex in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts, 
in SEX AND SEXUALITY IN EARLY AMERICA, supra note 194, at 89, 97.  “Although 
adultery, fornication, and bastardy involved couples, women in both northern and 
southern colonies were more likely than men to be prosecuted and convicted for these 
sexual offenses.”  D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 293, at 28.  Pregnancy was the 
reason for this disparity.  Id. 
 196. D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 193, at 22.  See also Hambleton, supra note 
194, at 89 (“Women who bore illegitimate children, their sexual partners, and couples 
whose first child arrived within eight months of marriage were prosecuted for fornication 
in the Quarterly Courts of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.”). 
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For adultery, most colonial laws authorized the death penalty.197  
However, in practice, “New England courts usually imposed fines of 
ten to twenty pounds, along with public whipping, and the wearing of 
the letters AD on a garment or burned onto the forehead.”198  In 
colonial America, these sexual regulations reflected “a consensus 
about the primacy of familial reproductive sexuality” in society; those 
who violated this consensus “could expect severe, often public, 
punishment and the pressure to repent.”199 
The criminalization of fornication and adultery remained in 
effect in this country until well into the twentieth century, although 
societal conceptions of sexuality and the family evolved.200  By the 
nineteenth century, “the sexualization of love” replaced the primacy 
of the familial reproductive sexuality.201  Marriage came to be known 
less as an institutional arrangement with reciprocal duties and more 
as a personal relationship between spouses based on love.202  By the 
twentieth century, the dominant view became that sexuality was a 
peak experience of marriage, which “served to legitimate the erotic 
aspects of sexuality itself.”203  As this view came to the fore, it was 
only a matter of time before people began to question why sexuality 
should be confined to marital relations.204 
Early twentieth-century American society began to embrace the 
idea that sex was a significant and legitimate experience, independent 
 
 197. D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 193, at 28. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. In the eighteenth century, although fornication and adultery remained illegal, 
southern colonies did not prosecute white men who raped female servants and slaves.  
Merril D. Smith, Race, Sex, and Social Control in the Chesapeake and Caribbean in the 
Eighteenth Century, in SEX AND SEXUALITY IN EARLY AMERICA, supra note 194, at 133.  
See also D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 193, at 101 (“By legal definition, a slave 
could not be raped, since she was the property of her master”).  White owners operated 
under the assumption that the women they enslaved were “sexually available to them.”  
See id. at 86–87.  This hypocrisy and cruelty did not undermine the general proscription on 
fornication and adultery within white society.  The sexual availability of enslaved women 
supported white supremacy.  See id. at 87.  White society did not condemn these sexual 
relations.  See id. at 95–96 (referencing belief of societal supporters that ability of white 
men to engage in extramarital sexual relations with women they enslaved “provided a 
safety valve that protected the virtue of white women”).  “Greater regulation of women’s 
sexuality was matched by greater sexual privilege for white men.  Slavery provided 
abundant opportunity for white men to exercise sexual license.”  Id.  White women faced 
punishment for engaging in extramarital sexual relations including “personal disgrace, 
violent physical punishment by her husband, divorce, and the loss of her children.”  Id. at 
95. 
 201. Weis, supra note 193, at 14. 
 202. Id.  When love failed, divorce became an alternative, but divorce was only 
available for cause, such as adultery, desertion, and cruelty.  Hasday, supra note 3, at 1465. 
 203. Weis, supra note 193, at 14. 
 204. Id. at 14–15. 
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of its relationship to marriage.205  As time passed, sexual expression 
outside of marriage began occurring more frequently and with more 
tacit social support.206  American society began to embrace “sexual 
liberalism—an overlapping set of beliefs that detached sexual activity 
from the instrumental goal of procreation.”207  Although the amount 
of acceptable sexual expression fluctuated during the Depression and 
World War II, by the mid-1960s, sexual liberalism was rooted firmly 
in United States society.208 
As a result of this sexual revolution, extra-marital sex was no 
longer generally criminalized, and marriage was no longer the only 
place that people could engage in legal sexual acts.209  Legitimate 
sexual activity began to occur in many different relationships.210  
Although fornication and adultery statutes continued to be invoked 
in civil suits, direct enforcement of fornication and adultery laws by 
states faded.211 
In the past, women were either unmarried or married and 
assumed to be sexually inactive or active, respectively.212  By the late 
twentieth-century, marriage no longer represented a meaningful 
distinction between those women who had sex and those who did not.  
As legitimate sexual activity moved outside the marital relationship, 
the ongoing consent ideology founded on the marital rape exemption 
moved outside the marital relationship as well. 
Two major changes in rape law occurred as a result of these 
transformed attitudes toward non-marital sex.  First, marital 
immunities in some states began to include sexual offenses against 
cohabitants and voluntary social companions.  Second, states passed 
rape shield laws that admitted evidence of the sexual history of the 
defendant and the complainant, regardless of the legal status they 
shared. 
 
 205. Id. at 16.  Examples of such trends are the rising percentage of premarital sexual 
experiences among young people, the “expansion of marital sexuality, including increases 
in frequency, satisfaction, and variation in behavior,” and greater equality between 
genders.  Id. at 17. 
 206. See, e.g., D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 193, at 241. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 240–41. 
 209. Anderson, supra note 23, at 1746. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Coughlin, supra note 182, at 23–26.  As of 1998, seventeen states and the District of 
Columbia continued to outlaw fornication and 24 states and the District of Columbia 
continued to outlaw adultery.  Id. at 21–22. 
 212. See supra notes 181–22 and accompanying text. 
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B. Cohabitants and Voluntary Social Companions 
As a result of the societal transformation that legitimized sex 
outside of marriage, a number of states adjusted the focus of their 
marital exemptions from formal marital status to the substantive 
matter of sexual relations.  In 1962, the Model Penal Code, for 
example, supplemented its comprehensive marital rape immunity 
with a provision that included cohabitants.  It said: “Whenever in this 
article the definition of an offense excludes conduct with a spouse, the 
exclusion shall be deemed to extend to persons living as man and 
wife, regardless of the legal status of their relationship.”213  This 
provision thereby expanded the common law marital rape immunity 
to unmarried individuals who were living together.214 
Some states went further than cohabitation in their sexual 
offense codes to create provisions applying to “voluntary social 
companions.”  The Model Penal Code itself downgraded first-degree 
rape to second-degree if the victim was “a voluntary social companion 
of the actor upon the occasion of the crime” who had “previously 
permitted him sexual liberties.”215  Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, North 
Dakota, and West Virginia enacted similar statutes that gave partial 
immunity to men who sexually assaulted women who had previously 
permitted them sexual contact.216  If a man had previous consensual 
sex with a woman, he could not be convicted of raping her.217  For 
example, from 1986 to 1998, Delaware’s criminal code on first-degree 
rape provided: 
A person is guilty of unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree 
when the person intentionally engages in sexual intercourse . . . 
without the victim’s consent and the defendant was not the victim’s 
voluntary social companion on the occasion of the crime and had 
not permitted the defendant sexual intercourse within the previous 
12 months.218 
 
 213. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(2) (2001). 
 214. Id. 
 215. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(d) (2001). 
 216. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 149. 
 217. Id. 
 218. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 775 (1986), was stricken in its entirety on June 11, 1998 
and replaced with § 773, first-degree rape.  Today, the statute is formally neutral.  See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (1975–2001) (silent on sexual harassment, unclassified 
misdemeanor); § 767 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in third degree, Class A 
misdemeanor); § 768 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in second degree, Class G felony); 
§ 769 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in first degree; Class F felony); § 770 (silent on 
rape in fourth degree; Class C felony); § 771 (silent on rape in third degree, Class B 
felony); § 772 (silent on rape in second degree, Class B felony); § 773 (silent on rape in 
first degree, Class A felony); § 776 (silent on sexual extortion, Class E felony). 
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If a victim had “permitted the defendant sexual intercourse 
within the previous 12 months,” regardless of the marital status of the 
parties, the defendant could not be convicted of first-degree rape.219 
In their study, Finkelhor and Yllo analyzed the effect of adding 
voluntary social companion provisions to sexual offense statutes: 
These voluntary-social-companion laws may work to vitiate the 
effect of abolishing the marital exemption.  For example, when 
Delaware eliminated the spousal exemption as it applied to first- 
and second-degree rape, it also enacted a law to prohibit the 
prosecution of voluntary social companions for the crime of first-
degree rape.  If “voluntary social companions” are interpreted to 
include husbands and cohabiting boyfriends, the marital-rape 
exemption may still be in effect for that first-degree charge.220 
As they went on to explain, “the extension of the exemption to 
voluntary social companions appears to imply that by merely allowing 
sexual intimacy once, a woman grants a form of permanent 
consent.”221  Finkelhor and Yllo thereby explained how Hale’s 
ongoing consent theory behind the marital rape exemption evolved 
into an inference of ongoing consent based solely on the existence of 
a prior intimate relationship, without marriage. 
Connecticut, Hawaii, and Minnesota currently extend their 
spousal immunities to cohabiting partners.222  In Connecticut, for 
example, cohabitation is a complete defense to sexual assault when 
the victim is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless and to 
sexual assault involving sexual contact without consent.223  The 
relevant provision states, “it shall be an affirmative defense that the 
defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged 
offense, living together by mutual consent in a relationship of 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 149. 
 221. Id. at 150. 
 222. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 
(2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. 
Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West). 
 223. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West 2002) (“A person is guilty of sexual 
assault in the fourth degree when: (1) Such person intentionally subjects another person to 
sexual contact who is (A) under fifteen years of age, or (B) mentally defective or mentally 
incapacitated to the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual contact, or (C) 
physically helpless . . . ; or (2) Such person subjects another person to sexual contact 
without such other person’s consent”).  Section 53a-65 (Sexual contact is defined as 
“contact with the intimate parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of 
sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such 
person”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002).  The Commission Comment 
from 1971 states, “Parties not legally married to each other but living together as man and 
wife are treated the same as married persons.  The rationale is that the same elements of 
privacy, consent, and intimacy of relationship are likely to be present here as in the 
marriage situation.  This is in accord with the position taken by the Model Penal Code. . . .  
It is meant to convey a continuing status of cohabitation as man and wife.” 
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cohabitation, regardless of the legal status of their relationship.”224  
Hawaii’s statute indicates that “married” includes “a male and female 
living together as husband and wife regardless of their legal status.”225  
Hawaii’s commentary to this provision explains that the “definition of 
married was amended to recognize the prevalence of many male and 
female couples living together although not legally married.”226  
Under a section entitled “voluntary relationships,” Minnesota’s code 
clarifies that its marital immunity applies “if the actor and 
complainant were adults cohabitating in an ongoing voluntary sexual 
relationship at the time of the alleged offense.”227 
Notably, modern scholars who argue for the marital rape 
exemption treat rape by non-spouse intimates as the equivalent of 
spousal rape.  In defending the modern marital immunities in sexual 
offenses, they rarely stop at marital status.  The Commentary to the 
Model Penal Code’s comprehensive marital rape exemption, for 
example, applies it to all those intimates in “equivalent” relationships: 
marriage or an equivalent relationship, while not amounting to a 
legal waiver of the woman’s right to say “no,” does imply a kind of 
generalized consent that distinguishes some versions of the crime of 
rape from parallel behavior by a husband.  The relationship itself 
creates a presumption of consent, valid until revoked.228 
Likewise, Ingram offers an expansive range of relationships to 
which his “rebuttable presumption” of consent should apply.229  He 
argues, “[t]he same presumptions [of consent] should also arguably be 
recognized with unmarried cohabitants, and probably with regular, 
frequent social companions, regardless of their level of sexual 
activity.”230 
Dripps agrees with this view.  After claiming that sex with an 
unconscious wife is legitimated by the man’s “implied authorization” 
to proceed without consent, Dripps clarifies that the couple’s 
marriage itself is not essential.231  He points out, such “implied 
authorization” would exist for those engaged in an ongoing 
cohabiting or dating relationship as well—indeed, whenever “a long-
standing sexual relationship connects the defendant with the 
 
 224. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002). 
 225. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (2001). 
 226. 14 HAW. REV. STAT. § § 37-38, commentary on chapters 701–853 (1993) at 169. 
 227. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. 
Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West). 
 228. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, cmt. (1985) (emphasis added). 
 229. Ingram, supra note 110, at 30. 
 230. Id. at 31.  Even with such a presumption of consent, however, “very little” was 
necessary to “rebut or negate it.”  Id.  “Any words or action suggesting lack of consent 
should prompt the other person to inquire and be sure that sexual activity is wanted by 
both.”  Id. 
 231. See Dripps, supra note 5, at 1801. 
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victim.”232  The modern scholars who support marital immunity 
therefore seek to include prior intimate relationships within their 
reach under the theory that  “a long-standing sexual relationship” 
implies ongoing consent to future sexual acts.233 
C. Evidence of the Sexual History between the 
Defendant and the Complainant 
The extension of marital immunity to cohabitants and voluntary 
social companions in some states was not the only manifestation of 
the broad reach of the ongoing consent ideology.  Another 
manifestation came from an unlikely source: another area of feminist 
reform in rape laws.  In the late 1970s and 1980s, legislatures passed 
rape shield laws.234  These laws were part of a feminist effort to ensure 
that the rape defendant, not the rape victim, was on trial.235  Rape 
shield laws were designed to protect rape victims from embarrassing 
questions about their private sexual lives when they testified.236  In 
general, they forbade the admission of evidence of a complainant’s 
prior sexual history at a rape trial.237  Forty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia passed some form of rape shield law.238  These 
laws, by statute or by judicial decree, contained one nearly universal 
exception: prior sexual behavior between the complainant and the 
defendant himself would be admitted.239  By this exception, the law 
declared that evidence of the prior sexual behavior between a rape 
defendant and a complainant was relevant and admissible when he 
claimed the defense of consent.240 
Given the widely varied forms of rape shield laws across the 
country, this uniform exception was striking.  It communicated a 
shared assumption about sexual relations: once a woman “hath given 
her body” to a man, she was assumed to continue to consent to sexual 
intercourse.241  Coupled with the traditional norm of ongoing consent 
derived from the marital rape exemption, this universal exception 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 3 (“In the late 1970s, in response to such calls, feminists around the country 
began to mount legal and political efforts to remove the marital-rape exemption from the 
law books.  Bills to criminalize rape in marriage were introduced in many state legislatures 
and after intensive lobbying efforts, they were successful in California, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, as well as other states.”).  Anderson, supra note 23, at 1732–37. 
 235. Anderson, supra note 23, at 1737–36. 
 236. Id.  In that Article, I critiqued the use of privacy as a basis for rape shield laws.  See 
Id. at 1747–46. 
 237. Id. at 1705–07. 
 238. Id. at 1733. 
 239. Id. at 1771–75. 
 240. Id. at 1775. 
 241. HALE, supra note 1, at 629. 
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facilitated the improper modern inference of consent based solely on 
the existence of an intimate relationship. 
In states that have abolished the marital rape exemption, a man 
who rapes a woman with whom he has been previously intimate does 
not enjoy formal immunity from prosecution.  However, he does have 
the benefit of presenting evidence of their sexual history to prove his 
defense of consent.242  This benefit is great indeed.  It often deters 
women who are raped by prior intimates from reporting that they 
have been raped to the police.243  When these women do report a 
rape, it often discourages police from founding the complaints and 
taking their reports seriously.244  Police frequently have been 
unresponsive or hostile to women who report having been raped by 
their intimate partners.245  Some women have had to lie to police to 
 
 242. Anderson, supra note 23, at 1771–84. 
 243. See, e.g., JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE 
MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME 96 (1993). The authors note that somewhere between 10 and 
14% of wives are raped by their husbands, and the rape of a spouse can be among the 
most brutal of rapes.  Despite its prevalence, however, victims of spousal rape often 
remain silent.  See Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: 
Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 936 (2001). 
 244. See, e.g., Charles R. Jeffords, Prosecutorial Discretion in Cases of Marital Rape, 9 
VICTIMOLOGY 415 (1984).  In a mail survey of 113 prosecutors in the 11 states in which no 
legal distinction existed between marital and non-marital rapes, responses to hypothetical 
rape cases containing corroborative evidence indicated that prosecutors were significantly 
less likely to believe that maximum charges would be filed in marital rape cases, 
particularly where no serious injury occurred. Many prosecutors choose not to prosecute 
these cases even if the victim was willing.  It was noted that the prosecutor must convince 
the jury that the perpetrator deserves to be convicted.  See also Kersti Yllo & David 
Finkelhor, Marital Rape, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 156 
(Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1985).  “The criminal justice system in the United States has 
reinforced the fact that the marriage license is essentially a raping license.  Laws make 
prosecution of marital rape impossible and reinforce the assumption that marriage implies 
unquestionable consent by wives to all sexual advances by husbands.”  Id. 
 245. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 55 (“Most commonly, women felt that the 
police were unresponsive to them because the abusers were their husbands.  Erica 
‘couldn’t believe it.  They [the police] were no help at all because we were married.’  Pam 
told me, ‘I called the cops one day, and they came and said, ‘You gotta go’ and made me 
leave.  And I said, ‘I called you, and you’re taking his side.’  They were his friends, and 
they didn’t care that he beat me up.  It was my fault.’”).  See also id. at 56 (“The police 
wouldn’t come out, and when they did, they didn’t even take the knife [that her husband 
had used to assault her], and they didn’t want me to press charges.  I wanted to have a 
rape kit done and asked for a woman, and they said there was no woman.  There was no 
one to speak to me.”); id.  (“Wanda met with a similar response: ‘The police wouldn’t let 
me do a rape kit, and they said we don’t know about that law [against wife rape].’  Because 
of the police reaction, Wanda did not pursue filing charges.  In fact only eight women in 
my study saw their husbands charged with rape in the criminal justice system.”); id. (“Of 
those women who did file reports with the police, only two found police officers 
supportive.  Most had experiences similar to Sally’s: ‘I had to go to the state police, and 
then I had to go through three detectives and explain everything and be totally 
embarrassed, and I had to talk about penises and how he ejaculated and how he did 
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get them to respond to rapes by intimates.246  Some police have 
encouraged raped women to remain with their husbands.247  Police 
behavior has put some women at greater risk for serious injury from 
their abusers.248  When police do take reports of marital rape 
seriously, the potential admission of evidence of the sexual history 
between the defendant and the complainant often dissuades 
prosecutors from pursuing the charges.249  When prosecutors do 
pursue charges, evidence of the sexual history between the defendant 
and the complainant can dissuade a panel of appellate judges from 
upholding an intimate rape conviction on appeal.250  The fact that 
newly enacted rape shield laws admitted the prior sexual history of 
the defendant and the complainant, regardless of their marital status, 
was consistent with the concurrent expansion of the marital 
immunity’s rationale of ongoing consent to non-marital intimate 
relationships. 
The transformation of doctrinal rape law from one that focused 
on marital status to one that included non-marital intimate 
relationships confirms that the sexual relationship, rather than 
marriage per se, was at the heart of the marital rape exemption.  The 
fact that rape shield laws make no distinction between spouses and 
non-spouses in terms of the blanket exceptions they provide for the 
admission of sexual history between the defendant and the 
 
certain things.  I had to do it with the [tape] recorder on, and they kept saying, ‘Could you 
say that again miss, speak up, miss, and call it this and that, miss.’  And ‘what kind of 
underwear were you wearing, miss?  Were you wearing fancy negligees?’  They were like 
his [her husband’s] buddies, and they were busting my balls.  They should have been more 
qualified to handle this case, and they should have a woman in that situation.”). 
 246. Id. at 57 (“In one case, Karen was finally able to successfully obtain the help of the 
police when she cleverly disguised the nature of the problem.  Karen had called the police 
on numerous occasions and said it normally took them 45 minutes to respond to her calls.  
With her past experiences in mind, on the day she left her abuser, Karen ‘called the cops 
and said some guy was beating up some lady in front of the house with a gun.  They first 
asked me if the guy was married to the woman—like that makes a big difference.  I said no 
and they showed up in 15 minutes.”). 
 247. Id. at 55 (“When Donna called the police for assistance, they encouraged her to 
‘work it out and get marital counseling.’  Donna never called the police again.”). 
 248. Id. at 57 (“‘I saw the cops walking up the walkway, but they never came in.  I know 
today that I should have sued the police department, because I could have been lying 
there almost near death, and I saw two officers walk up and then turn around and leave 
and then I was like, I knew I was dead.  He [her husband] was going to kill me for calling 
the police, and he was very violent all that day, and I stayed in the bedroom all day 
petrified.’  Natalie also called the police repeatedly but eventually stopped because the 
police routinely ‘did nothing’ and her partner would beat her unmercifully to punish her 
for her ‘betrayal.’”). 
 249. See, e.g., Jeffords, supra note 243, at 415 (noting that prosecutors often take on 
only those cases that are very violent, and many choose not to prosecute even if the victim 
is willing). 
 250. See infra cases discussed at notes 260–87 and accompanying text. 
ANDERSON13 8/25/2003  3:07 PM 
July 2003] A NEW LAW ON SEXUAL OFFENSES BY INTIMATES 1525 
complainant means that the ongoing consent ideology has affected a 
new area of the law. 
As a result, it is not enough to have formal neutrality in sexual 
offenses statutes that simply allow for the prosecution of spouses for 
sexual assault.  States need to reject the ongoing consent ideology 
that now affects both marital and other intimate rape. 
IV.  Formal Neutrality on Marital Status in 
Sexual Offenses Revisited 
Two main proposals for reform of the marital rape exemption 
have emerged over the past thirty years: the argument that states 
should simply abolish the marital immunities in their sexual offense 
statutes and the argument that states should add an explicit provision 
on marital status in their sexual offense statutes declaring that men 
may be prosecuted for raping their wives.  Twenty-four states and the 
District of Columbia have no immunities for sexual crimes based on 
the formal relationship of the parties.251  The statutes in these states 
are either silent as to marital rape, or they contain an explicit 
provision clarifying that marriage is no defense to sexual assault.252  
An examination of how these state statutes work in practice reveals 
their inadequacies in terms of eliminating the ongoing consent 
ideology that affects marital and other intimate rape. 
A. Silence on Marital Status in Sexual Offenses 
A number of scholars have called for states to delete all 
provisions in rape laws that refer to the marital status of the parties.253  
These scholars argue that silence on the issue of marital status in a 
rape statute would allow a state to criminalize marital and non-
marital sexual assault in equal ways.254  These rape statutes would 
 
 251. See supra note 8 for a complete list of state statutes. 
 252. See infra notes 252–97 and accompanying text. 
 253. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 5, at 1800 (proposing that legislatures replace rape 
statutes with graded statutory offenses based on the amount of force used); Sitton, supra 
note 3, at 264 (“[C]omplete abolition of all laws distinguishing among rape and sexual 
assault victims based on their relationship to their assailant is required in order for women 
to achieve equal protection under the law.”). 
 254. Bearrows, supra note 3, at 222–26 (proposing silent rape statute on relationship 
between perpetrator and victim and proposing grading offenses based on amount of 
violence used).  He proposed that statutes remain silent on the issue of the relationship 
between the defendant and the complainant and grade sexual offenses based on the 
amount of violence the defendant employed.  For example, Sexual Battery in the First 
Degree was when the actor caused another person serious injury or displayed a deadly 
weapon in a threatening manner.  Bearrows, supra note 3, at 224.  Second degree involved 
the use of or a threat to use force which did not create a substantial risk of death or serious 
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allow “a married woman to withdraw her consent to sexual relations 
when she so desired.”255  Depending on the type of force used, a 
husband could be found guilty of first or second-degree sexual 
assault.256  This proposal seems appealing because it removes from 
statutes the specific provisions that prevented prosecutors from 
charging men for sexual offenses against their wives. 
Seventeen states currently have sexual offense laws that are 
silent on the question of the marital status between the parties.257  
 
injury, third degree required the use of or threat to use force, and fourth degree was sexual 
contact perpetrated without the victim’s consent.  Id. 
 255. Id. at 222.  Because his statute was silent as to relationship status, Bearrows 
intended for the statute to cover stranger rapes and spousal rapes, as well as 
nonconsensual sodomy.  Id. at 226.  “The model statute prohibits several different types of 
sexual invasions which a husband could commit upon his wife.”  Id. 
 256. In a footnote, however, he admitted that the reality of such violence was doubtful: 
“It seems extremely unlikely that husbands will commit rape using deadly weapons or 
causing serious injury to their wives.  Instead a husband may indulge in nonconsensual 
sexual contact, constituting sexual battery in the third or fourth degree.”  Id. at 226, n.167. 
 257. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (Michie 1987–2001) (silent on rape, Class Y felony); 
§ 5-14-124 (silent on sexual assault in first degree, Class A felony); § 5-14-125 (silent on 
sexual assault in second degree, Class B felony); § 5-14-126 (silent on sexual assault in 
third degree, Class C felony); § 5-14-127 (silent on sexual assault in fourth degree, Class A 
misdemeanor); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (1975–2001) (silent on sexual harassment, 
unclassified misdemeanor); § 767 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in third degree, Class 
A misdemeanor); § 768 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in second degree, Class G 
felony); § 769 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in first degree; Class F felony); § 770 
(silent on rape in fourth degree; Class C felony); § 771 (silent on rape in third degree, 
Class B felony); § 772 (silent on rape in second degree, Class B felony); § 773 (silent on 
rape in first degree, Class A felony); § 776 (silent on sexual extortion, Class E felony); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2002-
211 (H.B. 1399) (West) (silent on sexual battery); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (West 
2002) (silent on rape, Class A or B felony); § 35-42-4-2 (silent on criminal deviate conduct, 
Class A or B felony); § 35-42-4-8 (silent on sexual battery, Class C or D felony); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (Michie 2002) updated 2002 Kentucky Acts Ch. 259 (S.B. 25) (silent 
on rape in first degree); § 510.040 (silent on rape in second degree); § 510.060 (silent on 
rape in third degree); § 510.070 (silent on sodomy in first degree); § 510.080 (silent on 
sodomy in second degree); § 510.090 (silent on sodomy in third degree); § 510.100 (silent 
on sodomy in fourth degree); § 510.110 (silent on sexual abuse in first degree); § 510.120 
(silent on sexual abuse in second degree); § 510.130 (silent on sexual abuse in third 
degree); § 510.140 (silent on sexual misconduct); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A § 253 (West 
2002) (silent on gross sexual assault, Class A, B or C crime); § 255 (silent on unlawful 
sexual contact, Class C, D, or E crime); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 22 (West 2002) 
(silent on rape); § 34 (silent on crime against nature); § 35 (silent on unnatural and 
lascivious acts); § 3 (silent on drugging persons for sexual intercourse); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 566.030 (2002) (silent on rape); § 566.040 (silent on sexual assault); § 566.060 (silent on 
forcible sodomy); § 566.070 (silent on deviate sexual assault); § 566.090 (silent on sexual 
misconduct in first degree); § 566.100 (silent on sexual abuse); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
502 (2001) (silent on sexual assault); § 45-5-503 (silent on sexual intercourse without 
consent); § 45-5-505 (silent on deviate sexual conduct); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (2001) 
(silent on sexual assault in first degree, Class II felony); § 28-320 (silent on sexual assault 
in second or third degree, Class III felony and Class I misdemeanor); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
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They delineate various sexual offenses in their statutes but do not 
mention whether a spouse may or may not be prosecuted for these 
crimes.  These states reveal how silence in sexual offense statutes 
tends to work in practice.  An examination of the cases in these states 
discloses that silence in sexual offense statutes as to the marital status 
of the parties is an inadequate solution to the ongoing consent 
ideology derived in the marital rape exemption.258 
Despite the ability to bring suits against spouses for various 
sexual offenses in these seventeen states, there is a paucity of written 
appellate dispositions involving spousal rape or spousal sexual 
abuse.259  The lack of criminal appeals suggests that the belief in 
ongoing consent in marital relationships may continue to discourage 
prosecutors from pursuing these cases and being able to obtain 
convictions.260 
 
§ 30-9-11 (Michie 1978–2001) (silent on criminal sexual penetration); § 30-9-12 (silent on 
criminal sexual contact); § 30-9-14.3 (silent on aggravated indecent exposure); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 12.1-20-03 (1999–2001) (silent on gross sexual imposition, Class A or B felony); 
§ 12.1-20-04 (silent on sexual imposition, Class B felony); § 12.1-20-07 (silent on sexual 
assault, Class C felony or Class A misdemeanor); § 12.1-20-12 (silent on deviate sexual act, 
Class A misdemeanor); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.355 (2001) (silent on rape in the third 
degree, Class C felony); § 163.365 (2001) (silent on rape in second degree, Class B felony); 
§ 163.375 (silent on rape in first degree, Class A felony); § 163.385 (silent on sodomy in 
third degree, Class C felony); § 163.395 (silent on sodomy in second degree, Class B 
felony); § 163.405 (silent on sodomy in first degree, Class A felony); § 163.408 (silent on 
unlawful sexual penetration in second degree, Class B felony); § 163.411 (silent on 
unlawful sexual penetration in first degree, Class A felony); § 163.415 (silent on sexual 
abuse in third degree, Class A misdemeanor); § 163.425 (silent on sexual abuse in second 
degree, Class C felony); § 163.427 (silent on sexual abuse in first degree, Class B felony); 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (West 2002) (silent on rape); § 3123 (silent on 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse); § 3124.1 (silent on sexual assault); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 22.011, § 22.021 (Vernon 2002) (silent on sexual assault or aggravated sexual 
assault); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2001) (silent on sexual assault), § 3253 (silent on 
aggravated sexual assault); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-3 (1966–2002) (silent on sexual assault 
in first degree, felony); § 61-8B-4 (silent on sexual assault in second degree, felony); § 61-
8B-5 (silent on sexual assault in third degree, felony); § 61-8B-7 (silent on sexual abuse in 
first degree, felony); § 61-8B-8 (silent on sexual abuse in second degree, misdemeanor); 
§ 61-8B-9 (silent on sexual abuse in third degree, misdemeanor). 
 258. See infra notes 258-87 and accompanying text. 
 259. Westlaw research has revealed a scarcity of appellate level cases involving 
convictions for marital rape or sexual abuse committed by a spouse in the seventeen states 
that have statutes silent as to the marital status of the parties.  The following is a list of the 
number of appellate cases that were located in each of these seventeen states that involved 
convictions for rape or sexual abuse by a spouse or estranged spouse under the statutes 
silent as to marital status: Arkansas (2), Delaware (1), Florida (6), Indiana (2), Kentucky 
(1), Maine (3), Massachusetts (1), Pennsylvania (3), Missouri (2), Montana (1), Nebraska 
(2), New Mexico (1), North Dakota (0), Oregon (2), Texas (8), Vermont (2), and West 
Virginia (4). 
 260. It may, of course, also, deter wives from reporting sexual abuse by their spouses 
and dissuade juries from convicting. 
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There is also very little applicable case law involving rape by 
intimates who are not legally married but simply cohabitate.  Where it 
appears, one can detect the improper inference of ongoing consent 
based on intimate relationships.  In Vermont v. Gonyaw,261 for 
example, the complainant and Gonyaw had a relationship that began 
six years before an alleged sexual assault.  Although not married, they 
cohabitated for the first three years of that relationship.262  At trial, 
Gonyaw wanted to testify in front of the jury as to the sexual 
relationship they had prior to the alleged sexual assault.263  At a 
hearing in front of the judge on the matter, the complainant testified 
that they had not engaged in consensual sexual intercourse for more 
than a year before the assault.264  Gonyaw, by contrast, testified that 
they had consensual sex four days prior to the alleged assault.265  The 
trial court decided to prohibit Gonyaw’s testimony and the jury 
convicted.266 
The Vermont Supreme Court reversed.  It stated, “[a] jury 
hearing evidence, even though contradicted, of consensual sexual acts 
after their separation, one which allegedly occurred four days before 
the act complained of, might well have” acquitted Gonyaw.267  It held, 
“[c]onsensual sexual activity over a period of years, coupled with a 
claimed consensual act reasonably contemporaneous with the act 
complained of, is clearly material on the issue of consent.”268  The 
court limited its holding to circumstances in which the prior sexual 
activity was “reasonably contemporaneous, and the relationship 
between the parties must support a reasonable belief that there was 
consent to renewed sexual activity.”269  The court thus concluded that 
the complainant’s “consent to renewed sexual activity” with Gonyaw 
could reasonably be inferred if she had engaged in a sexual act with 
him four days prior to the alleged assault.270 
Vermont’s criminal code does not have a marital rape exemption 
and is silent as to its abolition.271  Although prosecutors can bring 
charges against Gonyaw for sexually assaulting the complainant, 
Vermont’s silent statute does not otherwise help to curb the improper 
 
 261. 507 A.2d 944, 946 (Vt. 1985). 
 262. Gonyaw, 507 A.2d at 945. 
 263. Id. at 946. 
 264. Id. 
 265. He also testified that the complainant would often “initially refuse to participate in 
sexual intercourse but would then consent.”  Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 947. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2001) (silent as to marital exemption on sexual 
assault), § 3253 (silent as to marital exemption on aggravated sexual assault). 
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inference jurors and judges will likely make based on the intimate 
relationship of the parties.  The complainant is subjected to the 
inference that sex four days prior to the alleged assault can support a 
reasonable belief in renewed, ongoing consent to sexual activity with 
the defendant. 
Improper inferences of ongoing consent based on intimate 
relationships also emerge in cases involving intimates who are not 
legally married and have never cohabitated.  Take, for example, the 
recent Nebraska case of State v. Sanchez-Lahora.272  At trial, the 
complainant testified that Sanchez-Lahora asked her to sell drugs for 
him, and when she agreed, he insisted on sex.273  After she declined, 
he went to the kitchen, retrieved a gun, and asked her if she wanted 
to die.274  Each time she refused his advances, Sanchez-Lahora asked 
if she wanted to die.275  He then pressed the gun to her forehead and 
stated, “[o]ne bullet for you,” and had oral, vaginal, and anal sex with 
her.276 
After the complainant left, she went to a neighbor’s house.277  
The neighbor testified that she arrived at his house pale, shaking, 
crying, and breathing as if she might hyperventilate.278  She told him 
what had happened and cried throughout her visit.279 
Sanchez-Lahora himself took the stand and testified that he and 
the complainant had a secret relationship and had previously met five 
or six times at a club.280  He admitted that on the night in question he 
had sex with her, but claimed that the sex was consensual.281  He also 
sought to introduce testimony that he and the complainant “had been 
engaging in a sexual relationship for several months prior to that 
date,” estimating that they had had sexual intercourse 11 to 14 
times.282  The trial court denied Sanchez-Lahora’s motion to present 
this evidence under Nebraska’s rape shield law, which required the 
defendant to “(1) show a relation between the past conduct and the 
conduct involved in the case and (2) establish a pattern of conduct of 
behavior by the victim which is relevant to the issue of consent.”283 
 
 272. 616 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000). 
 273. Sanchez-Lahora, 616 N.W.2d at 816. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 814. 
 283. Id. at 818. 
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The Nebraska appellate court reversed.  It cited approvingly an 
evidentiary syllogism it found implicit within Nebraska’s rape shield 
law: 
Major [premise]: The victim’s past sexual behavior with the 
defendant was consensual behavior.  Minor [premise]: The victim’s 
behavior in the present prosecution is the type of activity in which 
the victim participated with the defendant in the past.  Conclusion: 
Therefore, the victim’s behavior in the present prosecution was 
consensual.284 
As to the disputed evidence, then, the appellate court concluded, 
“[w]e believe the evidence of the alleged prior sexual conduct 
between the defendant and the victim does tend to establish a pattern 
of conduct relevant to the issue of consent,” and, thus, the jury should 
have heard it.285 
In abolishing its marital rape exemption, the state of Nebraska 
decided to remain silent in its rape statute on the marital status of the 
parties.286  Nebraska’s silent statute does not help the woman who 
complained of Sanchez-Lahora’s behavior.  She is subjected to the 
assumption that her prior consent to sex with Sanchez-Lahora 
implied ongoing consent to sex with him.  The court’s syllogistic 
reasoning is clear: prior consent to similar sexual acts means consent 
to the sexual acts in question.287  Again, the prior intimate relationship 
itself creates an improper inference of ongoing consent.288 
 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 820. 
 286. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (2001) (silent on sexual assault in first degree, Class II 
felony); § 28-320 (silent on sexual assault in second or third degree, Class III felony and 
Class I misdemeanor). 
 287. Lahora, 616 N.W.2d at 818. 
 288. The ongoing consent ideology can even appear in cases in which the alleged prior 
sexual intercourse occurred not 11 to 14 times, but one time.  In Bixler v. Kentucky, 712 
S.W.2d 366, 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), for example, Bixler and Bean were tried for having 
raped a female acquaintance.  Bixler sought to testify that he had engaged in consensual 
sexual intercourse with the complainant once some 18 months earlier.  Id. at 368.  The trial 
judge excluded that evidence, stating, “I can’t see how sexual intercourse 18 months 
before the incident can be contemporaneous with or under [the rape shield] statute be 
appropriate for evidence of this action.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed.  
It held, “Evidence of such prior sexual habits or conduct between the victim and Bixler 
was crucial” because Bixler’s defense was consent and because “Bean’s defense hinged in 
part on the fact that he knew the victim had a prior sexual relationship with Bixler and, 
therefore, he expected to have a similar relationship with her.”  Id. 
In abolishing its marital rape immunity, the state of Kentucky decided to remain 
silent in its rape statute on the marital status of the parties.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 510.040 (West 2002) updated 2002 Kentucky Acts Ch. 259 (S.B. 25) (silent on rape in 
first degree); § 510.040 (silent on rape in second degree); § 510.060 (silent on rape in third 
degree); § 510.070 (silent on sodomy in first degree); § 510.080 (silent on sodomy in second 
degree); § 510.090 (silent on sodomy in third degree); § 510.100 (silent on sodomy in 
fourth degree); § 510.110 (silent on sexual abuse in first degree); § 510.120 (silent on 
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Statutory silence on marital status and intimate relationships 
between the parties is inadequate.  Silence does nothing for those 
women, married or not, who have had sexual relationships with 
defendants when the defendants claim that such sexual relationships 
entitle them to assume consent to the sexual acts alleged to have been 
rapes.  The next section turns to explicit provisions in sexual offense 
statutes authorizing the prosecution of spouses for marital rape to see 
if they provide a better solution to the improper inference of ongoing 
consent based on intimate relationships. 
B. Explicit Provisions in Sexual Offenses Authorizing 
Prosecution of Spouses 
A number of scholars have argued that states should do more 
than remain silent; they should insert new provisions into their sexual 
offense statutes that explicitly authorize the prosecution of spouses.289  
A statutory framework might criminalize marital rape by defining 
rape as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person 
including the spouse of a perpetrator.”290  This provision seems to do 
more than the mere silence on the marital status of the parties.  It 
would remove the marital exemptions in sexual offense laws by 
clarifying that marriage itself is not an impediment to prosecution.  
Jurisdictions have enacted two kinds of analogous statutes: 
prosecutorial “allowance” codes and “no defense” codes. 
The “allowance” codes explicitly authorize the prosecution of 
men who rape their wives.  The codes of the District of Columbia, 
Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, and 
Wisconsin contain such specific provisions.291  North Carolina’s code, 
 
sexual abuse in second degree); § 510.130 (silent on sexual abuse in third degree); 
§ 510.140 (silent on sexual misconduct).  Kentucky’s silent statute does not help the 
woman who reported having been raped by Bixler and Bean.  She is subjected to an 
assumption that her prior consent to sex on one occasion with Bixler may imply 
subsequent consent to sex with him (and even consent to sex with Bean). 
 289. See, e.g., Eskow, supra note 3, at 704–05 (ideal rape statute would first “set[] forth 
a definition of rape that neither affirmatively include nor exclude spouses as potential 
victims, while the second paragraph [would] clarif[y] that marriage is no defense to 
rape.”). 
 290. Id.  Eskow believed Utah’s rape statute to be the best example of her strategy.  
Utah’s rape statute reads: 
(1) A person commits rape when the actor has sexual intercourse with another 
person without the victim’s consent. 
(2) This section applies whether or not the actor is married to the victim. 
(3) Rape is a felony of the first degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1994).  See also Eskow, supra note 3, at 705. 
 291. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-419 (2002) (“No actor is immune from prosecution under 
any section of this subchapter because of marriage or cohabitation with the victim; 
provided, however, that marriage of the parties may be asserted as an affirmative defense 
in a prosecution under this subchapter where it is expressly so provided.”); MICH. COMP. 
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for example, states that prosecution for sexual crimes is not 
dependent upon the relationship between the offender and the victim: 
“A person may be prosecuted under this Article whether or not the 
victim is the person’s legal spouse at the time of the commission of 
the alleged rape or sexual offense.”292  Codes in New Jersey, 
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia state that a husband “shall 
not be presumed to be incapable of violating” a sexual offense 
provision.293 
The “no defense” codes are slightly different.  The codes of 
Alaska, Colorado, and Georgia not only allow prosecutors to charge 
men with sexual offenses against their wives, but they also clarify that 
the marital status of the parties “shall not be a defense” to a charge of 
rape.294  Of the two types, the “no defense” provisions goes further 
than the “allowance” provisions.  Not only may a husband be 
prosecuted for violating the rape statute, but he also may not use the 
marriage itself as a defense at trial.295 
Hybrid states also exist; these states’ provisions do not fall neatly 
into the “allowance” or “no defense” categories because they also 
include silent provisions.296  Idaho and Utah, for example, state that 
 
LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (“A person may be charged and convicted . . . even 
though the victim is his or her legal spouse.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 (2002) 
(“An actor commits a crime under this chapter [sexual offenses] even though the victim is 
the actor’s legal spouse.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 2002) (“No actor shall be 
presumed to be incapable of committing a crime under this chapter because of age or 
impotency or marriage to the victim.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (2002) (“A person may 
be prosecuted under this Article whether or not the victim is the person’s legal spouse at 
the time of the commission of the alleged rape or sexual offense.”). WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 940.225(6) (West 2002) (“A defendant shall not be presumed to be incapable of violating 
this section because of marriage to the complainant.”). 
 292. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (2002). 
 293. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3019; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 2002); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West 2002). 
 294. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (“Except as provided in (a) of this 
section [when victim is mentally incapable or incapacitated] it is not a defense that the 
victim was, at the time of the alleged offense, the legal spouse of the defendant.”); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-409 (West 2002) (“Any marital relationship, whether established 
statutorily, putatively, or by common law, between an actor and a victim shall not be a 
defense to any offense under this part 4 unless such defense is specifically set forth in the 
applicable statutory section by having the elements of the offense specifically exclude a 
spouse;” spouses exempt only from statutory rape); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(2) (Harrison 
1982–2001) (“The fact that the person allegedly raped is the wife of the defendant shall 
not be a defense to a charge of rape”); § 16-6-2 (“The fact that the person allegedly 
sodomized is the spouse of a defendant shall not be a defense to a charge of aggravated 
sodomy”). 
 295. See infra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 296. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 2002) (“Rape of a spouse”) with § 243.4 
(silent on sexual battery), § 266c (silent on unlawful sexual intercourse), § 286 (silent on 
sodomy), § 288 (silent on lewd or lascivious acts), and § 289 (silent on forcible acts of 
sexual penetration); compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(2) (Harrison 1982–2001) (“The 
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fact that the person allegedly raped is the wife of the defendant shall not be a defense to a 
charge of rape.”) and § 16-6-2 (“The fact that the person allegedly sodomized is the spouse 
of a defendant shall not be a defense to a charge of aggravated sodomy”) with § 16-6-22.1 
(silent on sexual battery) and § 16-6-22.2 (silent on aggravated sexual battery); compare 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-732 (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Sess. Laws 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 
2002) (partial marital immunity for sexual assault in third degree) and § 707-733 (marital 
immunity for sexual assault in the fourth degree) with § 707-730 (silent on sexual assault in 
first degree) and § 707-731 (silent on sexual assault in second degree); compare IDAHO 
CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (“No person shall be convicted of rape for any act or 
acts with that person’s spouse, except under the circumstances cited in paragraphs 3 
[force] and 4 [threats of harm or use of intoxicating substance] of section 18-6101”) with 
§ 18-6608 (silent on forcible sexual penetration by use of foreign object); compare KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-3508 (2001) (marriage is defense to lewd and lascivious behavior, a Class 
B nonperson misdemeanor or Level 9 person felony) and § 21-3517 (2001) (marriage is 
defense to sexual battery, Class A person misdemeanor) with § 21-3505 (silent on criminal 
sodomy), § 21-3506 (silent on aggravated criminal sodomy), and § 21-3508 (silent on rape); 
compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43 (West 2002) (marital immunity for simple rape) 
and § 43.1 (marital immunity for sexual battery) with § 14:41 (silent on rape), § 14:42 
(silent on aggravated rape), § 14:42.1 (silent on forcible rape), and § 14:43.2 (silent on 
aggravated sexual battery); compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (McKinney 2002) (spouses 
are partially immune from sexual misconduct, Class A misdemeanor), § 130.40 (marital 
immunity for sodomy in third degree, Class E felony), § 130.45 (marital immunity for  
sodomy in second degree, Class D felony), § 130.50 (marital immunity for sodomy in first 
degree, Class B felony), § 130.55 (marital immunity for  sexual abuse in third degree, Class 
B misdemeanor), § 130.60 (marital immunity for sexual abuse in second degree), and 
§ 130.65 (marital immunity for sexual abuse in first degree, Class D felony) with § 130.25 
(silent on rape in third degree), § 130.30 (silent on rape in second degree), § 130.35 (silent 
on rape in first degree), § 130.65-a (silent on aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth 
degree), § 130.66 (silent on aggravated sexual abuse in third degree), § 130.67 (silent on 
aggravated sexual abuse in second degree), and § 130.70 (silent on aggravated sexual 
abuse in first degree); compare R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–2001) (marital 
immunity for first degree sexual assault when victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally 
disabled, or physically helpless; silent on other provisions) with § 11-37-4 (silent on second 
degree sexual assault); compare S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 (Michie 1968–2002) 
(spouses exempt from sexual contact without consent with person who is capable of 
consenting, Class 1 misdemeanor) with § 22-22-1 (silent on rape); compare UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-402(2) (1953–2001) (“This section [rape] applies whether or not the actor is 
married to the victim”) and § 76-5-405 (aggravated sexual assault; includes definition of 
rape in statute which applies “whether or not the actor is married to the victim.”) with 
§ 76-5-402.2 (silent on object rape), § 76-5-403 (silent on forcible sodomy), and § 76-5-404 
(silent on forcible sexual abuse); compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B), § 18.2-67.1(B), 
and § 18.2-67.2(B) (Michie 2002) (no person shall be found guilty of rape, forcible sodomy, 
or object sexual penetration unless, at time of alleged offense, spouses were living separate 
and apart) with § 18.2-67.3 (silent on aggravated sexual battery) and § 18.2-67.4 (silent on 
sexual battery); compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 2002) (marital 
immunity for rape in third degree, Class C felony) and § 9A.44.100 (marital immunity for 
indecent liberties, Class A or B felony) with § 9A.44.040 (silent on rape in first degree) 
and § 9A.44.050 (silent on rape in second degree). 
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marriage is not a defense to first-degree rape, but they remain silent 
on other sexual assault provisions such as sexual battery.297 A number 
of other states specifically delineate certain crimes for which marriage 
is a defense and certain crimes for which marriage is not a defense.298 
States with explicit provisions in sexual offense statutes 
authorizing the prosecution of men for raping of their wives reveal 
how these provisions tend to work in practice.  An examination of the 
cases in these states discloses that even these explicit provisions are 
an inadequate solution to the ongoing consent ideology embedded 
within the traditional marital rape immunity. 
The assumption that marriage provides men with their wives’ 
ongoing consent to sexual relations may continue to exist in states 
 
 297. IDAHO CODE § 18-6107; § 18-6608 (Michie 1948–2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
402(2), § 76-5-405, § 76-5-402.2, § 76-5-403, § 76-5-404 (1953–2001); see also GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-6-1(2), § 16-6-2, § 16-6-22.1, § 16-6-22.2 (Harrison 1982–2001). 
 298. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.432(b) (Michie 2002) (“Except as provided in (a) of this 
section, in a prosecution under AS 11.41.410 or 11.41.420, it is not a defense that the victim 
was, at the time of the alleged offense, the legal spouse of the defendant.”); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002) (“In any prosecution for an offense under this part, 
except an offense under section 53a-70 [sexual assault in first degree], 53a-70a [aggravated 
sexual assault in first degree], 53a-70b [sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting 
relationship], 53a-71 [sexual assault in second degree], 53a-72a [sexual assault in third 
degree] or 53a-72b [sexual assault in third degree with firearm], it shall be an affirmative 
defense that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense, 
living together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of the legal 
status of their relationship”); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (“No person 
shall be convicted of rape for any act or acts with that person’s spouse, except under the 
circumstances cited in paragraphs 3 [force] and 4 [threats of harm or intoxicating 
substance] of section 18-6101”); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. § 3-318 (West 2002) (spouses can 
only be prosecuted for rape in first degree, rape in second degree, or sexual offense in 
third degree if force is used or couple is living separately); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in first 
through fourth degrees based solely on his or her spouse being under age 16, mentally 
incapable or mentally incapacitated); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended 
by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (spouse does not commit 
criminal sexual conduct in third or fourth degree if actor knows or has reason to know that 
complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File 
156 (H.B. 485) (West) (marriage or cohabitation is no defense to rape if offender uses 
force or threat of force); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (“A person 
cannot be guilty of criminal sexual conduct under Sections 16-3-651 through 16-3-659.1 if 
the victim is the legal spouse unless the couple is living apart and the offending spouse’s 
conduct constitutes criminal sexual conduct in the first degree or second degree as defined 
by Sections 16-3-652 and 16-3-533”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (2002) (A person 
does not commit an offense under sexual offenses if the victim is the legal spouse of the 
perpetrator unless defendant is armed with weapon, inflicts serious bodily injury, or 
parties are living separately and have filed for divorce); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-307 
(Michie 1977–2001) (“The fact that the actor and the victim are married to each other is 
not by itself a defense to a violation of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) or 6-5-303(a)(i), (ii), 
(iii) or (vi)”). 
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with explicit statutes.299  One case indicates that states may lack a 
coherent theory about what the evidence of sexual relations grants 
defendants in terms of consent in marital rape cases.  Adair was 
charged with two counts of sexually assaulting his wife a few days 
after serving her with divorce papers.300  At a hearing in front of the 
judge on the admissibility of evidence of the prior sexual history 
between the parties, the wife admitted that, during a brief 
reconciliation, she had engaged in consensual sexual relations with 
Adair a few times after that alleged sexual assault.301  The trial court 
decided to admit evidence of those subsequent sexual acts.302  An 
interlocutory appeal on the matter went to the Michigan Supreme 
Court, which remanded the issue and directed the trial court to re-
weigh the evidence’s probative value to determine its admissibility: 
On a common-sense level, a trial court could find that the closer 
in time to the alleged sexual assault that the complainant engaged in 
subsequent consensual sexual relations with her alleged assailant, the 
stronger the argument would be that if indeed she had been sexually 
assaulted, she would not have consented to sexual relations with him 
in the immediate aftermath of sexual assault.  Accordingly, the 
evidence may be probative.  Conversely, the greater the time interval, 
the less probative force the evidence may have, depending on 
circumstances.303 
The court offered factors that would make the subsequent sexual 
acts more or less probative of the wife’s consent on the instance in 
question.304  However, the court did not articulate a theory about what 
prior or subsequent consensual sexual acts standing alone reveal in 
terms of consent on the instance in question. 
Michigan’s rape statute explicitly provides that husbands “may 
be charged and convicted” of criminal sexual conduct “even though 
the victim is his or her legal spouse.”305  Although the provision allows 
 
 299. There are apparently very few marital rape cases in these jurisdictions as well.  
Westlaw research has revealed few appeals for criminal convictions of rape or sexual 
assault of a spouse in each of the “allowance” and “no defense” states.  The number of 
appeals found in each of the states are as follows: Alaska (3), Colorado (2), District of 
Columbia (0), Georgia (7), Michigan (5), New Hampshire (3), New Jersey (2), North 
Carolina (0), and Wisconsin (6). 
 300. Michigan v. Adair, 550 N.W.2d 505 (Mich. 1996). 
 301. Adair, 550 N.W.2d at 508. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 512.  The court also directed the trial court to weigh the nature of the 
relationship.  Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (“person may be charged and 
convicted [for first through fourth degree criminal sexual conduct] even though the victim 
is his or her legal spouse;” however, spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual 
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Adair to be prosecuted, it does not prevent Adair’s wife from being 
subjected to an improper inference that her subsequent consent to sex 
with Adair itself implied consent to sexual intercourse with him on 
the instance in question. 
Ongoing sexual consent analysis emerges in cases involving 
intimates who are not legally married.  In the recent Alaska case of 
Napoka v. State, the complainant, fourteen-year-old N.A., made a 
report to a state trooper after he gave a presentation at her school 
about sexual abuse.306  She stated that Napoka had raped her nine or 
ten times over the past few years.307  Upon investigation, Napoka 
admitted to the trooper that he had engaged in non-consensual sex 
with N.A. on three previous occasions, so he was indicted for those 
three instances.308  At trial, the state moved to exclude evidence of the 
other sexual acts between Napoka and N.A.309 The trial court granted 
the motion, but on appeal, this decision was reversed.310  The court of 
appeals stated: 
N.A.’s prior sexual conduct with Napoka was clearly relevant to the 
two issues confronting the jury: (1) whether, as a factual matter, 
N.A. consented to have sex with Napoka on the three occasions 
identified in the indictment, and (2) whether, even if N.A. did not 
consent, Napoka nevertheless reasonably believed that she did 
consent. . . .  The disputed evidence was relevant, not because it 
showed that N.A. had engaged in sexual activity before, but rather 
because it showed that N.A. had engaged in sex with Napoka 
before.  If, as the defense claimed in its offer of proof, Napoka and 
N.A. had a long history of consensual sex, this fact would obviously 
be important to the jury’s proper decision of these two things.311 
 
conduct in first through fourth degrees based solely on spouse being under age 16, 
mentally incapable, or mentally incapacitated). 
 306. 996 P.2d 106, 107 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000). 
 307. Id. at 107. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 108. 
 311. Id. at 110 (emphasis in original).  The court continued: 
The evidence is important, not because of what it reveals about N.A.’s 
willingness to engage in sexual activity in general, but because of what it reveals 
about N.A.’s relationship with Napoka—specifically her willingness to engage in 
sexual activity with Napoka—and how this might have influenced Napoka’s 
perception of whether N.A. consented to the sexual activity during the three 
incidents charged in the indictment.  Id.  Similarly, in the recent case of Nickoli v. 
State, Nos. A-7129, 4285, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS 1471558 (Oct. 4, 2000), the 
appellate court issued a memorandum disposition, indicating that the outcome of 
the case was controlled by the precedent of Napoka and its holding broke no new 
legal ground.  Nevertheless, the court’s analysis in Nickoli is instructive.  Nickoli 
was charged with first-degree sexual assault; his defense was consent.  A.S. 
testified that he had taken her to a remote spot along the Yukon River and raped 
her.  At trial, she offered that she had previously engaged in consensual sexual 
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According to this court, then, the prior sex was crucial to the 
jury’s consideration of N.A.’s consent on the instance in question and, 
even if she did not consent, Napoka’s reasonable belief that N.A. 
consented on the instance in question.312 
Alaska’s marital statute includes an explicit provision regarding 
forcible and nonconsensual marital rape such as the kind that N.A. 
allegedly suffered.313  The court in Napoka, however, declared that the 
evidence of prior sexual activity between Napoka and N.A. revealed 
her “willingness to engage in sexual activity with Napoka” on the 
instance in question.314  Alaska’s explicit “no defense” provision does 
nothing for N.A.; the court still found that her prior relationship with 
Napoka implied ongoing consent. 
Explicit provisions regarding marital status do not attack Hale’s 
understanding of sexual relations: that a woman who “hath given her 
body” to a man continues to consent to sexual intercourse with him 
through time.315  To reach the heart of this improper inference, society 
needs a new law on sexual offenses by intimates. 
 
intercourse with Nickoli one month before the sexual assault.  The trial judge 
restricted Nickoli’s ability to question A.S. about a prior sexual relationship that 
spanned several years.  Nickoli appealed the judge’s decision on this matter and 
the court of appeals reversed.  It analyzed the disputed evidence this way: 
Nickoli’s prior sexual relationship with A.S was critical to his defense.  The 
fact that A.S. had engaged in a single act of sexual intercourse 
approximately one month before the alleged rape was certainly substantial 
evidence which supported Nickoli’s defense.  But the fact that A.S. and 
Nickoli engaged in sexual intercourse over a long period of time on several 
occasions, both before and after A.S. was married, significantly strengthens 
Nickoli’s claim.  The fact that A.S. had been involved in a long-term 
relationship with Nickoli supports the inference that she might have been 
willing to engage in consensual intercourse with Nickoli, or that Nickoli 
might have reasonably concluded that she was willing at the time of the 
alleged rape.  A jury might find these inferences stronger with evidence of a 
long-term relationship than with evidence that Nickoli had engaged in a 
single recent act of consensual sex with A.S.  Nickoli was entitled to present 
this evidence to the jury. 
Id. at *7–*8.  A “long-term relationship” implied ongoing consent. 
 312. Id. 
 313. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (“Except as provided in (1) of this 
section [when victim is mentally incapable or incapacitated] it is not a defense that the 
victim was, at the time of the alleged offense, the legal spouse of the defendant”).  
Alaska’s marital rape immunity extends to sexual offenses in which the victim is mentally 
incapable or incapacitated—circumstances that would include Dripps’ hypothetical 
unconscious wife.  ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (it is defense to sexual assault 
when victim is incapable of consenting that offender is married to person and neither party 
has filed with the court for separation). 
 314. Napoka, 996 P.2d at 110. 
 315. HALE, supra note 1, at 629. 
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V.  New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates 
As a preliminary matter, this Part begins by analyzing two 
possible responses to the ongoing consent ideology that continues to 
dominate rape cases involving intimates: (1) reforming rape shield 
laws and (2) admitting expert testimony on intimate rape.  After 
exploring the limitations of these two responses, Section A sets out a 
proposal for a new law on sexual offenses by intimates, and argues 
that its manifold advantages outweigh its potential disadvantages.  
Section B applies the new law on sexual offenses by intimates to the 
cases discussed in Part IV.  It concludes that such a law would 
mitigate the harm of the ongoing consent ideology and improve the 
law in useful and equitable ways. 
One obvious place to begin reforming the law regarding sexual 
offenses by intimates is with rape shield laws, which admit evidence of 
the sexual history between the defendant and the complainant.  In an 
earlier Article, I argued that routinely admitting this evidence 
befuddles the jury’s ability to discern truth from a set of facts.316  It 
prejudices the truth-seeking process primarily by reinforcing the 
antiquated notion that, once a woman consents to sexual intercourse 
with a man, he is entitled to assume that she consents to future sexual 
acts.317  To limit the admission of evidence of the sexual history 
between the complainant and the defendant, I proposed the following 
rape shield statute: 
Evidence of the complainant’s sexual conduct and sexual 
communication with the defendant on the instance in question is 
admissible.  Direct or opinion evidence of the complainant’s sexual 
conduct and sexual communication prior or subsequent to the 
instance in question is inadmissible, subject to the following three 
exceptions: 
(1) Evidence of an alternate source for the semen, pregnancy, 
disease, or injury that the complainant suffered. 
(2) Evidence of negotiations between the complainant and the 
defendant to convey consent in a specific way or to engage 
in a specific sexual act at issue. 
(3) Evidence of the complainant’s bias or motive to fabricate 
the charge of rape.318 
This statute would prohibit the admission of much of the specific 
evidence of prior sexual history between the defendant and the 
complainant.  In brief, the only routinely admissible evidence of the 
sexual history between the complainant and the defendant would be 
“[e]vidence of negotiations between the complainant and the 
 
 316. Anderson, supra note 23, at 1771–84. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 1802. 
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defendant to convey consent in a specific way or to engage in a 
specific sexual act at issue.”  Negotiations “to convey consent in a 
specific way” might entail, for example, a discussion that a person 
likes to have sex while saying “no” but wants her partner to stop if 
she says “red.”  Negotiations “to engage in a specific sexual act” 
might entail, for example, a discussion about the sexual acts that the 
parties planned to do to each other on their next date, provided that 
those acts were at issue.  Most other evidence of specific sexual acts 
between the parties would be inadmissible. 
Although I do not expect to convince the reader of the merits of 
the statute here (for a full discussion of it, please refer to my earlier 
Article), what I do hope to do is to show that even a restrictive rape 
shield statute such as the one I previously proposed would not 
dismantle the ongoing consent ideology that tends to affect intimate 
rape cases.319  Despite its restrictions on admissible evidence, the 
statute would still admit evidence of the fact that the parties had been 
previously intimate.  As I argued: 
Although prior sexual history between the complainant and the 
defendant should not be a categorical exception to rape shield laws, 
complaints of rape should not want for meaningful context.  A 
complainant who has been intimate with the defendant cannot 
pretend to be a stranger to him when she lodges a complaint that he 
raped her.  For the sake of background and perspective, it is 
appropriate to allow the defendant to discuss general information 
about the nature of the parties’ relationship, such as the fact that 
the parties were married or lived together, or dated previously.  
This general information is not covered by rape shield laws and is 
not the sort of evidence that would be excluded by them.  
Descriptions of the level of sexual intimacy previously attained or 
of specific prior sexual acts, however, befuddle the truth-seeking 
process, so they should ordinarily be inadmissible.320 
In a footnote, I explored briefly the potential bias that might flow 
from the admission of even general information about the nature of 
the parties’ relationship: 
Admittedly, even general statements about the prior intimate 
relationship between the complainant and the defendant may also 
befuddle the truth-seeking process.  However, defendants have the 
right to provide some context for the instance in question, and the 
state should not be allowed to leave the misimpression with the jury 
that the complainant and the defendant were strangers.321 
Given that general information about the nature of the parties’ 
relationship would be admitted after the passage of such a law, there 
remains the very real problem that jurors and judges will invest this 
 
 319. For a fuller discussion of the merits of the statute, see id. at 1802–08. 
 320. Id. at 1784. 
 321. Id. at 1784, note 490. 
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general evidence with probative value that it simply does not contain.  
Therefore, some other reform measure is needed to blunt potential 
bias against women who are sexually assaulted by their intimates. 
One might propose that experts on intimate rape be allowed to 
testify in intimate rape cases.  Experts could testify, for example, that 
a complainant’s prior consent to sexual intercourse does not imply 
later consent to sexual intercourse.322  Experts could testify that 
women are harmed by intimate rape and that they do not intend to 
give ongoing consent to sexual activities to men once they have had 
sex with them.  I support the proposal for expert testimony in these 
cases; however, it would require, of course, prosecutors to obtain 
experts.  Often, local prosecutors do not have the resources or the 
desire to do so.  There is no reason to leave a much-needed legal 
change to the constraints imposed by local prosecutors’ possibly 
limited resources or imaginations.  Changes should be made at a 
statewide level in a way that imposes no new burdens on 
prosecutorial budgets. 
Additionally, expert testimony can be disputed.  A defense 
attorney could present its own expert to testify that a woman’s past 
consent does imply consent to future sexual acts.  The question at 
issue, however, is not actually one of expert opinion.  The question is 
whether the law will allow defendants and jurors to infer that past 
consent to sexual acts itself means consent to future sexual acts.  
Either defendants and jurors may infer a complainant’s consent to 
sexual intercourse on the instance in question based solely on her 
prior consent or they may not.  If the law does not allow such an 
improper inference to be made, a new provision should be adopted 
that simply states that such an inference is incorrect as a matter of 
law. 
 
 322. Another way to eliminate juror bias in date rape trials proposed by Steve 
Friedland was to screen jurors “more carefully during voir dire to allow the attorney to 
exclude those jurors who are indelibly tainted by the culture of acceptance.”  See 
Friedland, supra note 16, at 520.  Once the jury selection process was completed, the 
selected jurors would be educated about the dangers of the culture of acceptance.  Id.  
Friedland views this as a two-pronged prevention and educational attack on the culture of 
acceptance.  Id. at 523.  Because determining which jurors would be more influenced by 
the culture of acceptance would be difficult, Friedland sees this educational process to be 
an intricate element to his proposal. 
A number of district attorneys have acknowledged the need to educate jurors through 
experts about domestic violence and marital rape in order to “contextualize rape in 
marriage and debunk myths about implied consent.”  See Eskow, supra note 3, at 699-702.  
One prosecutor believed that the key to removing this stigma was through domestic 
violence classes in high schools and colleges, which would educate potential jurors earlier.  
Id. at 701–02. 
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A. Analysis of the New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates 
States must directly address the question of what impact a prior 
sexual relationship between the defendant and the complainant has 
on a claim of consent.  I propose that states abolish provisions in their 
sexual offense codes that deal exclusively with the marital status of 
the defendant and the complainant.  I propose, instead, that each 
state’s sexual offense statute include the following provision: 
A prior or subsequent sexual relationship between the defendant 
and the complainant—in marriage, cohabitation, dating, or other 
circumstances—shall not be a defense to a sexual offense and shall 
not affect the grading of a sexual offense.  The sole fact that the 
complainant consented to the same or different acts with the 
defendant on other occasions shall not be a sufficient basis for 
inferring consent on the instance in question.  The mere existence 
of such a sexual relationship shall not be a sufficient basis for the 
defendant to claim a mistake of fact as to consent defense. 
These three sentences would significantly change the way that 
the legal system weighs evidence of a sexual relationship between the 
complainant and the defendant.  I will analyze each sentence in turn. 
“A prior or subsequent sexual relationship between the defendant 
and the complainant—in marriage, cohabitation, dating, or other 
circumstances—shall not be a defense to a sexual offense and shall not 
affect the grading of a sexual offense.” 
This first sentence would address rape by intimates as a whole 
and not single out marital rape victims for special treatment.  
Collective treatment of rape by intimates is appropriate because 
victims who have been previously intimate with their assailants suffer 
similar harm to marital rape victims.323  As we have seen, “one need 
not be legally married to suffer the trauma and consequences of being 
raped by one’s intimate partner.”324  More importantly, from a 
fairness standpoint, victims who have been previously intimate with 
their assailants are often subject to the improper inference of ongoing 
consent regardless of the formal legal status the parties share.  As a 
result, the sexual relationship between the parties itself is the 
centerpiece of the proposed provision; whether that relationship 
occurred “in marriage, cohabitation, dating, or other circumstances” 
is immaterial because the provision covers each circumstance. 
The first sentence also clarifies that such a prior sexual 
relationship “shall not be a defense to a sexual offense.”  In that 
 
 323. See supra notes 129–35 and accompanying text. 
 324. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 8 (“Furthermore . . . ’a marriage license 
probably does not change the dynamics of sexual abuse within an ongoing intimate 
relationship, except to make it legal in some states.’  Thus, my sample includes legally 
married women, those who have cohabited with their partners for more than a year, and 
those in partnerships who share a child.”). 
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sense, it is similar to the “no defense” provisions of Alaska, Colorado, 
and Georgia, which state that the marital status of the parties “shall 
not be a defense” to a charged sexual offense.325  The new law on rape 
by intimates is different, however, because it focuses on what drives 
the traditional marital rape exemption: the prior sexual relationship 
between the parties itself.  For that reason, the new law says that the 
prior sexual relationship itself (rather than technical marital status) 
“shall not be a defense.” 
In addition to addressing a prior sexual relationship between the 
parties, the first sentence addresses a subsequent sexual relationship 
between the parties.  Many battered women stay with their abusers 
even after they have been assaulted repeatedly.  The fact that they 
stayed after the abuse does not mean that they consented to being 
battered or that the battering was not a crime.  Likewise, many raped 
women continue to have relationships with their abusers, 
relationships that may include subsequent sexual relations.326  As we 
have seen, the fact that they stayed after the rapes does not mean that 
they consented to being raped or that the rapes were not crimes. 
Finally, the first sentence clarifies that a sexual relationship 
between the parties “shall not affect the grading of a sexual offense.”  
At least four states allow the mere fact that the parties were married 
or cohabitating to affect the grading of the offense and, as a 
consequence, how seriously the police, prosecutors, courts, and juries 
take these offenses.  In basic fairness to women, this explicit 
statement that a previous sexual relationship shall not affect the 
grading of the offense should be included in the statute as a matter of 
legislative intent. 
“The sole fact that the complainant consented to the same or 
different acts with the defendant on other occasions shall not be a 
sufficient basis for inferring consent on the instance in question.” 
 
 325. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (“Except as provided in (a) of this 
section [when victim is mentally incapable or incapacitated] it is not a defense that the 
victim was, at the time of the alleged offense, the legal spouse of the defendant”); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-409 (West 2002) (“Any marital relationship shall not be defense 
unless such defense is specifically set forth in statute;” spouses exempt only from statutory 
rape); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(2) (Harrison 1982–2001) (“The fact that the person 
allegedly raped is the wife of the defendant shall not be a defense to a charge of rape”); 
§ 16-6-2 (“The fact that the person allegedly sodomized is the spouse of a defendant shall 
not be a defense to a charge of aggravated sodomy”). 
 326. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 54 M.J. 700, 705 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) (victim 
testified to having sexual relations with defendant after two alleged rapes of victim by 
defendant); State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 473 (N.C. 1984) (discussing defendant and 
complainant’s sexual relations after complaint made to police about alleged rape); 
Commonwealth v. Richter, 711 A.2d 464, 466 (Pa. 1998) (victim allowed defendant to 
move back in with her after alleged rape). 
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This second sentence of the new law on sexual offenses by 
intimates means that that one cannot conclude that the complainant 
consented on the instance in question simply by virtue of her consent 
to the same act with the defendant on a different occasion.  Simply 
because a woman previously agreed to have oral sex with a man 
before does not mean that she consented to oral sex with him on the 
instance in question.  The prior act, alone, provides no basis for 
making that inference.  Combined with other evidence, such as how 
the complainant acted on the instance in question in light of her prior 
behavior in the relationship, the prior act may be a factor upon which 
one might infer consent, but as a lone bit of evidence, it is not 
sufficient for one to infer consent.  The provision therefore states that 
the complainant’s consent on the instance in question may not be 
inferred solely based on her consent to the same act with the 
defendant on other occasions. 
The second sentence also addresses prior consent to sexual acts 
that are different than the one charged.  It likewise clarifies that one 
cannot infer consent simply by virtue of the complainant’s consent to 
a different act with the defendant on a different occasion.  Simply 
because a woman had consensual vaginal sex with a man previously 
does not mean that she consented to oral sex with him on the instance 
in question.  The provision therefore states that the complainant’s 
consent on the instance in question may not be inferred solely based 
on her consent to a different act with the defendant on other 
occasions. 
Finally, the second sentence of the new law on sexual offenses by 
intimates abolishes the defendant’s ability to claim that he enjoyed 
“implied authorization” to proceed with sex with the complainant 
without her consent whenever “a long-standing sexual relationship 
connects the defendant with the victim.”327  Such “implied 
authorization,” Dripps argues, derives from the fact that the woman 
had, “while sober and over a long course of dealing, approved of a 
complex relationship in which sex plays a prominent role.”328  The 
new law on sexual offenses by intimates nips this analysis in the bud: 
The complainant’s consent on the instance in question may not be 
inferred solely from her consent to the same or different acts with the 
defendant on other occasions.  No “implied authorization” for future 
sex follows “a complex relationship in which sex plays a prominent 
role.”329 
 
 327. Dripps, supra note 5, at 1801. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
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“The mere existence of such a sexual relationship shall not be a 
sufficient basis for the defendant to claim a mistake of fact as to 
consent defense.” 
The third sentence of the new law addresses the specific defense 
of mistake of fact as to consent that a prior sexual relationship 
between the parties helps provide defendants.  It clarifies that a 
defendant may not assume he has consent solely by virtue of the fact 
that he has been sexually active with a woman before.  There may be 
any number of reasons a man harbors a legitimate mistake of fact as 
to a woman’s consent, but the mere fact that he has been sexually 
active with her before should not provide him with the opportunity to 
make such a claim.  This provision prevents the defendant from 
relying on a particularly unreasonable mistaken belief: that once a 
woman consents to sex with him, she has given him ongoing consent 
to future sexual acts.  The new law declares that, because it is 
unreasonable to make an assumption of consent based solely on the 
fact that one has been sexually active with someone before, it is 
legally untenable.  Combined with other evidence of what occurred 
on the instance in question in light of past practices between the 
parties, the fact that a man has been sexually active with a woman 
before may be a factor upon which he may conclude, reasonably but 
mistakenly, that she consented on the instance in question.  But the 
mere existence of a relationship itself cannot provide him with a 
reasonable mistake.  Prior consent alone provides the defendant with 
no reasonable basis upon which to assume consent on the instance in 
question. 
In proposing this new law on sexual offenses by intimates, I am 
advancing a particular normative vision of consent to sexual 
intercourse.330  I believe that consent to sexual intercourse is 
temporally constrained permission that is specific as to act and non-
transferable to others.331  Examples illustrate each of these principles.  
Consent is temporally constrained: A woman may choose to end a 
passionate affair in order to become a celibate Buddhist nun.  Just 
because she consented to sex with her lover in the past does not mean 
she consents in the future.  Consent is specific as to act: A wife may 
choose to have vaginal intercourse with her husband, but refuse his 
requests for anal sex.  Just because she consented to vaginal 
intercourse does not mean she consents to anal sex.  Consent is non-
transferable to other people: A woman may exchange oral sex for 
money with seven men in one night to pay her rent, but refuse the 
eighth.  Just because she consented to sex with seven men, does not 
 
 330. I advanced the same normative vision of consent in an earlier article on rape shield 
laws.  See Anderson, supra note 23, at 1796–1802. 
 331. Id. at 1707–08. 
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mean she consents to sex with the eighth.  Sexual consent is 
permission that must be negotiated each time. 
Rape law has not evinced this normative vision of consent.332  
Historically, rape law portrayed consent to sexual intercourse as 
temporally unconstrained permission that could be imprecise as to act 
and even indiscriminate as to person.333  Marital immunity for sexual 
offenses enshrined two of these objectionable aspects of this distorted 
normative vision into rape law. 
First, it established sexual consent as temporally unconstrained 
permission.  As Vivian Berger noted in her influential Columbia Law 
Review article on the marital rape exemption, marital immunity 
derived from the “fictional notion that marriage implies continuing 
consent to sexual relations.”334  As we have seen, ongoing sexual 
consent to her husband was imagined to be a “term” of the marriage 
“contract,” something that continued for the duration of the 
marriage.335 
Second, marital immunity established sexual consent as 
permission that was imprecise as to sexual act.  Once a woman 
professed a nuptial “I do,” she could not assert a conjugal “I don’t do 
that.”336  Her husband could force her to engage in any sexual act that 
pleased him, and the law provided her no refuge.337 
The new law on sexual offenses by intimates abandons this 
retrograde normative vision of consent in favor of a more egalitarian 
view.  This new law would help to temporally constrain sexual 
 
 332. Id. at 1703–04. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Women’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1977). 
 335. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (N.J. 1981) (noting most prevalent justification for 
marital exemption is “that upon entering the marriage contract a wife consents to sexual 
intercourse with her husband”).  “If a wife can exercise a legal right to separate from her 
husband and eventually terminate the marriage ‘contract,’ may she not also revoke a 
‘term’ of that contract, namely, consent to intercourse?”  Id.  See also Weishaupt v. 
Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 854 (Va. 1984) (“[I]f a woman can unilaterally secure a 
divorce, thereby revoking the marriage contract in its entirety, then it is illogical to 
conclude that she cannot, by her own act, revoke a term of that contract.”); Kizer v. 
Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 291, 293 (Va. 1984) (“[T]he prosecution . . . must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the wife unilaterally had revoked her implied consent to 
marital intercourse.”). 
 336. See HALE, supra note 1, at 629 (stating women give matrimonial consent which 
may not be withdrawn).  Hale provided justification for the marital rape exemption by 
saying, “the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, 
for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this 
kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”  See id. (emphasis added).  See also 
Hasday, supra note 3, at 1399 (emphasizing how Hale had formulated a “legal rule 
conclusively inferring consent from her initial agreement to marry”). 
 337. See Hasday, supra note 3, at 1400.  Marriage provided a man “a right of sexual 
access to his wife.”  Id.  Likewise, it “bestowed an obligation on the wife to submit.”  Id. 
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consent and make it precise as to act.  Consent would be temporally 
constrained because a prior or subsequent sexual relationship would 
not itself be a defense to a rape charge.  The mere existence of 
consensual sex on another occasion would not be sufficient to infer 
consent on the instance in question.  Consent would also be specific 
as to act because neither the defendant nor the jury would be 
permitted to infer that the complainant consented to the sexual act in 
question simply by virtue of the complainant’s prior consent to the 
same or a different sexual act. 
Defendants charged with sexual offenses in jurisdictions in which 
this new law on sexual offenses by intimates has been adopted could 
still claim consent as a defense, of course.338  These defendants would 
not, however, be able to argue that, simply by having had sex with the 
complainant before, they could assume consent to the sexual acts in 
question.  Under the new law on sexual offenses by intimates, a 
defendant’s prior sexual relationship with a complainant would not be 
a defense, nor would it provide a defendant with an inference of 
ongoing consent. 
The new law on sexual offenses by intimates I propose may 
break new ground in rape law, but it travels a well-worn path.339  As 
we have seen, three states have enacted “no defense” provisions in 
their rape codes that clarify that marital status is no defense to a 
charged sexual offense.340  The new law on sexual offenses by 
intimates is not a great leap from those provisions; it simply re-
 
 338. A defendant could advance a defense of consent primarily by producing evidence 
of the complainant’s words or actions on the instance in question.  If a complainant and a 
defendant previously negotiated a unique method of communicating consent to sex, 
evidence of that negotiation would certainly be admissible to reveal what the defendant 
reasonably believed about the complainant’s consent to sexual intercourse on the instance 
in question.  If a complainant and a defendant previously negotiated future consent to 
specific acts, again, evidence of that negotiation would be admissible to reveal what the 
defendant reasonably believed about the complainant’s consent to sexual intercourse on 
the instance in question.  Notice, however, that in both circumstances, the mere existence 
of a previous sexual relationship would not be a defense to a charge of rape, nor would it 
provide the defendant with an automatic presumption of consent to future sexual 
relations.  Anderson, supra note 23, at 1804–07. 
 339. Steven Friedland argued for specialized jury instructions that would warn jurors 
against assuming a woman’s consent to sexual acts simply because they disapprove of her 
nonverbal actions before those acts.  See Friedland, supra note 16, at 524.  Friedland 
argued, “[t]he instructions could inform juries explicitly that nonverbal cues such as dress 
and body language do not impliedly support a finding of consent unless there is a 
reasonable, unbiased ground for that inference.”  Id. at 525.  One district attorney in 
northern California surveyed for a student note in the Stanford Law Review argued for 
creating specialized jury instructions that read, “[a]ll spouses have the right to control their 
bodies.  Spousal status [is] no defense to rape.”  This provision would be similar to the new 
law on sexual offenses by intimates that I propose herein.  Eskow, supra note 3, at 702. 
 340. For a further discussion of statutes providing that marital status is “no defense” to 
rape, see supra note 293-294 and accompanying text. 
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focuses the law on the impact of the prior sexual relationship rather 
than the technical marital status.  In addition, the states of California 
and Colorado have interesting, analogous provisions regarding the 
substantive issue of consent in their sexual offense codes.  Both the 
California and Colorado codes on consent state, “[a] current or 
previous dating relationship shall not be sufficient to constitute 
consent” for a sexual offense.341  California courts have interpreted 
this provision to mean, “consent, to be a defense, must be current; the 
fact that a victim has previously engaged in sexual activities with the 
attacker does not constitute consent in perpetuo.”342  In other words, 
consent to prior sexual acts does not extend in perpetuity to other 
sexual acts: consent is not ongoing.  This analysis is a central rationale 
behind the new law on sexual offenses by intimates. 
This new law on sexual offenses by intimates would authorize 
prosecutors to obtain jury instructions that would limit the jury’s 
ability to infer consent from a prior sexual relationship between the 
parties.  Three states with arguably the best statutes on marital 
immunity each have statutes that provide that marriage is not a 
defense to a charge of rape.343  However, these three states lack 
patterned jury instructions to take advantage of the statutes.344  The 
progressive language in these laws, declaring that marriage is not a 
defense to rape, is ineffectual without an accompanying jury 
instruction cautioning the jury not to make an improper inference of 
consent based solely on the marital relationship. 
Appropriate jury instructions based on the new law on sexual 
offenses by intimates would depend on whether, in the applicable 
jurisdiction, nonconsent is a material element of the crime of rape and 
so must be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or consent 
 
 341. People v. Gonzalez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778 (C.A. 2d Dist. 1995).  It goes on to say, 
“[n]othing in this section shall affect the admissibility of evidence or the burden of proof 
on the issue of consent.”  Id. at 780.  See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2002); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-401 (West 2002). 
 342. In re Keith S., No. E027838, 2002 WL 220630 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.) (unpublished 
disposition). 
 343. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Mitchie 2001) (“[I]t is not a defense that the victim [of 
sexual assault in the first or second degree] was, at the time of the alleged offense, the 
legal spouse of the defendant.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-409 (West 2002) (“Any 
marital relationship, whether established statutorily, putatively, or by common law, 
between an actor and a victim shall not be a defense to any offense under this part); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a)(2) (Harrison 1982–2001) (“The fact that the person allegedly 
raped is the wife of the defendant shall not be a defense to the charge of rape.”). 
 344. See generally ALASKA SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, ALASKA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) (1980) (amended 
1988); COLO. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS , COLO. 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (1993); COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES OF GA., 
SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL CASES, vol. II (1991) (amended 
2002). 
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is an affirmative defense for which the defendant has the burden of 
persuasion.  In most jurisdictions, nonconsent is a material element of 
the crime of rape.  One potential jury instruction based on the new 
law on sexual offenses by intimates in these jurisdictions would, 
therefore, be: 
In this case, the defendant claims that the complainant consented to 
the conduct alleged to have been rape.  You have heard evidence 
that the parties _____________ [were involved in a prior sexual 
relationship] or [were involved in a subsequent sexual relationship] 
or [engaged in the same sexual act on another occasion] or 
[engaged in a different sexual act on another occasion].  This fact, 
in and of itself, is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to 
consent.  This fact, weighed with other evidence, may raise a 
reasonable doubt as to consent. 
If the defendant offers other evidence of consent besides the 
prior sexual relationship itself, the risk remains that jurors will invest 
the relationship with probative value that it does not warrant.  
Therefore, even if the defendant offers other evidence of consent, the 
prosecution should be entitled to obtain this instruction when a 
defendant in an intimate sexual offense case claims the defense of 
consent. 
On the question of mistake of fact as to consent, a jury 
instruction might read: 
In this case, the defendant claims that he had a reasonable but 
mistaken belief that the complainant consented to the conduct 
alleged to have been rape.  You have heard evidence that the 
parties _____________ [were involved in a prior sexual relationship] 
or [engaged in the same sexual act on another occasion] or 
[engaged in a different sexual act on another occasion].  This fact, 
alone, is not a reasonable basis upon which the defendant can make 
a mistake as to the complainant’s consent.  If you find that this fact 
is the sole basis upon which the defendant believed that the 
complainant consented, you must find that his belief was 
unreasonable.  If, however, you find that the defendant relied on 
other evidence as well, you may weigh this fact with that other 
evidence when evaluating whether his mistake was reasonable. 
By these instructions, juries would be cautioned that a sexual 
relationship between the parties is not itself a defense and that the 
defendant may not assume ongoing consent or “implied 
authorization” to sexual intercourse simply by virtue of a prior or 
subsequent sexual relationship.  Such instructions would help to 
curtail juror bias against victims who have had prior sexual 
relationships with their assailants.  These instructions would also 
undermine the legal legacy of the marital rape exemption: the 
substantive notion of ongoing consent based solely on an intimate 
relationship, regardless of the marital status of that relationship. 
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B. Application of the New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates 
If the victims in Gonyaw, Sanchez-Lahora, Adair, and Napoka 
had lived in jurisdictions in which the new law on sexual offenses by 
intimates had been in effect, the appellate courts evaluating those 
cases would have had to acknowledge that a prior sexual relationship 
between the defendant and the complainant did not itself afford the 
defendant an inference of consent.  Moreover, on retrial, the juries in 
those cases would be properly cautioned about how to weigh that 
evidence and their ability to make an improper inference of ongoing 
consent would be appropriately constrained. 
In Gonyaw, the complainant and the defendant had cohabitated 
for three years.345  The Vermont Supreme Court stated that 
consensual sex between them four days prior to the alleged sexual 
assault could “support a reasonable belief that there was consent to 
renewed sexual activity.”346  Under the new law on sexual offense by 
intimates, the defendant could not reasonably believe in consent to 
“renewed sexual activity” based solely on a recent consensual act of 
sex.347  Consent to “renewed sexual activity” as a concept would be 
improper because prior sexual acts, in and of themselves, do not 
imply consent to subsequent sexual acts, even if those prior acts were 
“reasonably contemporaneous” with the instance in question.348  At 
retrial, after hearing evidence of their three-year cohabitation and a 
disputed act of sex four days earlier, the jury would be properly 
instructed that the existence of such a sexual relationship “alone, is 
not a reasonable basis upon which the defendant can make a mistake 
as to the complainant’s consent.” 
If the new law on sexual offenses by intimates were in effect in 
Nebraska at the time, the appellate court in Sanchez-Lahora could 
not have endorsed the faulty syllogism it believed it found in the 
state’s rape shield law.  In that case, Sanchez-Lahora wanted to testify 
that he had had sex with the complainant 11–14 times before.349  When 
analyzing this potential evidence the appellate court said: 
Major [premise]: The victim’s past sexual behavior with the 
defendant was consensual behavior.  Minor [premise]: The victim’s 
behavior in the present prosecution is the type of activity in which 
 
 345. Vermont v. Gonyaw, 507 A.2d 944, 947 (Vt. 1985). 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id.  Under the rape shield law I proposed in an earlier Article, evidence of sex four 
days prior to the alleged assault would likely be excluded, but evidence of the fact that the 
parties had previously cohabitated would not be excluded.  See supra notes 316–20 and 
accompanying text.  For this reason, the new law on sexual offenses by intimates and the 
jury instruction it allows would be appropriate even if Vermont had passed my rape shield 
law. 
 348. Gonyaw, 507 A.2d at 947. 
 349. State v. Sanchez-Lahora, 616 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000). 
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the victim participated with the defendant in the past.  Conclusion: 
Therefore, the victim’s behavior in the present prosecution was 
consensual.350 
The new law on sexual offenses by intimates rejects the notion 
that consent to sex on the instance in question ineluctably follows 
from consent to similar acts before.  On the contrary, it clarifies that, 
as a logical matter, one may not infer consent on the instance in 
question based on the mere fact that the complainant’s past sexual 
behavior with the defendant was similar and consensual.351  At retrial, 
the jury would be properly instructed that the sole fact that the 
complainant consented to the same act with the defendant before “is 
not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to consent.” 
In Adair, the Michigan Supreme Court would not have had to 
struggle for a way to interpret the sexual acts that occurred after the 
alleged sexual assault during a brief reconciliation between the Adair 
and his wife.352  The new law on sexual offenses by intimates would 
instruct the jury plainly that a “subsequent sexual relationship” 
between the defendant and the complainant, in and of itself, “is not 
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to consent.” 
Likewise, in Napoka, the “long history of consensual sex” alleged 
by Napoka with the minor would not imply authorization for sex with 
her on the three instances in question.353  In Napoka, the Alaska 
appellate court said that the sexual history of sex between a 
complainant and a defendant was important to two material issues: 
(1) the actual consent of the minor to the sex alleged to have been 
rape and (2), if there was no actual consent, the defendant’s 
reasonable belief that she consented.354  The new law on sexual 
offenses by intimates addresses both material issues.355  Actual 
 
 350. Id. at 818. 
 351. Under the rape shield law I proposed in an earlier Article, evidence of sex 11–14 
times prior to the alleged assault would likely be excluded, but evidence of Sanchez-
Lahora’s allegation that the parties had previously been involved in some kind of romantic 
relationship would not be excluded.  See supra notes 316–20 and accompanying text.  For 
this reason, the new law on sexual offenses by intimates and the jury instruction it allows 
would be appropriate even if Nebraska had passed my rape shield law. 
 352. Michigan v. Adair, 550 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Mich. 1996).  Under the rape shield law I 
proposed in an earlier Article, evidence of sex after the alleged assault would likely be 
excluded, but evidence of the fact that the parties were married would not be excluded.  
See supra notes 316–20 and accompanying text.  For this reason, the new law on sexual 
offenses by intimates and the jury instruction it allows would be appropriate even if 
Michigan had passed my rape shield law. 
 353. Napoka v. Alaska, 996 P.2d 106, 110 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000). 
 354. Id. at 110. 
 355. Under the rape shield law I proposed in an earlier Article, evidence of allegedly 
consensual sex between Napoka and the minor prior to the alleged assault would likely be 
excluded, but evidence of the fact that Napoka claimed some romantic relationship would 
not be excluded.  See supra notes 316–20 and accompanying text.  For this reason, the new 
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consent to sexual intercourse may not be inferred solely based on a 
history of consensual sex.  Because, legally, jurors and defendants 
may not infer consent on the instance in question based solely on 
prior consensual sexual behavior, the defendant himself may not 
construct a defense of reasonable belief in consent based on that 
evidence alone.  Prior consent in and of itself provides the defendant 
with no reasonable basis to assume consent on the instance in 
question.  At retrial, the jury would be properly instructed that the 
mere existence of such a sexual relationship “is not sufficient to raise 
a reasonable doubt as to consent” and “is not a reasonable basis upon 
which the defendant can make a mistake as to the complainant’s 
consent.”  Having such an instruction is superior to the status quo 
because it allows the jury to make conclusions based on the evidence 
surrounding the disputed sexual act itself rather than on a biased 
inference of ongoing consent based solely on prior acts. 
Critics might worry that the new law on sexual offenses by 
intimates would engender unfair results in cases in which the issue of 
consent is a particularly close one.  They need not fret.  Assume, for 
example, a situation in which a woman voices no affirmative consent 
to sexual intercourse, nor does she verbally or physically object to it.  
What happens when her husband penetrates her but she remains 
passive and silent?  As a practical matter, of course, no prosecutor 
would bring such a weak case to the jury.  Even if the parties were not 
married, this case could not result in a conviction under current law in 
the vast majority of jurisdictions.356  The new law on sexual offenses 
would not change that fact. 
Moreover, as a theoretical matter, the application of the new law 
on sexual offenses in a hypothetical prosecution based on these facts 
would not make the case more troubling.  Should the husband be able 
to argue that his wife consented on the instance in question based 
solely on the existence of his prior relationship with her?  No.  His 
defense of consent should be based on evidence surrounding the 
disputed sexual act itself: that his wife was passive and silent on the 
instance in question.  Coupled with this evidence, he would also be 
able to point to past sexual practices between them to argue consent.  
Whether he would prevail would depend on the substantive definition 
 
law on sexual offenses by intimates and the jury instruction it allows would be appropriate 
even if Alaska had passed my rape shield law. 
 356. Most jurisdictions do not criminalize this behavior.  Only in jurisdictions such as 
New Jersey, in which consent requires affirmative, freely given permission, would this 
situation be potentially criminal.  State of New Jersey in the interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 
1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (consent defined as “affirmative and freely-given permission of the 
victim to the specific act of penetration”). 
ANDERSON13 8/25/2003  3:07 PM 
1552 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54 
of consent in the jurisdiction, rather than on the new law on sexual 
offenses by intimates that I have proposed.357 
Conclusion 
Legally declaring that “a prior sexual relationship between the 
defendant and the complainant—in marriage, cohabitation, dating, or 
other circumstances—shall not be a defense to a sexual offense” will 
not end the occurrence of sexual offenses by intimates, of course.358  It 
will, however, end the marriage between an intimate relationship and 
the improper inference of ongoing consent to sexual intercourse.  
Because the ideology of ongoing consent has bullied the legal 
interpretation of intimate relationships in rape cases for generations, 
such a divorce is long overdue. 
 
 357. See, e.g., id. 
 358. As Diana Russell has pointed out: “Clearly, though legal reform is a crucial step in 
dealing with wife rape, it is not enough.  Our survey data have shown that many women 
who are economically dependent on their husbands do not feel able to leave the husbands 
who rape them.  Hence, the struggle against wife rape and other wife abuse is connected 
with the struggle for women to obtain greater economic independence, in their marriages 
and outside of them.  Ultimately it is not possible to eradicate wife rape as long as women 
are subordinate to men in the family and in society.  Hence, the struggle for equal power, 
which means more for women and less for men, is part of the struggle against wife rape.”  
RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 360. 
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Introduction to the Appendix of State Sexual Offense  
Statutes with Marital Immunity 
The following appendix details only those twenty-six states that 
contain some form of marital immunity in their sexual offense 
statutes.  It does not include states that have abolished marital 
immunity. 
State statutes regarding sexual offenses vary widely.  Many states 
criminalize sexual transgressions in unique ways.  Even as I have tried 
to be comprehensive in this compilation of states’ sexual offense 
statutes with marital immunity, I have cut certain provisions to focus 
on the most pertinent aspects of the doctrine for forcible and 
nonconsensual sexual offenses.  For this reason, I have omitted 
provisions that criminalize sexual intercourse based on age of the 
victim, commonly called statutory rape laws.  These almost 
universally provide for marital immunity.359  I have also omitted 
provisions that criminalize sexual intercourse based on the 
developmental disability or other cognitive limitation of the victim; 
statutes often refer to these victims as “mentally defective.”360  These 
 
 359. Statutes that exempt spouses from crimes classified as statutory rape are beyond 
the scope of this paper and will not be discussed.  Additionally, nearly every state has a 
provision providing immunity for spousal statutory rape.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 3252 (2001) (sexual assault: “The other person is under the age of 16, except where the 
persons are married to each other and the sexual act is consensual”); W.VA. CODE § 61-
8B-3 (1966–2002) (sexual assault in first degree: “The person, being fourteen years old or 
more, engages in sexual intercourse or sexual intrusion with another person who is eleven 
years old or less and is not married to that person”).  Marital immunity for statutory rape 
will not be discussed in this paper.  I have also omitted provisions regarding incest because 
they do not involve spouses. 
 360. Several states provide marital immunity for sexual offenses if one spouse suffers 
from mental retardation or a mental defect that renders her incapable of providing 
consent.  ALA. CODE 1975 § 13A-6-62(a)(2) (2002) (marital immunity for rape in second 
degree when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with a victim who is incapable of 
consent by reason of being mentally defective); § 13A-6-64 (marital immunity for sodomy 
in the second degree when person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a person who 
is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally defective); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 
(Michie 2001) (marital immunity for sexual assault in the first degree when the offender 
“engages in sexual penetration with another person who the offender knows is mentally 
incapable”); §11.41.420 (marriage is defense to second degree sexual assault if the victim is 
mentally incapable); §11.41.420 (marriage is a defense to third degree sexual assault if the 
victim is mentally incapable); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002) (spouses or 
cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault in fourth degree, which occurs when person 
intentionally subjects another to sexual contact who is mentally defective, mentally 
incapacitated or physically helpless); § 53a-71 (spouses and cohabitants are immune from 
sexual assault in second degree when the victim is mentally defective); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 707-732(d) (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (spouses and 
cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault in third degree, Class C felony, if victim is 
mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 
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provisions, too, routinely provide for marital immunity.  I have 
omitted the rare provisions regarding rapes that involve an abuse of 
authority (which frequently provide for marital immunity), such as 
those in which the victim is a prisoner in a correctional facility in 
which the offender is a guard.  I have also omitted those very rare 
provisions regarding rapes that involve an abuse of trust (which are 
silent as to marital immunity), such as those that involve perpetrators 
who are members of the clergy or attending psychotherapists.  
Occasionally, a state explicitly criminalizes attempted sexual offenses; 
I have omitted those provisions.  I have also omitted indecent 
exposure statutes (which routinely provide for marital immunity).361 
 
(Michie 1948–2002) (marital immunity where the victim is incapable, through any 
unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 709.4(A)(2)(a) (West 2002) (marriage is defense to sexual abuse in third 
degree if victim is suffering from mental defect or incapacity which precludes giving 
consent; Class C felony); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.035 (West 2002) updated 2002 
Kentucky Laws Ch. 259 (S.B. 25) (marriage is a defense to sexual intercourse, deviate 
sexual intercourse, or sexual contact if the spouse is mentally retarded); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual 
conduct in first through fourth degrees based solely on his or her spouse being under age 
16, mentally incapable or mentally incapacitated); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 
2002) amended by 2002 MINN. SESS. LAW. SERV. CH. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (spouse does 
not commit criminal sexual conduct in third or fourth degree if actor knows or has reason 
to know that complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically 
helpless); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(h) (2002) (spouses are exempt from 
prosecution under aggravated felonious sexual assault if victim is “mentally defective and 
the actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defective”); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–2001) (spouses exempt from first degree sexual assault if 
victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically helpless); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-22-7.2 (Michie 1968–2002) (spouses exempt from sexual contact when person is 
incapable of consenting, Class 4 felony); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050(c) (West 
2002) (marital immunity for rape in the second degree “when the victim is 
developmentally disabled and the perpetrator is a person who is not married to the victim 
and who has supervisory authority over the victim”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-302(iv) 
(Michie 1977–2001) (marital immunity from sexual assault in the first degree when the 
actor “knows or reasonably should know that the victim through a mental illness, mental 
deficiency or developmental disability is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim’s 
conduct”). 
Surprisingly, the Rhode Island statute for first degree sexual assault provides a partial 
marital rape immunity if the victim is mentally incapable or physically helpless, and 
therefore unable to give consent, yet the statutes for second and third degree sexual 
assault provide no such immunity.  R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2, § 11-37-4, § 11-37-6 
(1953–2001). 
 361. Some states criminalize indecent exposure as a sexual offense.  I have excluded 
references to indecent exposure statutes in the appendix, however, because that issue is 
beyond the scope of this article.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-734 (2001) note in 2002 Haw. 
Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (“A person commits the offense of indecent 
exposure if, the person intentionally exposes the person’s genitals to a person to whom the 
person is not married under circumstances in which the actor’s conduct is likely to cause 
affront.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-504 (2001) (“A person commits the offense of 
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Appendix of State Sexual Offense  
Statutes with Marital Immunity 
Statute  Relevant Statutory Provisions Interpretation 
ALABAMA 
13A-6-60: 
Definitions 
Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as “any 
act of sexual gratification between persons 
not married to each other involving the sex 
organs of one person and the mouth or anus 
of another.”  Sexual contact is defined as “any 
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts 
of a person not married to the actor.” 
 
13A-6-63: 
Sodomy   
in 1st degree 
Engaging “in deviate sexual intercourse with 
another person by forcible 
compulsion; . . . [OR] . . . with a person who is 
incapable of consent by reason of being 
physically helpless or mentally incapacitated.”
13A-6-65: 
Sexual 
misconduct 
Being a male and engaging “in sexual 
intercourse with a female without her consent, 
under circumstances other than those covered 
[by 1st degree rape]; or with her consent 
where consent was obtained by the use of any 
fraud or artifice; or being a female [and 
engaging] in sexual intercourse with a male 
without his consent; [OR being male or 
female and] engag[ing] in deviate sexual 
intercourse with another person under 
circumstances other than [1st degree sodomy].
Marital immunity from 
sodomy in 1st degree and 
Sexual misconduct when 
engaging in deviate sexual 
intercourse because deviate 
sexual intercourse is defined 
as only between “persons not 
married to each other.”  See 
13A-6-60. 
13A-6-66: 
Sexual abuse 
in 1st degree 
Subjecting “another person to sexual contact 
by forcible compulsion; [OR] . . . who is 
incapable of consent by reason of being 
physically helpless or mentally incapacitated.”
13A-6-67: 
Sexual abuse 
in 2nd degree 
Subjecting “another person to sexual contact 
who is incapable of consent by reason of some 
factor other than being less than 16 years 
old.”  
 
Marital immunity from sexual 
abuse in 1st and 2nd degree 
because sexual contact can 
only occur by the touching of 
“intimate parts of a person not 
married to the actor.” 
 Rape in 1st degree is silent as to marital immunity. 
 
indecent exposure if the person knowingly or purposely exposes the person’s genitals 
under circumstances in which the person knows the conduct is likely to cause affront or 
alarm in order to (a) abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade another; or (b) arouse or gratify 
the person’s own sexual response or desire or the sexual response or desire of any 
person.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.100 (West 2002) (spouses exempt from 
indecent liberties, Class A or B felony). 
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ALASKA 
11.41.432(a): 
Defenses 
“It is a defense to [2nd degree sexual assault 
when the offender knows that the victim is 
incapacitated; or unaware that a sexual act is 
being committed and 3rd degree sexual 
assault] that the offender is . . . married to 
the person and neither party has filed with 
the court for a separation, divorce or 
dissolution of the marriage.  
Marital immunity from 3rd 
degree sexual assault (sexual 
contact) and 2nd degree 
sexual assault (sexual 
penetration) when the 
offender knows that the victim 
is “ . . . incapacitated; or 
unaware that a sexual act is 
being committed.” 
11.41.432(b): 
Defenses 
“Except as provided in (a) of this section, in 
a prosecution [of 1st or 2nd degree sexual 
assault], it is not a defense that the victim 
was, at the time of the alleged offense, the 
legal spouse of the defendant.” 
No marital immunity from 1st 
or 2nd degree sexual assault. 
ARIZONA 
13-1401: 
Definitions 
Spouse is defined as “a person who is legally 
married and cohabiting.” 
 
13-1404: 
Sexual abuse 
“Intentionally or knowingly engaging in 
sexual contact with any person fifteen or 
more years of age without consent of that 
person . . . .” 
Marital immunity because 
marital defense is allowed.  
See 13-407. 
13-1406: 
Sexual assault 
“Intentionally or knowingly engaging in 
sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact 
with any person without consent of such 
person.”  Punished as class 2 felony. 
13-1406.01: 
Sexual assault 
of a spouse 
“Intentionally or knowingly engaging in 
sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact 
with a spouse without consent of the spouse 
by the immediate or threatened use of force 
against the spouse or another.”  Punished as 
class 6 felony; judge has “discretion for 
conviction of a class 1 misdemeanor with 
mandatory counseling.” 
Spousal sexual assault is 
punished more lenient than 
sexual assault, shown by the 
lesser class felony and the 
judge’s ability to reduce the 
sentence even further at his or 
her discretion.  Sexual assault 
of a spouse also requires the 
use of force, while sexual 
assault does not. 
13-1407: 
Defenses 
It is a defense to a prosecution of sexual 
abuse “that the person was the spouse of the 
other person at the time of commission of 
the act.  It is not a defense to a prosecution 
[of sexual assault of a spouse] that the 
defendant was the spouse of the victim at the 
time of commission of the act.” 
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CALIFORNIA 
261.6: 
Consent 
A current or previous dating or marital 
relationship shall not be sufficient to 
constitute consent where it is at issue in 
prosecution of a rape, rape of a spouse, 
sodomy, lewd or lascivious acts, or forcible 
acts of sexual penetration 
 
262: 
Rape of a 
spouse 
“Rape of a person who is the spouse of the 
perpetrator is an act of sexual intercourse 
accomplished . . . [by] force, violence, . . . 
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury 
 . . .; where a person is prevented from 
resisting by any 
intoxicating . . . substance . . .; [OR] where a 
person is at the time unconscious of the 
nature of the act . . . .”  Violation must be 
reported within one year of the violation, 
unless the allegation can be corroborated by 
independent, admissible evidence.  Sexual 
battery, rape, sodomy, lewd or lascivious 
acts and forcible sexual penetration are 
silent as to marital immunity 
The reporting requirements 
required under the spousal 
rape charge do not exist for 
rape. 
CONNECTICUT 
53A-65: 
Definitions 
Definitions for sexual intercourse and sexual 
contact are limited to “persons not married 
to each other.” 
 
53a-67: 
Affirmative 
defenses 
In any prosecution for an offense, except an 
offense [of 1st degree sexual assault, 1st 
degree aggravated sexual assault, spousal 
sexual assault, 2nd or 3rd degree sexual 
assault or 3rd degree sexual assault with a 
firearm], it shall be an affirmative defense 
that the defendant and the alleged victim 
were, at the time of the alleged offense, 
living together by mutual consent in a 
relationship of cohabitation, regardless of 
the legal status of their relationship.” 
Not only is there a marital 
immunity for 4th degree 
sexual assault (see 53a-73a), 
but cohabitation is an 
affirmative defense for 4th 
degree sexual assault.  
53a-70: 
Sexual assault, 
1st degree 
Compelling “another person to engage in 
sexual intercourse by the use of force against 
such other person . . . or by the threat of use 
of force against such other person, . . . [OR] 
engages in sexual intercourse with another 
person and such other person is mentally 
incapacitated to the extent that such other 
person is unable to consent to such sexual 
intercourse.” 
Marital immunity from 1st 
degree sexual assault, because 
the meaning of sexual 
intercourse “is “limited to 
persons not married to each 
other.” 
53a-70a: 
Aggravated 
sexual assault, 
1st degree 
Committing sexual assault in 1st degree, 
“and in the commission of such offense such 
person uses or is armed with and threatens 
the use of . . . a deadly weapon, with intent 
to disfigure the victim seriously…under 
circumstances evincing an extreme 
indifference to human life . . . .” 
Marital immunity from 1st 
degree aggravated sexual 
assault, because a spouse 
cannot be convicted of 1st 
degree sexual assault. 
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CONNECTICUT (CONTINUED) 
53a-70b: 
Sexual assault 
in spousal or 
cohabitating 
relationship 
“No spouse or cohabitor shall compel the 
other spouse or cohabitor to engage in 
sexual intercourse by the use of force against 
such other spouse or cohabitor, or by the 
threat of the use of force against such other 
spouse or cohabitor which reasonably causes 
such other spouse or cohabitor to fear 
physical injury.”  Sexual intercourse is 
defined for purposes of this provision as 
including persons married to each other. 
Requires the use of or threat 
of the use of force.  No 
provision against engaging in 
sexual intercourse with a 
person who is mentally 
incapacitated, as in 1st degree 
Sexual Assault. 
53a-71: 
Sexual assault, 
2nd degree 
Engaging in sexual intercourse with another 
person and “ . . . such other person is 
physically helpless . . . .” 
53a-72a: 
Sexual assault, 
3rd degree 
Compelling “another person to submit to 
sexual contact by the use of force . . . or by 
the threat of use of force against such other 
person or against a third person . . . .” 
Marital immunity from 2nd, 
3rd degree sexual assault, 
because the meanings of 
sexual intercourse and sexual 
contact are limited to persons 
not married to the actor. 
53a-72b: 
Sexual assault, 
3rd degree 
with a firearm 
Committing sexual assault in 3rd degree, 
“and in the commission of such offense such 
person uses or is armed with and threatens 
the use of . . . a pistol, revolver, machine gun, 
rifle, shotgun or other firearm.” 
Marital immunity from 3rd 
degree sexual assault with a 
firearm because a spouse can 
not be convicted of 3rd degree 
sexual assault. 
53a-73a: 
Sexual assault, 
4th degree 
Intentionally subjecting “another person to 
sexual contact who is . . . mentally 
incapacitated to the extent that he is unable 
to consent to such sexual contact, or 
physically helpless . . . .” 
Marital immunity from 4th 
degree sexual assault because 
of definition of sexual contact. 
HAWAII 
707-700: 
Definitions 
“‘Married’ includes persons legally married, 
and a male and female living together as 
husband and wife regardless of their legal 
status, but does not include spouses living 
apart.”  ‘Sexual contact’ means any touching 
of the sexual or other intimate parts of a 
person not married to the actor.” 
 
707-732: 
Sexual assault, 
3rd degree 
“Recklessly subject[ing] another person to 
an act of sexual penetration by 
compulsion; . . . knowingly subject[ing] to 
sexual contact another person who 
is...mentally incapacitated, or physically 
helpless, or causes such a person to have 
sexual contact with the actor; [OR] 
knowingly, by strong compulsion, [having] 
sexual contact with another person or 
caus[ing] another person to have sexual 
contact with the actor.” 
Marital and cohabitant 
immunity from 3rd and 4th 
degree sexual assault 
whenever the crime involves 
sexual contact because sexual 
contact is defined as “touching 
of the sexual or other intimate 
parts of a person not married 
to the actor” and “married” 
includes any male and female 
living together as husband and 
wife. 
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HAWAII (CONTINUED) 
707-733: 
Sexual assault, 
4th degree 
Knowingly subjecting “another person to 
sexual contact by compulsion or caus[ing] 
another person to have sexual contact with 
the actor by compulsion; . . . knowingly 
expos[ing] the person’s genitals to another 
person under circumstances in which the 
actor’s conduct is likely to alarm the other 
person or put the other person in fear of 
bodily injury; [OR] . . . knowingly 
trespass[ing] on property for the purpose of 
subjecting another person to surreptitious 
surveillance for the sexual gratification of 
the actor.” 
 
 
 1st and 2nd degree sexual assault are silent as to marital immunity 
IDAHO 
18-6107: 
Rape of a 
spouse 
“No person shall be convicted of rape for any 
act or acts with that person’s spouse, except 
[where she is overcome by force, threatened 
with immediate and great bodily harm, or 
intoxicated against her will by the offender].”  
Forcible sexual penetration by use of foreign 
object is silent as to marital immunity 
Marital immunity from rape 
unless force or nonconsensual 
intoxication is used.  
ILLINOIS 
5/12-18: 
General 
provisions 
“Prosecution of a spouse of a victim . . . for 
any violation by the victim’s spouse of 
[criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal 
sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, or 
aggravated criminal sexual abuse] is barred 
unless the victim reported such offense to a 
law enforcement agency or the State’s 
Attorney’s office within 30 days after the 
offense was committed, except when the court 
finds good cause for the delay.” 
Marital immunity from all 
charges of sexual assault and 
sexual abuse made more than 
30 days after offense was 
committed, except where 
court finds good cause for 
delay. 
IOWA 
709.4: 
Sexual abuse, 
3rd degree 
Committing “sexual abuse in the third degree 
when the person performs a sex act . . . [and] 
the act is done by force or against the will of 
the other person, whether or not the other 
person is the person’s spouse or is 
cohabitating with the person; . . .  the act is 
performed while the other person is under the 
influence of a controlled substance, . . . and 
the controlled substance prevents the other 
person from consenting to the act and the 
person performing the act knows or should 
have known that the other person was under 
the influence of the controlled substance . . . ; 
[OR] the act is performed while the other 
person is mentally incapacitated, physically 
incapacitated, or physically helpless. 
No marital immunity when 
force is used against the will of 
the person.  Implicit marital 
immunity when the act is 
performed while the other 
person is under the influence 
of a controlled substance or 
when the act is performed 
while the other person is 
mentally or physically or 
physically helpless. 
 1st and 2nd degree sexual abuse are silent as to marital immunity. 
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KANSAS 
21-3501: 
Definitions 
Spouse is defined as “a lawful husband or 
wife, unless the couple is living apart in 
separate residences or either spouse has filed 
an action for annulment, separate 
maintenance or divorce or for relief under the 
protection from abuse act.” 
Must file some kind of legal 
separation action in order to 
be considered not married. 
21-3517: 
Sexual 
battery 
“The intentional touching of the person of 
another who is 16 or more years of age, who is 
not the spouse of the offender and who does 
not consent thereto, with the intent to arouse 
or satisfy the sexual desires of the offender or 
another.”  Rape, Aggravated criminal sodomy 
and Aggravated sexual battery are silent as to 
marital immunity. 
Marital immunity from sexual 
battery. 
LOUISIANA 
43: 
Simple rape 
Committing “anal, oral, or vaginal sexual 
intercourse . . . without the lawful consent of a 
victim who is not the spouse of the 
offender . . . when the victim is incapable of 
resisting or of understanding the nature of the 
act by reason of a stupor or abnormal 
condition of mind produced by an intoxicating 
agent or any cause, other than the 
administration by the offender of any narcotic 
or anesthetic agent or other controlled 
dangerous substance and the offender knew 
or should have known of the victim’s 
incapacity; [OR] when the victim is incapable, 
through unsoundness of mind, whether 
temporary or permanent, of understanding 
the nature of the act and the offender knew or 
should have known of the victim’s 
incapacity.”  “For purposes of this Section, a 
person shall not be considered to be a spouse 
if a judgment of separation from bed and 
board has been rendered, or if the person and 
the offender are not legally separated but are 
living separate and apart [AND] the offender 
knows that a temporary restraining order, 
preliminary or permanent injunction, or other 
order or decree has been issued . . . 
restraining the offender . . . .” 
Marital immunity from simple 
rape, defined as raping one’s 
spouse when she is incapable 
of resisting because of 
intoxication or because she is 
incapable of understanding 
the nature of the act, through 
unsoundness of mind.  In 
order to be considered not a 
spouse, one must have a 
judgment of separation or 
must be living separate and 
apart from her spouse and 
have a temporary restraining 
order issued. 
43.1: 
Sexual 
battery 
Intentionally “engaging in any of the 
following acts with another person, who is not 
the spouse of the offender, where the 
offender acts without consent of the 
victim . . .:  the touching of the anus or 
genitals of the victim by the offender using 
any instrumentality or any part of the body of 
the offender; [OR] the touching of the anus or 
genitals of the offender by the victim using 
any instrumentality or any part of the body of 
the victim.”  Rape, Aggravated rape, Forcible 
rape, and Aggravated sexual battery are silent 
as to marital immunity 
Marital immunity from sexual 
battery 
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MARYLAND 
3-304: 
Rape, 2nd 
degree 
Engaging “in vaginal intercourse with another 
by force, or the threat of force, without the 
consent of the other; [OR] if the victim is 
a . . . mentally incapacitated individual or a 
physically helpless individual, and the person 
performing the act knows or reasonably 
should know” this. 
Marital immunity from rape in 
2nd degree, defined as raping 
victim who is mentally 
incapacitated, but no 
immunity when force used 
3-307: 
Sexual 
offense, 3rd 
degree 
Engaging “in sexual contact with another 
person without the consent of the other;” and 
using any of the attendant circumstances 
listed under Rape in the 1st degree [OR] 
engaging “in sexual contact with another if 
the victim is a mentally . . . incapacitated 
individual or a physically helpless individual, 
and the person performing the act knows or 
should know” this. 
Marital immunity from 3rd 
degree rape when person is 
mentally incapacitated or 
physically helpless.  No 
immunity when force and non-
consent are used or when 
couple is under decree of 
limited divorce. 
3-318: 
Spousal 
defense 
“A person may not be prosecuted under [1st 
or 2nd degree rape, or 3rd degree sexual 
offense] for a crime against a victim who was 
the person’s legal spouse at the time of the 
alleged rape or sexual offense” except for the 
following:  “A person may be prosecuted 
under [1st degree rape], [2nd degree rape by 
force or threat of force without consent of the 
other], or [3rd degree sexual offense 
employing a dangerous weapon or seriously 
injuring the victim without consent of the 
victim] if at the time of the alleged crime the 
person and the person’s legal spouse have 
lived apart, without cohabitation and without 
interruption under a written separation 
agreement executed by the person and the 
spouse; or for at least 3 months immediately 
before the alleged rape or sexual offense; 
[OR] the person in committing the crime uses 
force and the act is without consent of the 
spouse.”  “A person may be prosecuted under 
[1st or 2nd degree rape], or [3rd degree sexual 
offense] for a crime against the person’s legal 
spouse if at the time of the alleged crime the 
person and the spouse live apart, without 
cohabitation and without interruption, under 
a decree of limited divorce.” 
Marital immunity from 
forcible crimes unless the 
parties have lived apart under 
a written separation 
agreement or have been living 
apart for at least 3 months 
following the crime OR unless 
force is used without consent.  
Marital immunity from all 
rape and 3rd degree sexual 
offense unless “at the time of 
the alleged crime the person 
and the spouse live apart, 
without cohabitation and 
without interruption, under a 
decree of limited divorce.”  
Marital immunity from 2nd 
degree rape or 3rd degree 
sexual offense involving a 
mentally incapacitated 
individual, unless the couple is 
under a decree of limited 
divorce. 
MICHIGAN 
750.5201: 
Married 
persons 
“A person may be charged and convicted [for 
first, second, third, or fourth degree criminal 
sexual conduct] even though the victim is his 
or her legal spouse.  However, a person may 
not be charged or convicted solely because his 
or her legal spouse is . . . mentally 
incapacitated.” 
Marital immunity only from 
all criminal sexual conduct 
charges when committed 
against a mentally 
incapacitated spouse. 
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MINNESOTA 
609.344: 
Criminal 
sexual 
conduct, 3rd 
degree 
Engaging “in sexual penetration with another 
person . . . if . . . the actor uses force or coercion 
to accomplish the penetration; [OR] the actor 
knows or has reason to know that the 
complainant is mentally . . . incapacitated or 
physically helpless . . . .” 
609.345: 
Criminal 
sexual 
conduct, 4th 
degree 
Engaging “in sexual contact with another 
person . . . if . . . the actor uses force or coercion 
to accomplish the sexual penetration . . .; [OR] 
the actor knows or has reason to know that the 
complainant is mentally . . . incapacitated or 
physically helpless . . . .” 
Marital and cohabitant 
immunity from sexual 
conduct in 3rd and 4th 
degree, which is sexual 
penetration or contact with 
someone who is 
incapacitated or physically 
helpless or unless the actor 
uses force or coercion to 
accomplish the act. 
609.349: 
Voluntary 
relationships 
“A person does not commit criminal sexual 
conduct [in the 3rd or 4th degree when the actor 
knows or has reason to know that the 
complainant is mentally incapacitated or 
physically helpless], if the actor and complainant 
were adults cohabiting in an ongoing voluntary 
sexual relationship at the time of the alleged 
offense, or if the complainant is the actor’s legal 
spouse, unless the couple is living apart and one 
of them has filed for legal separation or 
dissolution of the marriage.  Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to prohibit or restrain 
the prosecution for any other offense committed 
by one legal spouse against the other.” 
Marital and cohabitant 
immunity from sexually 
penetrating or contacting the 
complainant if she is 
mentally incapacitated or 
physically helpless at the 
time, unless the couple is 
living apart and one of them 
has filed for legal separation. 
 No immunity from 1st, 2nd, or 5th degree sexual conduct 
MISSISSIPPI 
97-3-99: 
Defense of 
marriage 
“A person is not guilty of [sexual battery] if the 
alleged victim is that person’s legal spouse and 
at the time of the alleged offense such person 
and the alleged victim are not separated and 
living apart; provided, however, that the legal 
spouse of the alleged victim may be found guilty 
of sexual battery if the legal spouse engaged in 
forcible sexual penetration without the consent 
of the alleged victim.” 
Marital immunity for sexual 
battery when victim is 
mentally incapacitated 
physically helpless or when 
she does not consent.  No 
immunity for forcible 
penetration or if couple is 
separated and living apart. 
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NEW YORK 
130.00:  
Definitions 
  
Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as “sexual 
conduct between persons not married to each 
other consisting of contact between the penis 
and the anus, the mouth and penis, or the mouth 
and the vulva.  Sexual contact is defined as “any 
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of 
a person not married to the actor . . . .”  Not 
married is defined as “the lack of an existing 
relationship of husband and wife between the 
female and the actor which is recognized by law, 
[OR] the existence of the relationship of 
husband and wife between the actor and which 
is recognized by law at the time the actor 
commits an offense . . . by means of forcible 
compulsion against the female [AND] the 
female and actor are living apart at such time 
pursuant to a valid and effective order issued by 
a court, decree or judgment of separation, or 
written agreement of separation subscribed by 
them.” 
 
130.20: 
Sexual 
misconduct  
Engaging “in sexual intercourse with another 
person without such person’s consent; [OR] 
engag[ing] in deviate sexual intercourse with 
another person without such person’s 
consent . . . .” 
Marital immunity from 
sexual misconduct involving 
deviate sexual intercourse 
because deviate sexual 
intercourse can only be 
between “persons not 
married.” 
130.40:  
Sodomy, 
3rd degree 
Engaging “in deviate sexual intercourse with a 
person who is incapable of consent by reason of 
some factor other than being less than 17 years 
old; [OR] engag[ing] in deviate sexual 
intercourse with another person without such 
person’s consent where such lack of consent is 
by reason of some factor other than incapacity 
to consent.” 
Marital immunity from all 
sodomy crimes because 
deviate sexual intercourse 
can only be between 
“persons not married.” 
130.45:  
Sodomy, 
2nd degree 
Engaging “in deviate sexual intercourse with 
another person who is incapable consent by 
reason of being mentally disabled or mentally 
incapacitated.” 
 
130.45: 
Sodomy, 1st 
degree 
Engaging “in deviate sexual intercourse with 
another person by forcible compulsion; [OR] 
who is incapable of consent by reason of being 
physically helpless . . . .” 
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NEW YORK (CONTINUED) 
130.55: 
Sexual 
abuse, 3rd 
degree 
Subjecting “another person to sexual contact 
without the latter’s consent.” 
Marital immunity from all 
sexual abuse crimes because 
sexual contact can only be 
the touching of “a person not 
married to the actor.” 
130.60: 
Sexual 
abuse, 2nd 
degree 
Subjecting “another person to sexual contact 
and when such other person is incapable of 
consent by reason of some factor other than 
being less than 17 years old.” 
 
130.65: 
Sexual 
abuse, 1st 
degree 
Subjecting “another person to sexual contact by 
forcible compulsion; [OR] when the other 
person is incapable of consent by reason of 
being physically helpless.”  1st, 2nd, 3rd degree 
rape, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th degree aggravated sexual 
abuse are silent as to marital immunity 
 
NEVADA 
200.373: 
Sexual 
assault of 
spouse by 
spouse 
“It is no defense to a charge of sexual assault 
that the perpetrator was, at the time of the 
assault, married to the victim, if the assault was 
committed by force or by the threat of force.” 
Marital immunity from 
sexual assault unless 
committed by force or threat 
of force. 
OHIO 
2907.01: 
Definitions 
Spouse is defined as “a person married to an 
offender at the time of an alleged offense, except 
that such person shall not be considered the 
spouse when . . . the parties have entered into a 
written separation agreement . . . ; during the 
pendency of an action between the parties for 
annulment, divorce, dissolution of marriage, or 
legal separation.” 
In order to not be considered 
a spouse of another, the 
parties must have entered 
into a written separation 
agreement. 
Engaging “in sexual conduct with another who is 
not the spouse of the offender or who is the 
spouse of the offender but is living separate and 
apart from the offender, when . . . for the 
purpose of preventing resistance, the offender 
substantially impairs the other person’s 
judgment or control by administering any drug, 
intoxicant, or controlled substance to the other 
person surreptitiously or by force, threat of 
force, or deception; [OR] . . . the other person’s 
ability to resist or consent is substantially 
impaired because of a mental or physical 
condition or because of advanced age, and the 
offender knows or has reasonable cause to 
believe” this. 
 
Marital immunity from rape 
when the offender 
administers an intoxicant 
against the will of the other 
or when the other person is 
impaired because of a mental 
or physical condition, unless 
the couple is living apart.  
2907.02: 
Rape 
  
“No person shall engage in sexual conduct with 
another when the offender purposely compels 
the other person to submit by force or threat of 
force.” 
“It is not a defense to a charge [of forced rape] 
that the offender and the victim were married or 
were cohabiting at the time of the commission of 
the offense.” 
Marital rape immunity unless  
force is used. 
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OHIO (CONTINUED) 
2907.03: 
Sexual 
battery 
“No person shall engage in sexual conduct with 
another, not the spouse of the offender, when 
the offender knowingly coerces the other person 
to submit by any means that would prevent 
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution; the 
offender knows that the other person’s ability to 
appraise the nature of or control the other 
person’s own conduct is substantially impaired; 
[OR] the offender knows that the other person 
submits because the other person is unaware 
that the act is being committed.” 
Marital immunity from 
sexual battery when the 
sexual conduct is coerced, 
the other person’s ability to 
understand what is going on 
is substantially impaired or 
the other person is unaware 
the act is being committed. 
2907.05: 
Gross 
sexual 
imposition 
“No person shall have sexual contact with 
another, not the spouse of the offender; or cause 
another, not the spouse of the offender, to have 
sexual contact with the offender . . . when . . . the 
offender purposely compels the other person, or 
one of the other persons, to submit by force or 
threat of force; for the purpose of preventing 
resistance, the offender substantially impairs the 
judgment or control of the other person or of 
one of the other persons by administering any 
drug, intoxicant, or controlled substance to the 
other person surreptitiously or by force, threat 
of force, or deception; [OR] the ability of the 
other person to resist or consent . . . is 
substantially impaired because of a mental or 
physical condition . . . .” 
Marital immunity from gross 
sexual imposition when the 
victim is compelled to submit 
by force, the offender 
administers an intoxicant 
against the will of the person 
to prevent resistance, or the 
victim is substantially 
impaired because of a mental 
or physical condition. 
2907.06: 
Sexual 
imposition 
“No person shall have sexual contact with 
another, not the spouse of the offender; or cause 
another, not the spouse of the offender, to have 
sexual contact with the offender . . . when . . . the 
offender knows that the sexual contact is 
offensive to the other person . . . or is reckless in 
that regard; the offender knows that the other 
person’s . . . ability to appraise the nature of or 
control the offender’s or touching person’s 
conduct is substantially impaired; [OR] the 
offender knows that the other person . . . 
submits because of being unaware of the sexual 
contact.” 
Marital immunity from 
sexual imposition when the 
offender knows that the 
contact is offensive, that the 
other person’s ability to 
understand the act is 
substantially impaired, or 
that the other person is 
unaware of the contact. 
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OKLAHOMA 
1111: 
Definition 
of rape 
“An act of sexual intercourse involving vaginal 
or anal penetration accomplished with a male or 
female who is not the spouse of the 
perpetrator . . . where the victim is incapable 
through mental illness or any other unsoundness 
of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of 
giving legal consent; where force or violence is 
used or threatened, accompanied by apparent 
power of execution to the victim or to another 
person; where the victim is intoxicated by a 
narcotic . . . administered by or with the privity 
of the accused as a means of forcing the victim 
to submit; [OR] where the victim is at the time 
unconscious of the nature of the act and this fact 
is known to the accused.” 
“Rape is an act of sexual intercourse 
accomplished with a male or female who is the 
spouse of the perpetrator if force or violence is 
used or threatened, accompanied by apparent 
power of execution to the victim or to another 
person.” 
Marital rape immunity where 
the victim is incapable of 
giving legal consent because 
of unsoundness of mind, the 
victim is administered an 
intoxicant against her will, or 
the victim is unconscious.  
Marital rape immunity unless  
force or the threat of force is 
used. 
1111.1:  
Rape by 
instrumenta
tion 
“An act within or without the bonds of 
matrimony in which any inanimate object or any 
part of the human body, not amounting to sexual 
intercourse is used in the carnal knowledge of 
another person without his or her consent and 
penetration of the anus or vagina occurs to that 
person.” 
No marital rape immunity 
from by instrumentation. 
1114:  
Rape, 1st & 
2nd degree 
“Rape in the first degree shall include:  rape 
committed upon a person incapable through 
mental illness or any unsoundness of mind of 
giving legal consent regardless of the age of the 
person committing the crime; or rape 
accomplished with any person by means of 
force, violence, or threats of force or violence 
accompanied by apparent power of execution 
regardless of the age of the person committing 
the crime; [OR] rape by instrumentation 
resulting in bodily harm . . . .” 
“In all other cases, rape or rape by 
instrumentation is rape in the second degree.” 
Marital rape immunity for 
1st & 2nd degree rape unless 
force or threat of force is 
used.   
See 1111. 
No marital rape immunity 
for rape by instrumentation. 
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RHODE ISLAND 
11-37-1: 
Definitions 
Spouse is defined as “a person married to the 
accused at the time of the alleged sexual assault, 
except that the person shall not be considered 
the spouse if the couple is living apart and a 
decision for divorce has been granted, whether 
or not a final decree has been entered.” 
In order to not be considered 
a spouse of another, the 
parties must be living apart 
and a decision for divorce 
must have been granted. 
11-37-2: 
Sexual 
assault, 1st 
degree 
Engaging “in sexual penetration with another 
person . . . if . . . the accused, not being the 
spouse, knows or has reason to know that the 
victim is mentally incapacitated . . . or physically 
helpless; the accused uses force or coercion; 
[OR] the accused, through concealment or by 
the element of surprise, is able to overcome the 
victim . . . .” 
 
Marital immunity from 
sexual assault if the accused 
knows that the victim is 
mentally incapacitated or 
physically helpless.   
 2nd degree sexual assault is silent as to marital immunity. 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
16-3-615: 
Spousal 
sexual 
battery 
“Sexual battery . . . when accomplished through 
use of aggravated force, defined as the use of or 
the threat of use of a weapon or the use or threat 
of use of physical force or physical violence of a 
high and aggravated nature, by one spouse 
against the other spouse if they are living 
together, constitutes a felony of spousal sexual 
battery and, upon conviction, a person must be 
imprisoned not more than ten years.” 
“The offending spouse’s conduct must be 
reported to appropriate law enforcement 
authorities within thirty days in order for that 
spouse to be prosecuted for this offense.” 
Conviction of spousal sexual 
battery results in a prison 
term of not more than ten 
years, less than given for 1st 
or 2nd degree criminal 
sexual conduct, and requires 
aggravated force. 
Must report spousal sexual 
battery within 30 days of the 
offense. 
16-3-652: 
Criminal 
sexual 
conduct, 1st 
degree 
Engaging “in sexual battery with the 
victim . . . if . . . the actor uses aggravated force 
to accomplish sexual battery; . . . [OR] the actor 
causes the victim, without the victim’s consent, 
to become mentally incapacitated or physically 
helpless by administering, distributing, 
dispensing, delivering  . . . a controlled 
substance . . . .” 
“Punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
thirty years . . . .” 
Marital immunity from 1st 
and 2nd degree sexual 
conduct unless spouses are 
living apart. 
Punished more harshly than  
spousal sexual battery 
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SOUTH CAROLINA (CONTINUED) 
16-3-653: 
Criminal 
sexual 
conduct, 
2nd degree 
Using “aggravated coercion to accomplish 
sexual battery . . . Punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than twenty years . . . .” 
 
16-3-654: 
Criminal 
sexual 
conduct, 3rd  
degree 
Engaging “in sexual battery with the victim . . . 
if . . . the actor uses force or coercion to 
accomplish the sexual battery in the absence of 
aggravating circumstances; the actor knows or 
has reason to know that the victim is . . . 
mentally incapacitated or physically helpless and 
aggravated force or aggravated coercion was not 
used to accomplish sexual battery . . . Punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than ten 
years . . . ” 
Marital immunity from 3rd 
degree criminal sexual 
conduct.  
Punishment is equal to 
spousal sexual battery. 
16-3-658: 
Criminal 
sexual 
conduct:  
where 
victim is 
spouse  
“A person cannot be guilty of criminal sexual 
conduct [in 1st, 2nd, or 3rd degree] if the victim 
is the legal spouse unless the couple is living 
apart and the offending spouse’s conduct 
constitutes criminal sexual conduct in the first 
degree or second degree . . . The offending 
spouse’s conduct must be reported to 
appropriate law enforcement authorities within 
thirty days in order for a person to be 
prosecuted for these offenses.” 
Victim and offender must be 
living apart, the offender’s 
conduct must be that of 1st 
or 2nd degree criminal 
sexual assault, and the 
conduct must be reported 
within 30 days in order to 
convict spouse for criminal 
sexual conduct.  
SOUTH DAKOTA 
22-22-7.2: 
Sexual 
contact with 
person 
incapable of 
consenting 
Knowingly engaging “in sexual contact with 
another person, other than his spouse . . . if the 
other person is incapable, because of physical or 
mental incapacity, of consenting to sexual 
contact.”   
 
Marital immunity from 
sexual contact with person 
incapable of consenting.   
22-22-7.4: 
Sexual 
contact 
without 
consent 
with person 
capable of 
consenting 
“No person . . . may knowingly engage in sexual 
contact with another person  
other than his spouse who, although capable of 
consenting, has not consented to such contact.”   
1st and 2nd degree rape are silent as to marital 
immunity. 
Marital immunity from 
sexual contact without 
consent with person capable 
of consenting. 
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TENNESSEE 
39-13-507: 
Spousal 
exclusion 
“A person does not commit an offense…if the 
victim is the legal spouse of the perpetrator 
except” for:  “‘Spousal rape’ means the unlawful 
sexual penetration of one spouse by the other 
where the defendant is armed with a weapon or 
any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead 
the victim reasonably to believe it to be a 
weapon, or the defendant causes bodily injury to 
the victim; [OR] the spouses are living apart and 
one of them has filed for separate maintenance 
or divorce.”  Spousal rape is class C felony.  
“‘Aggravated spousal rape’ is the unlawful 
sexual penetration of one spouse by the other 
where the defendant knowingly engaged in 
conduct that was especially cruel, vile and 
inhumane to the victim during commission of 
the offense; [AND] either causes serious bodily 
injury to the victim or is armed with a weapon or 
any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead 
the victim to reasonably believe it to be a 
weapon.”  Class B felony.  “‘Spousal sexual 
battery’ means the unlawful sexual contact by 
one spouse of another where the defendant is 
armed with a weapon or any article used or 
fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to 
reasonably believe it to be a weapon; the 
defendant causes serious bodily injury to the 
victim; [OR] the spouses are living apart and one 
of them has filed for separate maintenance or 
divorce.”  Class D felony. 
Spousal rape requires either 
a weapon, bodily injury or 
spouses living apart.  
Aggravated spousal rape 
requires especially cruel, vile 
and inhuman conduct against 
the spouse and either serious 
bodily injury or being armed 
with a weapon.  Spousal 
sexual battery requires either 
a weapon, bodily injury or 
spouses living apart.  A 
spouse can be convicted of 
spousal rape, aggravated 
spousal rape and spousal 
sexual battery but they are 
punished less severely and 
require more force than 
rape, aggravated rape and 
aggravated sexual battery. 
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VIRGINIA 
18.2-61: 
Rape 
Having “sexual intercourse with a complaining 
witness who is not his or her spouse . . . and such 
act is accomplished against the complaining 
witness’s will, by force, threat or intimidation of 
or against the complaining witness or another 
person; [OR] through the use of the complaining 
witness’s mental incapacity or physical 
helplessness . . . ”   
“If any person has sexual intercourse with his or 
her spouse and such act is accomplished against 
the spouse’s will by force, threat or intimidation 
of or against the spouse of another, he or she 
shall be guilty of rape.” 
“All or part of any sentence imposed for a 
violation of [spousal rape] may be suspended 
upon the defendant’s completion of counseling 
or therapy . . . if . . .  the court finds such action 
will promote maintenance of the family unit and 
will be in the best interest of the complaining 
witness.” 
“Upon a finding of guilt [of spousal rape] . . . the 
court, without entering a judgment of 
guilt . . . may defer proceedings and place the 
defendant on probation pending completion of 
counseling or therapy . . . . If such counseling is 
completed . . ., the court may discharge the 
defendant and dismiss the proceedings against 
him if . . . the court finds such action will 
promote maintenance of the family unit and be 
in the best interest of the complaining witness.” 
Marital rape immunity unless 
defendant uses force.  
Sentence may be suspended 
if the defendant completes 
counseling.  If tried without a 
jury, his conviction may even 
be deferred and ultimately 
dismissed if he completes 
counseling. 
18.2-67.1: 
Forcible 
sodomy 
Engaging in “cunnilingus, fellatio, anallingus, or 
anal intercourse with a complaining witness who 
is not his or her spouse, or caus[ing] a 
complaining witness whether or not his or her 
spouse, to engage in such acts with any other 
person, and . . . the act is accomplished against 
the will of the complaining witness, by force, 
threat or intimidation of or against the 
complaining witness or another person, or 
through the use of the complaining witness’s 
mental incapacity or physical helplessness.”   
“An accused shall be guilty of forcible sodomy if 
[he engages in forcible sodomy] and such act is 
accomplished against the will of the spouse, by 
force, threat or intimidation of or against the 
spouse or another person.” 
“However, no person shall be found 
guilty . . . unless, at the time of the alleged 
offense, the spouses were living apart, or the 
defendant caused bodily injury to the spouse by 
the use of force or violence.” 
The court may commute or defer sentences for 
spousal forcible sodomy in the same way as 
listed under Rape. 
Marital immunity unless the 
defendant uses force and 
causes bodily injury or unless 
living apart from his spouse.  
Sentence may be suspended 
if the defendant completes 
counseling.  If tried without a 
jury, his conviction may even 
be deferred and ultimately 
dismissed if he completes 
counseling. 
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VIRGINIA (CONTINUED) 
18.2-67.2: 
Object 
sexual 
penetration 
Penetrating “the labia majora or anus of a 
complaining witness who is not his or her spouse 
with any object, . . . or caus[ing] a complaining 
witness to so penetrate his or her own body with 
an object or caus[ing] a complaining witness, 
whether or not his or her spouse, to engage in 
such acts with any other person or to penetrate, 
or to be penetrated by, an animal, and . . . the act 
is accomplished against the will of the 
complaining witness, by force, threat or 
intimidation of or against the complaining 
witness or another person, or through the use of 
the complaining witness’s mental incapacity or 
physical helplessness.”  
“An accused shall be guilty of [spousal object 
sexual penetration] . . . if such act is 
accomplished against the spouse’s will by force, 
threat or intimidation of or against the spouse or 
another person.” 
“However, no person shall be found 
guilty . . . unless, at the time of the alleged 
offense, the spouses were living separate and 
apart or the defendant caused bodily injury to 
the spouse by the use of force or violence.” 
The court may commute or defer sentences for 
object sexual penetration in the same way as 
listed under Rape. 
Marital immunity unless the 
defendant uses force and 
causes bodily injury or unless 
living apart from his spouse.  
Sentence may be suspended 
if the defendant completes 
counseling.  If tried without a 
jury, his conviction may even 
be deferred and ultimately 
dismissed if he completes 
counseling.  
18.2-67.2:1: 
Marital 
sexual 
assault 
Engaging “in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, 
fellatio, anallingus or anal intercourse with his or 
her spouse, or penetrat[ing] the labia majora or 
anus of his or her spouse with any object . . . or 
caus[ing] such spouse to so penetrate his or her 
own body with an object, and such act is 
accomplished against the spouse’s will by force 
or a present threat of force or intimidation of or 
against the spouse . . . .”  The court may 
commute or defer sentences for marital sexual 
assault in the same way as listed under Rape. 
Punishable by confinement of not more than 
twenty years.  Sexual battery and aggravated 
sexual battery are silent as to marital immunity. 
Spouse must use force or a 
present threat of force.  
Sentence may be suspended 
if the defendant completes 
counseling.  If tried without a 
jury, his conviction may even 
be deferred and ultimately 
dismissed if he completes 
counseling. 
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WASHINGTON 
9a.44.010: 
Definitions 
Married is defined as “one who is legally 
married to another, but does not include a 
person who is living separate and apart from his 
or her spouse and who has filed in an 
appropriate court for legal separation or for 
dissolution of his or her marriage.” 
In order not to be considered 
married, one must be living 
separate and apart from her 
spouse and have filed for 
legal separation or divorce 
9A.44.060: 
Rape, 3rd 
degree 
Engaging “in sexual intercourse with another 
person [under circumstances not constituting 
rape in 1st or 2nd degrees], not married to the 
perpetrator where the victim did not 
consent . . . to sexual intercourse with the 
perpetrator and such lack of consent was clearly 
expressed by the victim’s words or conduct; 
[OR] where there is threat of substantially 
unlawful harm to property rights of the victim.” 
Marital rape immunity from 
3rd degree rape when the 
victim did not consent and 
such lack of consent was 
clearly expressed by the 
victim’s words or conduct. 
9A.44.100 
Indecent 
liberties 
“Knowingly caus[ing] another person who is not 
his or her spouse to have sexual contact with him 
or her or another by forcible compulsion; [OR] 
when the other person is incapable of consent by 
reason of being . . . mentally incapacitated or 
physically helpless.” 
 
Marital immunity from 
indecent liberties. 
 1st and 2nd degree rape are silent as to marital immunity. 
WYOMING 
6-2-304: 
Sexual 
assault, 3rd 
degree 
Subjecting “a victim to sexual contact under any 
of the circumstances of [1st or 2nd degree sexual 
assault] without inflicting sexual intrusion on the 
victim and without causing serious bodily injury 
to the victim.” 
Marital immunity when no 
serious bodily injury is 
inflicted on the victim and no 
sexual intrusion occurs. 
6-2-307: 
Evidence of 
marriage as 
defense 
“The fact that the actor and the victim are 
married to each other is not by itself a defense to 
a violation of [1st or 2nd degree sexual assault]. 
By inference, marriage is a 
defense for 3rd degree sexual 
assault and sexual battery. 
6-2-313: 
Sexual 
battery 
“Except under circumstances constituting a 
violation of [1st, 2nd or 3rd degree sexual 
assault], an actor who unlawfully subjects 
another person to any sexual contact is guilty of 
sexual battery.” 
Marital immunity. 
 
